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Abstract 
This thesis develops a discourse analytic approach to change processes in 
psychotherapy and addresses the question: 'how does change occur in psychodynamic- 
interpersonal psychotherapy? '. 
An extended rationale for utilising discourse analysis (Potter & Wetherell, 
1987) is provided by way of a detailed deconstruction of an alternative stage model 
approach as represented by the assimilation of problematic experiences scale (Stiles, 
Elliott, Llewelyn, Firth-Cozens, Margison, Shapiro, & Hardy, 1990). Discursive 
analysis is then applied to the study of three cases of psychodynamic-interpersonal 
psychotherapy selected from the Second Sheffield Psychotherapy Project (Shapiro, 
Barkham, Hardy, & Morrison, 1990). Cases were selected on the criterion of client 
Beck Depression Inventory scores; two successful cases and one unsuccessful case of 
therapy. Analysis focuses on a resolved client-specified problematic theme from each 
of the successful cases, and on an unresolved theme from the unsuccessful case. 
Findings suggest that the pattern of change promoted by psychodynamic- 
interpersonal psychotherapy is (1) the identification of a problem internal to the client, 
and (2) accomplishing an account of this problem implicating an external attribution of 
blame. Further research is required to assess the generalisability of this, pattern and 
whether clients co-operating with such accounts are more likely to be helped by this 
form of therapy than those who do not. Specific rhetorical strategies utilised in 
negotiating and legitimating such accounts are identified and linked to the protocol of 
psychodynamic-interpersonal psychotherapy and the three stages of problem 
(re)formulation established by Davis (1984,1986). 
Findings are discussed in relation the connection between therapy processes 
and the moral sphere, particularly in relation to the negotiation of rights and 
obligations, responsibility and blame. Moreover, discursive psychology is offered as a 
means of facilitating the development of research on depression and attribution. 
Conceptualising accounts as occasioned versions of the world, rather than as verifiable 
descriptions of states of affair, speculation is made regarding the therapeutic utility of 
matching clients' preferred problem accounts with the preferred accounts implicit in 
therapeutic rationales. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
It is enough to drive one to despair that in practical psychology there are 
no universally valid recipes and rules. There are only individual cases 
with the most heterogeneous needs and demands - so heterogeneous that 
we can virtually never know in advance what course a given case will 
take, for which reason it is better for the doctor to abandon all 
preconceived opinions. This does not mean that he should throw them 
overboard, but that in any given case he should use them merely as 
hypotheses for a possible explanation. 
C. G. Jung (1929/1966, p. 163) 
Evidence suggests that psychotherapy is, in general, effective (e. g., Lambert & 
Bergin, 1994; Smith, Glass, & Miller, 1980; Stiles, Shapiro & Elliott, 1986). We now 
need to know how it works. Accordingly, the present thesis utilises a discourse 
analytic approach to address the question 'how does change occur in psychodynamic- 
interpersonal psychotherapy? '. 
Can a useful research programme on the processes of psychotherapy be 
conducted, though, if we take seriously Jung's (1929/1966) proposition that there are 
no universally valid recipes and rules in practical psychology? This thesis offers such 
a programme. In using discourse analysis to investigate therapy processes the 
researcher explicates the specific contours of sequences as they unfold during the 
therapy conversation. Each unfolding sequence is viewed both as a unique interaction 
and as a communication embedded in the wider socio-cultural context. In conducting 
such research, then, the aim is not to produce rules of universal validity. The aim 
rather is to produce local, revisable but meaningful understandings; useful 
'hypotheses for a possible explanation'. 
This chapter first presents the context of psychotherapy research, offering an 
introduction to the different phases in the history of the field up to the present time. 
There is then an introduction to discourse analysis both in terms of its intellectual 
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heritage and as a research approach, and a link forged with the contemporary phase of 
psychotherapy research. Next is a review of interpretative, language- and 
communication-oriented approaches to psychotherapy research in order to 
contextualise the discourse analytic research on psychotherapy which is beginning to 
appear. This introductory chapter then concludes with a brief overview of the thesis. 
The context of psychotherapy change process research 
A number of phases in the history of psychotherapy research can be identified. As the 
identification of phases or generations of psychotherapy research depends on the 
particular features of methodology or theory focused on, reviewers have offered 
slightly differing historical maps of the field (e. g., Barkham, in press; Elliott & 
Anderson, 1994; Orlinsky & Russell, 1994; Shapiro, Harper, Startup, Reynolds, Bird, 
Suokas, 1994). Differences therefore are not in main due to dispute over the history 
of psychotherapy research. Moreover, the representations offered are acknowledged 
merely to be simplified but contextualising overviews of this rapidly developing 
discipline. 
Table 1.1: Overview maps of the changing phases of psychotherapy research 
Orlinsky & Russell Barkham Elliott & Anderson 
(1994) (in press) (1994); Shapiro et 
ill. ( 1'x'11) 
Phase I (Gei l"Illml 
(1943-1954) Gene rato 
Phase II I (hmct tt iýn 11) 
(1955-1969) (1950s- Generation 
(1970s) 11 1w I'll MI 1 111) 
Phase III Generation (1960s- 
1970-1983) III 1980s) Generation IV 
Phase IV (1970s- (1980s-present) 
(1984 resent) present) 
2 
Chapter 1 
(i) Early psychotherapy research 
Orlinsky and Russell (1994) identify four phases of psychotherapy research consisting 
of a 'pioneering period' followed by three further phases in the development of 
psychotherapy research as a scientific field. They suggest the main concern of 
researchers in Phase I (1943-1954) was "to demonstrate the feasibility and necessity 
of applying scientific methods to the study of psychotherapy" (1994, p. 191). Bergin 
(1971) is cited as tracing the earliest statistical studies of therapeutic outcome to the 
late 1920s (e. g., Huddleson, 1927; Matz, 1929). However, the roots of process 
(generally what happens in psychotherapy sessions) as opposed to outcome (changes 
that happen as a result of the processes of therapy) research are traced to the early 
1940s with the advent of phonographic recording technology (e. g., Bernard, 1943; 
Porter, 1943; Snyder, 1945). Many reviews (Gill, Newman, & Redlich, 1954; 
Gottman & Markman, 1978; Kiesler, 1973; Mahrer, 1985; Russell, 1987; Small & 
Manthei, 1986) see the beginning of process research in Carl Rogers' (e. g., 1942) 
investigation into "moments-of-movement" (Mahrer, 1985, p. 92; for review see 
Seeman & Raskin, 1953). However, Hill and Corbett (1993) award Frank Robinson 
(e. g., 1950) with the initiation of process research through providing counsellors with 
recordings of their own work. This procedure was designed to offer counsellors a way 
of supervising themselves when other supervision resources were limited. However, it 
had the added benefit of providing an archive of recorded sessions enabling a 
programme of research. 
Orlinsky and Russell (1994) see the end of the first phase of psychotherapy 
research signalled by Eysenck's (1952) critical review of the field; a review which is 
reported to have "created quite a stir among clinician psychologists" (Garfield, 1992, 
p. 125). Eysenck's criticism focused on outcome research, questioning the 
effectiveness of psychotherapy through pointing to the high rate of spontaneous 
remissions in control groups of clinical populations receiving no psychotherapeutic 
intervention. Orlinsky and Russell, however, suggest that Phase I research did 
produce some significant achievements. These included the demonstration that the 
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complex phenomena of psychotherapy could be subjected to scientific scrutiny 
without compromising the data or client confidentiality and that sound recording and 
forms of statistical analysis were ways of achieving this. 
An alternative map of the field offered by Barkham (in press), which focuses 
specifically on quantitative research, identifies three generations of psychotherapy 
research each guided by dominant research questions. Barkham suggests that the first 
generation of psychotherapy research was initiated by Eysenck's (1952) critique of the 
effectiveness of psychotherapy. In response to this critical review, the question 'is 
psychotherapy effective? ' is reported to have guided a generation of outcome research. 
Methodological issues related to the use of control groups, statistical concepts, and 
the development of meta-analytic techniques. Process research addressed the question 
'are there objective methods for evaluating process? '. Corresponding methodological 
issues were the development of observationally-based and self-report measures, and 
the use of random time samples of therapy interaction. 
Barkham (in press) reports the achievements of this period to include the 
research critiquing the findings on which Eysenck had based his review (e. g., Bergin 
& Lambert, 1978). He reports that such research "clearly established the effectiveness 
of psychotherapy and also provided the basis for investigating components of what 
might make therapy effective" (Barkham, in press). In relation to process research 
achievements included findings on therapeutically facilitative conditions postulated in 
Rogerian therapy (empathy, warmth, and genuineness) (e. g., Carkhuff & Berenson, 
1967). However, criticism of random time sampling of therapy interaction and lack of 
replication of specific findings are suggested to undermine the validity of much of 
this type of research. 
In the formulation offered by Orlinsky and Russell (1994), the corresponding 
period of psychotherapy research is termed Phase II (1955-1969) and described as'the 
search for scientific rigour'. These reviewers suggest that this project was carried out 
in line with the prevailing, logical positivist view of science in American psychology 
"interpreted by psychologists to mean that in order to be objective, their research had 
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to focus on the overt behaviours of individuals" (Orlinsky & Russell, 1994, p. 193). 
This lead to a focus on quantifiable client and therapist behaviours using 
nonparticipant observational measures. Orlinsky and Russell, however, criticise the 
Phase II researchers' search for a single experiment to demonstrate the effectiveness 
of psychotherapy. They also question whether "the ideals of objectivity and 
experimental control that guided the quest for rigor were not wrongly conceived by 
the second generation" (1994, p. 195). 
(ii) The middle period of psychotherapy research 
Barkham (in press) identifies a second generation of psychotherapy research spanning 
the 1960s-1980s initiated "in large part as a search for greater specificity in response 
to what became known as the 'uniformity myth"' (in press). Accordingly, this period 
of research is characterised as addressing the outcome question 'which therapy is more 
effective? ' and the process question 'what components are related to outcome? '. 
Earlier studies had glossed differences across clients, across therapists and therapies, 
and across the course of therapy. And greater specificity was being demanded; "what 
treatment, by whom, is most effective for this individual with that specific problem, 
and under which set of circumstances? " (Paul, 1967, p. 111). In relation to outcome, 
methodological issues were related to experimental design, particularly comparative 
outcome trials, and the measures utilised in such studies. Methodological issues in 
process research concerned the use of session as opposed to random time sampling 
techniques, based on an acknowledgement of intra-therapist variability (e. g., Gurman, 
1973). 
Barkham is tentative in drawing conclusions about the second generation of 
research. Although it failed in the goal of identifying specific differential effects of 
divergent therapy types, this itself has lead to the identification of the 'equivalence 
paradox'; the important finding that technically different therapies lead to broadly 
similar outcomes (Stiles et al., 1986). However, in relation to process, the research of 
this period is reviewed as generally failing to demonstrate a direct relationship 
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between facilitative conditions (i. e., empathy, warmth and genuineness) and outcome 
(Mitchell, Bozarth, & Krauft, 1977). 
Roughly corresponding to Barkham's (in press) second generation research 
(1960s-1980s) is Orlinsky and Russell's (1994) Phase III psychotherapy research 
(1970-1983). This period is characterised by Orlinksy and Russell in terms of 
increased methodological rigour; "the coalescence of a research mainstream 
committed to a program of objective, quantitative - and, where possible, experimental 
- studies" (1994, p. 196). In concurrence with Barkham, it is suggested that attention 
was focused on "the evaluation of components of specific treatments and the 
comparison of alternative treatments for specific disorders" (Orlinsky & Russell, 
1994, p. 196). Comparative outcome studies (see Sloane, Staples, Cristol, Yorkston, & 
Whipple, 1975), controlled clinical trials (e. g., Elkin, Parloff, Hadley, & Autry, 1985) 
and meta-analytic techniques (e. g., Shapiro & Shapiro, 1982) dominated research 
strategy. 
Also in concurrence with Barkham (in press), Orlinsky and Russell identify a 
disappointment with the process research on facilitative conditions and report a 
reconceptualisation of the relationship between client and therapist as a 'working 
alliance' (Bordin, 1979). This provided the impetus for the development of new 
measurement instruments to assess the therapeutic relationship (see Hovarth & 
Greenberg, 1994). 
(iii) Contemporary psychotherapy research 
Barkham (in press) characterises this contemporary period, third generation research 
(1970s-present), as addressing the outcome question 'how can we make treatments 
more cost effective? ' and the process question 'how does change occur? '. These 
questions are viewed as a natural development of previous generations of research. 
For example, cost-effectiveness can be regarded an extension of Generation I 
outcome research ('is psychotherapy effective? '). Moreover, the focus on change 
mechanisms may be seen as following naturally from Generation II process research 
on specificity ('what components are related to outcome? '). Barkham acknowledges, 
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though, that Generation III may equally well be considered a reaction to the earlier 
research; "(i)t is an extension in terms of it retaining specificity as a hallmark but a 
reaction in terms of refocusing research onto the process of change" (Barkham, in 
press). 
Methodological issues in relation to outcome research include the idea of 'dose 
effect' (that before an intervention is considered ineffective it must be established that 
this is not because too little of the intervention was given) and issues surrounding 
clinical or psychological, as opposed to statistical, significance. In relation to process 
research methodological issues relate to sampling strategy and how to 'tap' the 
working alliance. 
Barkham identifies three shifts in third generation process research; 
development of the idea of the working alliance (Bordin, 1979), the publication of a 
single case study in the Journal of Counseling Psychology (Hill, Carter, & O'Farrell, 
1983), and the use of new 'intensive' methodologies (e. g., task analysis, Rice & 
Greenberg, 1984). Other reviewers (e. g., Elliott & Anderson, 1994; Shapiro et al., 
1994), though, identify the early/mid-1980s as issuing a fourth generation of 
psychotherapy research associated with a growing advocacy of alternative, mainly 
qualitative methodologies. The significance of this point may be de-emphasised in 
Barkham's formulation as it is a review of quantitative research in the field. However, 
Barkham (1995, personal communication) suggests that evaluation of whether or not 
contemporary research constitutes a new paradigm is likely to become clear only in 
the perspective of time. 
Orlinsky and Russell describe Phase IV (1984-present) research as a period of 
"consolidation, dissatisfaction, and reformulation" (1994, p. 197). With regard to 
reformulation, they suggested that the contemporary period is premised on a 'context 
of discovery' as opposed to a 'context of verification' as previous phases of research. 
In the verification context it was considered that "those category systems participating 
in more interesting empirical relations would survive, and knowledge would be built 
up through induction and a bottom-up process of generalisation" (Orlinsky & Russell, 
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1994, p. 201). Orlinsky and Russell, however, consider such a methodology to have 
resulted in an accumulation of facts of little clinical or theoretical relevance. In 
contrast they suggest that Phase IV research is characterised by a willingness to view 
phenomena from a number of different perspectives and the development and 
utilisation of intensive, qualitative methodologies. 
It is argued here that transition into Phase IV (1984-present) (Orlinsky & 
Russell, 1994)/Generation IV (1980s-present) (Elliott & Anderson, 1994; Shapiro et 
al., 1994) is the most significant transformation in psychotherapy research in relation 
to the present thesis. The reconceptualisation of the field represented by this shift, as 
discussed below, sets the context for the introduction of discourse analysis to 
psychotherapy research within the remit of the developing aims of psychotherapy 
research itself. 
The current period of transition in psychotherapy research reflects a more 
general questioning of methodology and practice in other areas of psychology (e. g., 
Parker, 1989b). The change was heralded by a growing dissatisfaction with 
methodology (e. g., classification schemes and frequency ratings, Greenberg & Pinsof, 
1986) and statistical analysis (c. f., Firth-Cozens & Brewin, 1988; Marziali, 1984; 
Silberschatz, Fretter, & Curtis, 1986). For example, Elliott (1989) suggests that 
quantification necessitates the over-simplification of the natural complexity of 
therapy and points to the failure, often, of such methods to produce clinically 
meaningful results. Moreover, Rennie (1995) expresses disillusionment with the 
tendency of such procedures to privilege the therapist's, or clinical, framework of 
understanding at the expense of the client's. This is so, perhaps, as coding systems are 
developed by clinical researchers and implemented by clinicians or those they have 
trained. 
Earliest reconceptualisations of psychotherapy research in the contemporary 
period were published during the early- and mid-1980s (Elliott, 1983; Horowitz, 
1982; Rice & Greenberg, 1984) and articulated a reaction against the research that 
had been conducted during the period of about 1970-1983 (Phase III). This former 
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period of psychotherapy research has been characterised as dominated by the 'group 
contrast' and the 'relational' paradigms (Horowitz, 1982). The primary criticisms of 
these paradigms stem from their subscription to what is known as drug metaphor 
assumptions (Stiles, 1988; Stiles & Shapiro, 1989,1994; Strupp, 1986). Stiles and 
Shapiro (1989) consider the drug metaphor to have six assumptions: 
(1) "that process and outcome are readily distinguishable from, and bear a simple 
cause-effect relationship to one another; 
(2) that component names refer to ingredients of consistent content and scope; 
(3) that the potentially active ingredients are known and measured or manipulated; 
(4) that the active ingredients are contained in the therapist's behaviour, with the 
patient in a correspondingly passive role; 
(5) that the does effect curve is ascending and linear in the range being examined; 
(6) that the best way to demonstrate a psychotherapeutic procedure's efficacy is by 
controlled clinical trial.. . and that a process component's efficacy is shown by its 
correlation with outcome" (p. 525). 
Harper (1995) articulates the major criticisms of these drug metaphor 
assumptions which have influenced the development of a new paradigm of 
psychotherapy research. She divides the psychotherapeutic phenomena not captured 
by the traditional paradigms into four categories. 
First is the synergistic relationship between process and outcome and between 
client and therapist. Traditional paradigms have viewed process-outcome as a linear, 
unidirectional and causal relationship. Similarly, the effective ingredients of therapy 
have been conceptualised in terms of the therapist's action on a passive client. These 
assumptions are considered inadequate. A new paradigm is challenged to manage the 
way in which "process affects outcome and outcome affects process [... ] (and the) 
reflexive and transactive influences of client and therapist" (Harper, 1995, p. 58). 
Outcome is therefore conceived of as a fluid and continuous process (e. g., Safran, 
Greenberg, & Rice, 1988). 
9 
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Second, is the complexity of in-session process. The traditional paradigms 
conceptualise psychotherapy processes in terms of discrete ingredients which are 
either present or absent. A new paradigm is required to reconceptualise processes as 
functionally interdependent, responsively variant, context-dependent in meaning and 
therapeutic action, and having no predetermined effect. 
The third category of psychotherapeutic phenomenon Harper (1995) identifies 
as missing from traditional paradigms is an adequate conceptualisation of the time 
course and location of change. This is compounded by or perhaps an influencing 
factor in the paucity of studies relating psychotherapy process and outcome (Parloff, 
Waskow, & Wolfe, 1978). However, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of 
intervention research must be carried out in the context of measures of outcome, 
particularly micro ('little 'o'), session or domain outcomes known as impacts. New 
paradigm approaches are therefore challenged to explore change in relation to (i) in- 
session, micro-level outcomes, (ii) inter-session outcomes, and (iii) the continuation 
of processes between sessions. 
Finally, traditional paradigms are criticised for glossing 'between' and 'within' 
individual differences. In contrast, a new paradigm must seriously consider the 
proposition that "groups of clients are not homogeneous (and) individual client's are 
not average" (Harper, 1995, p. 59). Thus, as suggested above, Generation IV research 
retains the Generation II emphasis on specificity but refocuses research onto 
processes of change (Barkham, in press). 
There have been many calls over the years for research to be more directly 
informative to practitioners (e. g., Barlow, 1981; Bergin & Strupp, 1972; Elliott, 
1983; Luborsky, 1972; Orlinsky & Howard, 1978). This too has had an influence on 
the development of a new paradigm for psychotherapy research. Harper argues that 
traditional paradigms have been inadequate for addressing questions at the micro- 
level of clinical practice (Bergin & Garfield, 1994). And, it is the micro-level 
questions - the 'when-then' questions - that are characterised as the ""process 
diagnoses" that clinicians make continuously in sessions to inform their choice of 
10 
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strategy or intervention" (Harper, 1995, p. 60). By implication then, it is argued to be 
the micro-, moment-to-moment processes that must be examined if psychotherapy 
research is to be informative to practitioners. 
This new paradigm in psychotherapy research is designed to afford the 
development and testing of clinical theories of change and has been called the 'change 
process paradigm'. 
The change process paradigm has been put into research practice through the 
development of qualitative, discovery-oriented methods of intensive process analysis; 
a shift in research away from prediction and towards explanation (Greenberg, 1986). 
The best developed of these approaches are task analysis (Greenberg, 1984a; 1984b) 
and comprehensive process analysis (Elliott, 1984). Intensive process analyses 
examine small episodes of therapy defined as "meaningful units of therapeutic 
interaction which according to the therapeutic approach being used, are designed to 
achieve an intermediate goal" (Greenberg, 1986, p. 5). These small episodes are 
therefore clinically meaningful and contextualised units, and are considered potential 
significant change events. Such episodes are selected on the basis of explicit and 
implicit theory and are studied as sequences and patterns occurring over time. A 
discovery approach with the intensive analysis of these episodes is therefore 
advocated as a means of generating clinically meaningful hypotheses regarding 
processes of change from individual cases of therapy. This constitutes the 'change 
events research strategy' (Rice & Greenberg, 1984). 
With the influence of new paradigm thinking there has also been a growing 
advocacy and practice of methodological pluralism within the field (e. g., Hine, 
Werman, & Simpson, 1982; Rice, 1992; Shapiro et al., 1994) and of qualitative, 
language-oriented approaches in particular. Such approaches include, for example, 
conversation analysis (Gale, 1991), grounded theory (Rennie, Phillips, & Quartaro, 
1988), and narrative approaches (White & Epston, 1990). This thesis contributes to 
the growing interest in qualitative, language-oriented psychotherapy research through 
utilising a discourse analytic approach which, it will be argued, is particularly 
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compatible with the new paradigm as it is being developed within psychotherapy 
change process research. 
A discourse analytic approach'-' 
Discourse analysis is an umbrella term encompassing a number of different strands of 
work which may be divided into four different types (Potter & Wetherell, 1994). First 
there is that concerned with the organisation of conversational exchange which has 
been influenced particularly by Austin's (1962) speech act theory (e. g., Coulthard & 
Montgomery, 1981). Second is that focusing on recall and understanding in the 
context of discourse structure (e. g., van Dijk & Kintch, 1983). The third is an 
approach developed within the sociology of scientific knowledge to explore scientists' 
own discourse (e. g., Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984). And fourth is that based in semiology 
and post-structuralism (e. g., Hollway, 1989; Parker, 1992). However, a principle 
which all discourse analytic approaches have in common is that texts, and particularly 
linguistic texts, are regarded the primary resource for research. In this context the 
word 'text' refers to any tissue of meaning on which one can place an interpretative 
gloss, e. g., words, actions, symbols, pictures (Parker, 1992). 
The form of discourse analysis drawn upon in this thesis is that developed by 
Potter and Wetherell (1987; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, Edwards, & Wetherell, 
1993) which is closest to that developed in the sociology of scientific knowledge and 
in post-structuralism (Potter & Wetherell, 1994). For convenience then, the terms 
'discourse analysis' (the approach to research) and 'discursive psychology' (as the 
paradigm is becoming known) in this thesis are to be understood as referring to this 
particular approach. This is not to forget that other discourse analytic approaches 
exist. 
1.1 A version of this section was presented at the international meeting of the Society for 
Psychotherapy Research, Vancouver, Canada: Madill, A. (1995, June). Discourse analysis: 
Understanding psychotherapy as text and social practice. In A. Bachelor (Moderator), C. Hill 
(Discussant), Qualitative methodoloev in Qsychotherapy research: Basic features of four approaches. 
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(i) The roots of discourse analysis 
The historical roots and general principles of Edwards, Potter and Wetherell's 
discourse analysis are discussed below. This then provides the context for the 
rationale of selecting this particular approach for the study of change processes in 
psychotherapy. 
Although a relatively new approach in social psychology, discourse analysis 
or discursive psychology has roots in a variety of theoretical perspectives and sub- 
disciplines with longer and more established histories. These are listed specifying a 
primary feature of the approach which has contributed to the development of 
discourse analysis. Each is then discussed more fully below. 
(1) Wittgenstein's later philosophy of language (e. g., 1953): that the meaning of a 
word is related to its context of use. 
(2) Austin's speech act theory (e. g., 1962): that language is used to do things, i. e., is 
functional, rather than merely representative of states of affair. 
(3) Post-structuralism (e. g., Foucault, 1971): forms of knowledge understood to be 
constituted in and through discursive formulations. 
(4) Ethogenics (e. g., Harre, 1979): identification of the rules and conventions people 
use to generate their behaviour. 
(5) Rhetoric (e. g., Billig, 1987): orientation to the way in which accounts are 
implicitly organised to be persuasive and to undermine alternatives. 
(6) Ethnomethodology (e. g., Garfinkle, 1967): concern with the ordinary, everyday 
procedures people use to make sense of their social world. 
(7) Conversation analysis (e. g., Sacks, 1972): explication of the methods and 
strategies by which conversations are managed and function as an integral part of 
social life. 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy of language and Austin's speech act theory 
represent the philosophical background of discourse analysis. These philosophers 
offer functional approaches to the philosophy of language. This contrasts the 
approach formerly established in logical positivism in which language is regarded as 
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either emotive or as supplying empirically verifiable statements. Wittgenstein's 
controversial principle is that "the meaning of a word is revealed in its use" (Lyons, 
1977, p. 27). Thus he argues that there are no prescriptive rules governing language 
use at all times, only a variety of different 'language games'. Language games are 
understood to be determined by social convention and to be utilised to accomplish 
certain actions. For example, from this perspective, the language of the self or of 
'inner' experience is understood to utilise particular conventions of language which 
publicly demonstrate for effect rather than represent a private, inner state (Harre, 
1989). 
Similarly, Austin demonstrated the inherently social nature of language 
through identifying how language is used to do things. He argued that in asserting 
truth, stating facts or describing events we are not merely representing the world but 
accomplishing social actions (Lyons, 1977). Instead of statements being true, false or 
meaningless, as asserted in logical positivism, the very fact of speaking is argued to 
have social consequence; "a functioning element in social process itself' (Gergen, 
1989, p. 71). For example, the act of promising can be seen to have meaning and 
consequence and to accomplish a social function without having to refer to anything 
outside of itself. 
These philosophical perspectives highlighting the social and functional use of 
language preface more contemporary writings on language, discourse and text known 
as post-structuralism. Post-structuralism is particularly difficult to define, but is 
associated with a body of work produced by a number of French cultural analysts, 
historians and philosophers (e. g., Barthes, 1973; Derrida, 1976; Foucault, 1971; 
Lyotard, 1984). Post-structuralism, as the name indicates, was developed from a 
critique of structuralist approaches to language, perhaps most typified by the work of 
Chomsky but also present, to some extent, in the work of Saussure. 
Chomsky's (e. g., 1966) psycholinguistic approach views language as "a formal 
system principally concerned with describing or representing the world" (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987, p. 28). From this perspective it is considered that language is best 
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examined for its structural properties isolated from its context of use. Saussure (e. g., 
1974) also laid stress on language as a system with an underlying structure, however, 
undermined the idea that this system could be understood as representational. In fact, 
the central feature of semiology (the science of signs) developed by Saussure 
concerns the 'arbitrariness of the sign'. First, the association between the signifier and 
the signified was pointed out to be demonstrably arbitrary as different languages use 
different terms to denote the same object. However, second, and more 
controversially, semiology claims that the objects thus identified are themselves 
arbitrary. That is, different languages can be seen to divide up the world in differing 
ways. For example, the Japanese term 'amae' signifies a type of emotion which may 
be defined as an agreeable kind of 'sweet dependence'. However, this has no direct 
English translation or, in contrast to the Japanese, particular cultural significance 
(McDoe in Harre, 1986). From the stand-point of semiology, language is understood 
to acquire its meaning not through directly representing or naming features of reality 
but through being an abstract system of relationships and differences. 
Post-structuralism can be understood as a development of semiology which 
stresses the constitutive role of language in defining reality, linking this to socio- 
historical processes of change, and which often address issues of ideology, 
knowledge, and power. In particular, Foucault's approach and writings on what he 
termed the 'archaeology' and later 'genealogy' of knowledge is of relevance to the 
development of discourse analysis. From a Foucauldian perspective all forms of 
knowledge are considered constituted in and through discursive formations. Interest is 
therefore turned to studying the development of the constitution of certain 
formulations as knowledges as, for example, in the humans sciences (Foucault, 1970). 
Foucault was also interested in studying forms of power and patterns of domination. 
However, rather than see power in terms of its possession by certain individuals or 
groups, Foucault regarded power in terms of impersonal rituals which have the effect 
of constituting categories of person and of subjectivity itself (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 
1982). For example, psychiatry, medicine and the social sciences are identified as 
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modern regimes of power/knowledge, legitimating forms of regulation and control 
through the construction of standards of normalcy (e. g., Foucault, 1971). 
Post-structuralism, particularly its emphasis on the way in which language 
functions to sustain and legitimate forms of truth, has had an influence on the 
development of discourse analysis (e. g., Parker, 1992; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). 
However, Edwards and Potter's more recent developments in discursive psychology 
(e. g., Edwards & Potter, 1992) is more directly related to the social psychological and 
micro-sociological perspectives of ethogenics, rhetoric, ethnomethodology, and 
conversation analysis. 
Ethogenics (e. g., Harre, 1979) was developed in response to a dissatisfaction 
with traditional experimental methods in social psychology. Rather than attempt to 
control variables, the ethogenic approach was developed with a view to retaining the 
complexity of natural social interaction through analysing people's accounts. The 
central hypothesis of this approach is that "people possess a store of social knowledge 
which enables them to both act and to give accounts such as explanations or 
justifications of their action" (italics in original, Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 57). The 
aim of analysis then is to identify the rules and conventions people use on a day to 
day basis to generate their behaviour. 
Potter and Wetherell identify areas of concord with the ethogenic approach. 
First, is the stress on the range of purposes to which language is put. Second, is an 
agreement that the function of particular accounts is not always self-evident. 
However, rather than identifying the rules governing social competence, discourse 
analysis is more concerned with how participants' rule accounts are constructed and 
organised and the explication of what is achieved by particular accounts in specific 
circumstances. 
Incorporating ideas developed in the rhetorical approach to social psychology 
(e. g., Billig, 1987), discourse analysis conceives of language in terms of the 
'argumentative nature of talk and texts'. Rhetorical social psychology draws on the 
antiquarian art to inform a modern approach to the discipline. Principally, Billig 
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suggests a model of the subject as argumentative debater skilled in the 'witcraft' of 
persuasion and debate. Moreover, Billig stress the importance of argumentation in 
human thought drawing on Protagoras's maxim that there are two sides to every 
question so that "each form of thought can be contrasted by opposing form of 
thought" (Billig, 1987, p. 6). Such an emphasis is offered as a counter-point to 
psychology's tendency to venerate logical and consistent thinking conceived of as the 
private property of the individual. As Billig states; "(i)f deliberation is a form of 
argument, then our thought processes, far from being inherently mysterious events, 
are modelled upon public debate" (Billig, 1987, p. 5). Discourse analysis is concerned 
with explicating the strategies of witcraft as it occurs within everyday interaction as 
we discuss and formulate the nature and meaning of events, circumstances and 
relationships. 
Discourse analysis also has roots in the orientation and approach to research of 
ethnomethodology (e. g., Garfinkle, 1967). Ethnomethodology is a discipline in 
micro-sociology concerned with the procedures people use to make sense of their 
social world (for example as in a half-way-house; Wieder, 1974). In this approach the 
researcher is encouraged to utilise her/his own cultural understanding, or knowledge 
as a member, to identify, interpret and question the processes and assumption of lay 
sense-making. However, for this reason, ethnomethodology has been criticised for 
being too subjective. Subsequently, ethnomethodology has developed the sub-disciple 
of conversation analysis which is utilised to study the process of sense-making as it is 
in on-going negotiation in talk which can be transcribed and presented as data. 
The focus of conversation analytic research (e. g., Sacks, 1972) is the 
explication of the methods and strategies by which conversations are managed and 
function as an integral part of social life. Conversation analysis has three 
methodological principles. First, conversation is regarded as socially organised, rule- 
governed and functional. Second, conversations are regarded as embedded in, and 
thus inseparable from, the wider social context. This makes it vitally important to use 
naturally occurring data (absence of experimental manipulation or artificial 
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restrictions) and to analyse it with this context in mind. The third principle is that 
research is data- rather than hypothesis-driven. Analysis is conceived of as grounded 
in the data and constrained as little as possible by the researcher's assumptions as to 
what might be found. 
The principles developed for conversation analysis are generally accepted in 
discourse analysis. However, although many of the analytic concerns in these related 
disciplines are naturally similar, discourse analysis may be considered both wider in 
its theoretical base and differing in its investigative emphasis. That is, discourse 
analysis tends to focus on a particular topic, on variation in accounting practices and 
to encompass written or spoken language rather than concentrate on explicating 
conversational procedures. Thus, in its interest in all forms of text, discourse analysis 
has been utilised with regard to a variety of different resources, e. g., literature 
(Madill, 1990; Potter, Stringer & Wetherell, 1984), newspaper reports (Potter & 
Reicher, 1987), interviews, (Wetherell & Potter, 1992), and television documentary 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1994). 
In general then, understanding language as constructive (rather than 
representational) places discourse analysis within the social constructionist 
perspective in psychology and is therefore relativist in its epistemological stance (see 
Edwards, Ashmore, & Potter, 1995). Social constructionism regards human 
understanding as an artifact of socio-cultural discourses rather than a product of direct 
experience of ourselves and the world (Gergen, 1985a). This is a relativist 
epistemology in that there is considered to be no objective truth one can attempt to 
reflect, only plausible and useful accounts that may be offered. 
(ii) Discourse analysis as a research practice 
There are three major components to discourse analysis as a research practice. 
(1) Text as social practice. 
Approaching language as a social practice, a discourse analysis explicates the actions 
performed within the sequences studied (e. g., disconfirmation, agreement, blaming). 
As social actions may not always be made explicit, analysis explicates the action 
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orientation of talk through articulating the implications made available by particular 
accounts. 
(2) Threefold concern with construction, variability and function. 
Discourse analysis focuses on the way in which language is used to construct versions 
of reality. Potter and Wetherell argue that "(o)nce discourse is conceptualised in this 
way it becomes clear that there will be significant variation in, for example, 
descriptions of a phenomena, as participants perform different kinds of actions" 
(1994, p. 48). In detailed analysis of text, then, descriptions of events, persons and 
circumstances are demonstrated to be variable and often inconsistent (e. g., in racist 
talk, Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Thus, one aim of discourse analytic research is to 
demonstrate the process of construction through revealing the variable ways in which 
people account for or describe themselves and the world. 
Such variation in accounting practices is understood as orienting to the 
functionality of language. That is, accounts, or versions of the world, are understood 
to be implicitly organised to accomplish social actions, for example the allocation or 
mitigation of responsibility and blame (e. g., Buttny, 1985). Thus, orienting to 
variation in accounting practices allows the researcher to speculate on the social 
actions an account may be accomplishing within the context in which it was offered. 
(3) Rhetorical or argumentative organisation of text. 
Orientation to the constructed nature of accounts raises an issue regarding how the 
authority of particular versions is achieved or, for that matter, challenged. For 
example, the authority of an account may be achieved through presenting it as merely 
factual or may negotiated through more interactional debate and argument. Thus, a 
discursive analysis seeks to explicate the rhetorical strategies by which accounts are 
made persuasive, challenged and negotiated. 
In general, discourse analysis requires one stop reading a text for the 
information it contains and begin to analysis how that information was presented. 
This entails looking for inconsistencies in description, the assumptions underlying an 
accounts rationale and articulating the implications a particular account makes 
19 
Chapter 1 
available. As Parker (1992) suggests in relation to a variant approach, discourse 
analysis "should be a process of exploring the connotations, allusions and 
implications which the texts evoke" (p. 7). In this way the version, or versions, of 
reality a text offers is opened up to critical inspection. 
Potter (1988) describes discourse analysis as "fundamentally an interpretative 
exercise which offers up readings of texts for scrutiny" (p. 51). Thus, the goal of 
analysis is to reach an understanding of the text and to present it in such a way that 
the audience can assess this interpretation. To this end analytic claims are linked to 
specific extracts along with a detailed analysis as to why such claims are being made. 
The audience is therefore not asked to take the analyst's conclusions on trust (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987). 
The form of discourse analysis development by Potter and Wetherell was 
selected as the guiding research approach in this thesis on psychotherapy change 
process for a number of reasons. 
First, discourse analysis is emerging as an important new qualitative approach 
in social psychology, Harre and Gillett (1994) suggesting that "(t)he rapid rise of 
'discursive psychology' in the last five years indicates the appearance of a genuinely 
'new psychology' compared with what has gone before" (p. vii). The approach is 
undergoing continual sophistication (e. g., the formulation of the discursive action 
model, Edwards & Potter, 1993) and has offered a new perspective on a variety of 
concerns relevant to traditional psychological research, e. g., attribution theory (Potter 
& Edwards, 1990), prejudice (Wetherell & Potter, 1992), memory (Edwards, Potter 
& Middleton, 1992), and diagnosis of mental illness (Harper, 1994). This indicates 
both that discursive psychology has a developing theoretical base and demonstrates 
that it has huge potential for the exploration of diverse and important psychological 
questions. 
Second, conceptualising psychotherapy, the 'talking cure', primarily as a 
dialectical exchange between client and therapist, it is argued that the fundamental 
place of action and process in discourse analysis make it an ideal tool for researching 
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therapeutic conversation. That is, its micro-analytic focus allows a detailed 
examination of the processes inherent in these encounters and their effects. 
Third, discursive psychology has been offered as an alternative the dominant 
cognitive paradigm in contemporary social psychology. So discourse, comprising 
social text in the widest meaning of the term, is approached in its own right rather 
than as a "secondary route to things 'beyond' the text" (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, 
p. 160). This perspective immediately suggests a useful counter-point to and critique 
of the emphasis on intra-psychic process in psychology as a whole but also in 
approaches to psychotherapy research itself (e. g., the assimilation model, see Chapter 
2). 
Thus, it is argued that discourse analysis provides a means of addressing the 
reservations documented above levied at the dominant coding and quantification 
approaches in psychotherapy research (i. e., Elliott, 1989; Rennie, 1995) (see page 8). 
That is, first, in examining the on-going negotiation of meaning in sequences of 
naturally occurring therapy talk the researcher is obliged to deal squarely with the 
complexities of the phenomenon. And, second, as both client and therapist are 
regarded as negotiating discursive positions, analysis proceeds without assuming the 
priority of either participant's contribution. The focus, rather, is on examining how 
the legitimacy of alternative versions are managed and to give an account of their 
possible function within the therapeutic context. 
A discourse analytic approach therefore contributes to research perspectives 
calling for an understanding of psychotherapy process in terms of the joint and local 
production and negotiation of meaning between client and therapist on a moment-to- 
moment basis (Friedlander & Phillips, 1984; Hill, 1982; Lichtenberg & Barke, 1981; 
Martin, 1984; Strong & Claiborn, 1982). Thus, as a research approach, discourse 
analysis is particularly compatible with the new paradigm as it is being developed in 
psychotherapy change process research (see pages 8-12). 
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Review of interpretative. language- and communication-oriented approaches to 
psychotherapy research 
Discourse analysis is an interpretative language- and communication-oriented 
approach. However, although discourse analysis itself is only recently being utilised 
in the field, other similar approaches have been drawn upon throughout the history of 
psychotherapy research. Discourse analytic research therefore, in a broad sense, 
follows a certain tradition already established in the field. The following review of 
these interpretative, language- and communication-oriented approaches is offered as 
an orientation to the main strands of research in the area. This then contextualises the 
discourse analytic research on psychotherapy process which is beginning to appear 
and which is the focus of the present thesis. 
Language- and communication-oriented research approaches the therapeutic 
dialogue as a communication event and focuses on the development of meaning as it 
occurs between client and therapist (Chenail & Morris, 1995). What distinguishes the 
interpretative approach is "its insistence that the "facts" of social life have situation- 
specific interactional histories ... stress(ing) the essential ambiguity of language and the 
essential interdependence of context and meaning" (Pea & Russell, 1987, pp. 312- 
313). This contrasts approaches which conceptualise linguistic meaning as referential 
and autonomous of context. 
An appropriate starting point for the exploration of interpretative, language- 
and communication-oriented approaches to psychotherapy research is Freud's 1937 
paper Constructions in analysis. In this article Freud addressed the criticism levied at 
psychoanalysis in relation to assessment of the veracity of analytic interpretation. 
Freud paraphrases his critics; "if the patient agrees with us, then the interpretation is 
right; but if he contradicts us, that is only a sign of his resistance, which again shows 
that we are right" (Freud, 1937/1958, p. 257). 
Bouchard and Guerette (1991) suggest that Freud alternately supports an 
empiricist then a hermeneutic-constructivist (interpretative) viewpoint in his reply to 
this 'heads I win, tails you lose' objection to analytic strategy. Freud is identified as 
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supporting an empiricist position in suggesting that analytic goal is the rediscovery of 
the truth about the patient's 'forgotten years'. However, the therapist's task is 
formulated in hermeneutic terms, i. e., to construct what has been forgotten from the 
traces left behind. Addressing the issue of inaccurate constructions Freud appeals to 
the context of the continuing analysis. The therapist's construction is suggested to be 
open to verification through the nature of the patient's reaction to it; "(i)f the 
construction is wrong, there is no change in the patient; but if it is right or gives an 
approximation to the truth, he reacts to it with an unmistakable aggravation of his 
symptoms and of his general condition" (p. 256). In Freud's view, the ideal outcome of 
this process is that the analyst's construction leads to the patient's recollection 
(empiricist thesis). However, if the patient does not recollect that which has been 
repressed "if the analysis is carried out correctly, we produce in an assured conviction 
of the truth of the construction which achieves the same result as a recaptured 
memory" (Freud, 1937/1958, pp. 265-266) (hermeneutic thesis). 
As Bouchard and Guerette (1991) point out, the debate regarding the 
epistemological status of psychoanalysis as an empirical science or hermeneutic 
discipline continues today (e. g., Ederson, 1984; Grunbaum, 1984; Steel, 1979). The 
importance of this debate for contemporary psychotherapy process research is that it 
sets the context for the interpretative, language- and communication-oriented 
approaches which study interaction in terms of the joint production of meaning 
between client and therapist and as such draw on a hermeneutic understanding of the 
process of therapy. 
Frank and Frank's 1961 text Persuasion and healing: A comparative study of 
psychotherapy, represents an early but important work advocating a hermeneutical 
approach to psychotherapy research. These authors suggest that "(i)nsofar as the 
psychotherapist seeks to understand and interpret the meaning of the patient's 
communications, psychotherapy bears interesting resemblances to hermeneutics" 
(1961/1991, p. 70). It is further suggested that as multiple interpretations are always 
possible, therapeutic understanding does not necessitate the recovery of true meaning 
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but the discovery of shared meaning between client and therapist. In this work a 
parallel is also drawn between the art of the psychotherapist and of the rhetortition. In 
particular, a commonality is identified in that both are characterised as operating 
within the realm of subjective experience and work with a notion of probable rather 
than certain truths. A similarity in technique (persuasion, argument and 
responsiveness), target (the discontented) and goal (influence) are also suggested. 
Advocacy of a rhetorical approach to psychotherapy was echoed some years 
later by Szasz; "seeing therapy as a conversation rather than a cure thus requires that 
we not only consider the error of classifying it as a medical intervention, but we must 
look anew at the subject of rhetoric and assess its relevance to mental healing" (1978, 
p. 11). Billig's development of a rhetorical social psychology (see pages 16-17) during 
the 1980s, which has influenced discourse analysis, can therefore be seen as part of a 
general, contemporary movement in psychology toward investigating hermeneutical 
understandings of meaning. This has remained a continuing interest in psychotherapy 
research (e. g., Bouchard & Guerette, 1991; Chessick, 1990; Frank, 1987) 
In relation to empirical studies, the first interdisciplinary (psychiatry, 
linguistics, anthropology and kinesics), communication-oriented research on 
psychotherapy was brought together in 1956 in the Natural History of the Interview 
project (NHI). This study was designed to produce "a fine-grained analysis, 
transcription and interpretation of the speech and body motion of participants in a 
sound-filmed (and tape-recorded) family interview" (McQuown, 1971, p. 1). A major 
goal of the project was the development of theoretical frames to interpret the rich 
interactional material provided by linguistic, paralinguistic and body-motion data. 
This project is reported (Leeds-Hurwitz, 1987) to have influenced the development of 
many other seminal studies of interaction in psychotherapy, e. g., The first five minutes 
(Pittenger, Hockett, & Danehy, 1960), Communication structure: Analysis of 
psychotherapy transaction (Scheflen, 1973), and Therapeutic discourse: 
Psychotherapy as conversation (Labov & Fanshel, 1977). 
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Labov and Fanshel's (1977) 'Therapeutic discourse' project is of particular 
relevance to the present thesis. Characterised as "arguably the last of the NHI-style 
opuses" (Chenail & Morris, 1995, p. 6), the approach adopted in this former study is 
similar in some ways to discourse analysis as developed by Potter and Wetherell 
(1987). Labov and Fanshel's study is therefore worth examining here in some detail. 
Labov and Fanshel's aim was to explore "the goals and techniques of therapy 
through a close examination of the linguistic forms used by a patient and a therapist 
in 15 minutes of one session" (1977, p. ix). This study worked within the 
revolutionary framework of Pittenger, Hockett, and Danehey's earlier study (The first 
five minutes, 1960) providing a fine-grained analysis awarding attention "to the 
context-determined meaningfulness of prosodic cues, voice quality and well-specified 
body motions" (Pea & Russell, 1987, p. 316). Labov and Fanshel also integrated 
features from psychiatry, cognitive and social psychology, philosophy of language, 
linguistic and sociology to produce the approach known as comprehensive discourse 
analysis (CDA). 
CDA draws on principles developed in conversation analysis during the 1960s 
and 70s (e. g., Sacks, 1964-72) (see page 17). Conversation analysis offered a new 
methodology for research on linguistic interaction which by the early 1970s was 
being utilised in relation to psychotherapy conversation (e. g., Turner, 1972). 
Accordingly, Labov and Fanshel developed an approach which viewed psychotherapy 
as a form of conversational interaction; an approach which remains popular today 
(e. g., Gale, 1991; Morris & Chenail, 1995). 
A central focus of the analysis offered by Labov and Fanshel was 
"demonstrating the hierarchical nature of speech act sequencing in client-therapist 
speech" (Pea & Russell, 1987, p. 318). In doing so the researchers first identified 
'fields of discourse' (e. g., everyday, narrative, interview, family) distinguished by 
stylistic features such as the use of common description, vocabulary, and 
paralinguistic cues. The second structural unit identified was the 'episode', commonly 
separated from each other by changes in conversational topic. The next step in CDA 
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is termed 'expansion'. This process articulates 'propositions' alluded to but not 
specified in what has actually been said, incorporates information from the larger 
context of the previous conversation, and an interpretation of the meaning of 
paralinguistic cues. 
In their analysis, Labov and Fanshel distinguished two planes of 
conversational behaviour; 'what is said' (the expanded text) and 'what is done' ("a 
hierarchy of speech acts that comprise their interactional analysis" (Pea & Russell, 
1987, p. 327)). Four hierarchical levels of speech acts (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969b, 
1976) on which a single utterance may function simultaneously were identified in the 
examined text; (1) 'meta-actions' (related to the regulation of speech such as turn- 
taking), (2) 'representations' (indexing information), (3) 'requests' and, (4) 
'challenges'/'supports'. Other possible speech acts, e. g., flattery, promises, boasts, 
were acknowledged but were not found it the sequences they studied. Rules relating 
to the production and interpretation of requestive, challenging, and narrative 
conversational structures were also identified which "enable a speaker to create, and a 
listener to understand, the actions which the surface linguistic forms convey" (Pea & 
Russell, 1987, p. 332). The final stage of analysis was the production of an 
interactional statement specifying the set of actions accomplished in a single 
utterance. 
Analysis in CDA is therefore represented by text plus cues, an expansion of 
the text, and an interactional statement conveying the actions performed. Analysis of 
a series of utterances, perhaps constituting an episode, is then assembled allowing an 
examination of how speech acts are linked to one another in sequences during the 
therapy interaction. 
In orienting to function and social action, comprehensive discourse analysis is 
similar to discourse analysis as developed by Edwards, Potter and Wetherell. 
However, the approaches differ in that CDA offers a much more structured approach 
and is more prescriptive in the features of interaction deemed of interest. Moreover, 
the expansion of the text and statement of actions performed is presented as a given 
26 
Chapter 1 
interpretation. Discourse analysis offers a more analytic and argued account which 
makes a case the particular interpretation suggested. However, CDA does include 
information such as body movements which may be pertinent to linguistic meaning 
but, so far, not incorporated into the discourse analytic approach. 
The Labov and Fanshel study was conducted on individual psychotherapy. 
Interpretative, language- and communication-oriented approaches to psychotherapy 
have, however, also been utilised in the area of family therapy with early studies 
conducted in this field (e. g., the NHI). The development of a systemic approach to 
family therapy (e. g., Weakland, 1960) lead to a conceptualisation of psychological 
symptoms "in terms of what people were doing in the context of ongoing human 
relationships" (Goolishian & Anderson, 1987, p. 529). However, there are two strands 
of systemic approach. Maintaining the assumptions of the tradition social science 
paradigm, one strand views family systems in terms of social systems deriving their 
meaning from observed patterns of social organisation. The other strand in the family 
therapy field is "based on the proposition that systems can be described as existing 
only in language and communication action" (Anderson & Goolishian, 1988, p. 375). 
This approach is informed by hermeneutics, semantics and narrative, viewing reality 
as socially constructed (see also Hoffman, 1990). 
From this latter perspective psychotherapeutic change is conceptualised as the 
co-evolution of new meaning within language; problem dissipation rather than 
problem solving or resolution. The goal of psychotherapy process research would 
therefore be viewed as identification of the ways in which therapists can interact with 
clients so as to 'create a space for change' through "maintenance of the conversation 
until the problem disappears" (Goolishian & Anderson, 1987, p. 535). Therapy 
becomes 'talking with' from a 'not knowing' position rather than 'doing to' from a 
position of expertise. 
The social constructionist perspective in psychotherapy research has been 
promoted in Therapy as social construction edited by McNamee and Gergen (1992) 
and dedicated to the memory of Harold Goolishian. This collection contains chapters 
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from the perspective of individual therapy (e. g., O'Hanlon, 1992) but primarily draws 
on work conducted on family therapy (e. g., Anderson, 1992; Hoffman, 1992; Karl, 
Cynthia, Andrew, & Vanessa, 1992). A particularly interesting feature of this edited 
work, however, is its orientation to narrative approaches in psychotherapy research 
(e. g., the chapters by Epston, White, & Murray, 1992; Gergen & Kaye, 1992; 
O'Hanlon, 1992). 
Narrative approaches are premised on the "idea that people make sense of and 
communicate their experience through stories, that we live in a 'storied world"' 
(McLeod & Balamoutsou, 1995, p. 3). The narrative 'way of knowing' has been 
contrasted to theoretical, propositional or 'paradigmatic' knowledge which 
characterises the traditional approach to science (e. g., Bruner, 1986; Toukmanian & 
Rennie, 1992). White and Epston (1990) identify five dimensions on which the 
narrative and logico-scientific modes of thought differ: 
(1) experience (lived, personal experience -v- classes of event) 
(2) time (unfolding sequences -v- timeless laws) 
(3) language (range of possible meanings -v- univocal word use) 
(4) personal agency (active participant -v- passive object) 
(5) position of the observer (involved protagonist -v- objective observer) 
Narrative approaches suggest that experience is shaped by the stories people 
use to give meaning to their lives. 'Problem stories' are ones which award negative 
meaning to oneself and/or one's situation. Thus, an important concept in the narrative 
approach to psychotherapy process research is the idea of therapy as "providing 
opportunities for clients to 're-author' their lives" (McLeod & Balamoutsou, 1995, 
p. 3). This may involve the development alternative accounts of oneself and one's life 
through awarding significant meaning to experiences overlooked or ignored in the 
problem story (White & Epston, 1990). 
This 'narrative turn' has impacted the field of psychotherapy research (e. g., 
Edelson, 1993; Omer, 1993a, 1993b; Russell, 1991; Russell & Van den Broek, 1992; 
Schafer, 1980,1992; Spence, 1982; White & Epston, 1990). For example, McLeod 
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and Balamoutsou (1995) present a study identifying the narrative processes occurring 
in a single session of therapy; embeddedness, co-construction, narrative tensions, 
point-of-view, markers, structural elements, and use of metaphor. The authors 
conclude that "merely asking the question 'what stories are being told here? ' and 'how 
are these stories being constructed? ' (Riessman, 1993) opened up the text to a deeper 
level of appreciation and understanding" (McLeod & Balamoutsou, 1995, p. 15). 
Specifically, they point to the finding that therapeutic narratives are contextualised 
and co-constructed. 
Rennie (1994e) has also drawn on the notion of storytelling in psychotherapy 
but within the context of advocating grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) as a 
fruitful approach to psychotherapy process research (Rennie et al., 1988). Grounded 
theory is an approach to the analysis of text which is discovery-oriented and 
emphasises the generation of theories based, or 'grounded', in a close examination of 
the data. Rennie, Phillips, and Quartaro (1988) offer a precis of the method 
suggesting the following overlapping and cyclical stages; (1) division of material into 
meaningful units, (2) generation of categories describing the data, (3) identification of 
a set of categories effectively describing all the data, (4) memoing of theme or 
patterns found in the data, (5) development of theory regarding the nature of the 
relationship between the categories. 
Grounded theory is identified as a useful approach in relation to 
psychotherapy research as it offers a way of investigating complex phenomena which 
are "difficult, if not impossible, to address with traditional approaches to 
psychological research yet are inherent in the subject matter of psychology" (Rennie 
et al., 1988, p. 147). Rennie's empirical studies utilising grounded theory have 
included research on Clients' accounts of resistance in counselling,. 2(1994a) and 
Clients' deference in psychotherapy (1994b). 
1.2 In this thesis the term counselling will be understood as interchangeable with that of 
psychotherapy (see Hill & Corbett, 1993). 
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Research taking a critical stance (e. g., drawing on critical theory, taking a 
critical realist position, a feminist perspective, etc. ) toward medical interaction in 
general has also begun to appear (e. g., Fischer & Todd, 1983; West, 1984). Such 
research highlights issues of ideology and power and often utilise a form of discourse 
analysis. Critical research has also been conducted specifically on psychotherapy 
interaction itself (e. g., Burman, 1992, Identification and power in feminist therapy). 
However, of particular relevance to the present thesis is the discursive research on 
counselling interaction conducted by Derek Edwards; one of the main contributors to 
the development of the strand of discourse analysis utilised. Edwards is currently 
developing this research and has produced an initial study utilising extracts from 
relationship counselling (1995, Two to tango: Script formulations, dispositions, and 
rhetorical symmetry in relationship troubles talk). This study explores the way in 
which participants use descriptions to suggests that certain behaviours or actions are 
recurring and predictable. A similar process was identified in the current thesis as a 
contributing means by which a therapist's interventions had the effect of transforming 
a client's account of externally located problems to problems considered internal to 
her (see Chapters 5& 6). As Edwards points out, such formulations have implications 
for the moral accountability of the individual thus characterised. 
To conclude, although interpretative language- and communication-oriented 
approaches have been utilised in relation to psychotherapy research from at least 1956 
(NHI), many appear particularly compatible with the conceptual framework of the 
new paradigm as it is being developed within psychotherapy change process research 
today. To recap, change process research challenges the researcher to work with: 
(1) a conceptualisation of outcome as a fluid and continuous process between client 
and therapist; 
(2) a conceptualisation of processes as functionally interdependent, responsively 
variant, context-dependent in meaning and therapeutic action, and having no pre- 
determined effect; 
(3) an explication of process within the context of evaluation of outcome; 
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(4) an appreciation of individual differences in clients (and therapists); and, 
(5) a requirement for research to be informative to practice. 
In general, many interpretative language- and communication-oriented approaches 
naturally concur with this framework in examining the co-construction of meaning as 
it occurs between client and therapist, orienting to meaning and process as context- 
dependent, and manage the complex variety in the phenomenon studied. 
Such research, as reviewed above, has tended to utilised methodologies 
developed in other areas of psychology (e. g., discourse analysis from social 
psychology) and from outside the discipline (e. g., conversation analysis from micro- 
sociology). However, importation of methodologies to the field has often be carried 
out without specific orientation to the contemporary agenda of psychotherapy change 
process research itself. As Edwards states in relation to his (1995) paper; "it does not 
focus very centrally on how 'counselling' specifically is done" (1995, personal 
communication). In contrast, an aim of the present thesis is to introduce discourse 
analysis to psychotherapy research within the remit of the change process paradigm. 
That is, to do psychotherapy research with an appreciation of the historical 
development and transforming aims of the field. Thus the focus of this thesis subtly 
contrasts much of the former and current interpretative language- and 
communication-oriented research which has tended to utilise psychotherapy or 
counselling as a topic. Accordingly, this thesis addresses the research question 'how 
does change occur in psychodynamic-interpersonal psychotherapy? ' through the 
development of an approach linking discursive analysis of process with evaluation of 
outcome in a way which might inform psychotherapeutic practice. This may be 
characterised as psychotherapy research utilising a discourse analytic approach in 
contrast to discursive research utilising psychotherapy as topic. 
Introduction to thesis chapters 
The empirical work of the current thesis was designed as a series of research projects. 
Each of Chapters 2 and 4 to 7 are therefore presented as studies with an introduction 
(including a review of literature specific to that study), method, analysis, and 
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discussion. Links between these research projects and the rationale for progressing the 
research through this particular series of studies is also discussed as each new chapter 
is introduced. 
To begin, Chapter 2 offers a developed rational for utilising a discourse 
analytic approach to change processes in psychotherapy. This is achieved through 
presenting a detailed deconstructive analysis of the assimilation model of change as a 
representative of a traditional methodology in change process research. Chapter 3 
then offers the background to the four studies of psychotherapy interaction presented 
in Chapters 4 to 7. 
Chapter 4 presents the pilot analysis of a good outcome psychodynamic- 
interpersonal psychotherapy contrasting this with previous quantitative research on 
the case which utilised the framework of the assimilation model. Chapters 5 and 6 are 
two studies exploring the issue of problem (re)formulation in one unsuccessful 
therapy, homing in on demonstrating this process in particular extracts selected from 
this case. Chapter 7 then looks at the process of problem (re)formulation in the 
context of one successful case, broadening the scope of analysis to examine this 
process throughout one sub-theme spanning the course of therapy. 
Finally, this research is addressed as a cohesive body of work in the thesis 
discussion in Chapter 8. There is an evaluation of the research presented in the thesis 
and discussion regarding how the approach might be developed in subsequent 
research. The discussion also reflects on wider issues pertaining to the use of 
discourse analysis in psychotherapy research. Specific topics include the status of 
personal agency, representation of 'the other', and discussion of some of the political 
implications of this work. 
Thus, the thesis now continues with a chapter offering a further rationale for 
the utilisation of discourse analysis in psychotherapy research through a 
deconstructive analysis of an alternative, stage model approach to change in 
psychotherapy. 
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Deconstructing the assimilation of problematic 
experiences scale 
This chapter continues to explore the rationale behind using discourse analysis to 
investigate change processes in psychotherapy. This is achieved through offering a 
deconstructive analysis of a more traditional stage model approach to psychotherapy 
change process research. 
A traditional approach within psychotherapy process research has been the 
development and testing of stage models of change (e. g., the experiencing scale, 
Klein, Mathieu-Coughlan, & Kiesler, 1986; the stages of change model, Prochaska & 
DiClemente, 1984). Stage models rest on the assumption that there is a predictable 
and identifiable process common to most clients' progress through successful therapy. 
One such model, the assimilation model of change (Stiles, Elliott, Llewelyn, Firth- 
Cozens, Margison, Shapiro, & Hardy, 1990), will be focused on in this chapter. 
Alternative methodologies or stage models could have been chosen for 
examination in this chapter. The assimilation model was selected primarily as it is 
being utilised as a research tool by the clinical research team associated with the 
supervision of the current thesis. There was therefore a pragmatic interest in 
providing analysis of the model itself. Moreover, the current thesis illustrates some of 
the benefits of a discursive approach to change process research through drawing a 
contrast with previous work utilising the assimilation model (see chapter 4). 
The assimilation model is, however, also of interest in its own right. First, 
although its central hypothesis utilises constructs developed in cognitive psychology, 
the model is characterised as "integrative" (Stiles et al., 1990, p. 41 1). Specifically, the 
assimilation model is described as drawing on concepts from psychodynamic, 
experiential, cognitive-behavioural, personal construct theories and developmental 
psychology. So, the model appears a significant and important conceptual scheme in 
its potential relevance across a wide range of different therapies. Second, the 
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assimilation model has already been demonstrated to provide a viable and useful 
understanding of change processes in psychotherapy (e. g., Field, Barkham. Shapiro, 
& Stiles, 1994; Stiles, Meshot, Anderson, & Sloane, 1992). It therefore represents the 
successful utilisation of a traditional approach within the field. 
Table 2.1: Assimilation of problematic experiences scale (APES) 
0. Warded off. 
Content is unformed; client is unaware of the problem. An experience is considered warded off if there is 
evidence of actively avoiding emotionally disturbing topics (e. g., immediately changing the subject raised by 
the therapist). Affect may be minimal at level 0, reflecting successful avoidance; vague negative affect 
(especially anxiety) is associated with levels 0.1 to 0.9. 
1. Unwanted thoughts. 
Content reflects emergence of thoughts associated with discomfort. Client prefers not to think about it; topics 
are raised by therapist or external circumstances. Affect is often more salient than the content and involves 
strong negative feelings - anxiety, fear, anger, sadness. Despite the feelings' intensity, they may be unfocused 
and their connection with the content may be unclear . Levels 1.1 to 1.9 reflect increasingly stronger affect 
and less successful avoidance. 
2. Vague awareness. 
Client acknowledges the existence of a problematic experience, and describes uncomfortable associated 
thoughts, but cannot formulate the problem clearly. Affect includes acute psychological pain or panic 
associated with the problematic thoughts and experiences. Levels 2.1 to 2.9 reflect increasing clarity of the 
experience's content and decreasing intensity and diffusion of affect. 
3. Problem statement/clarification. 
Content includes a clear statement of a problem - something that could be worked on. Affect is negative but 
manageable, not panicky. Levels 3.1 to 3.9 reflect active, focused work toward understanding the 
problematic experience. 
4. Understandingrnsight. 
The problematic experience is placed into a schema, formulated, understood, with clear connective links. 
Affect may be mixed, with some unpleasant recognitions, but with curiosity or even pleasant surprise of the 
"aha" sort. Levels 4.1 to 4.9 reflect progressively greater clarity or generality of the understanding, usually 
associated with increasing positive (or decreasingly negative) affect. 
5. Application/working-through. 
The understanding is used to work on a problem; there is reference to specific problem-solving efforts, 
though without complete success. Client may describe considering alternatives or systematically selecting 
courses of action. Affective tone is positive, businesslike, optimistic. Levels 5.1 to 5.9 reflect tangible 
progress toward solutions of problems in daily living. 
6. Problem solution. 
Client achieves a successful solution for a specific problem. Affect is positive, satisfied, proud of 
accomplishment. Levels 6.1 to 6.9 reflect generalizing the solution to other problems and building the 
solutions into usual or habitual patterns of behavior. As the problem recedes, affect becomes more neutral. 
7. Mastery. 
Client successfully uses solutions in new situations; this generalizing is largely automatic, not salient. Affect 
is positive when the topic is raised, but otherwise neutral (i. e., this is nolonger something to get excited 
about). 
The assimilation model was developed from a number of sources; listening 
closely to taped therapy sessions, clinical and life experience, reading and discussions 
(Stiles 1995, personal communication). The central hypothesis of the model is that 
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successful therapy entails the assimilation of a problematic experience to a schema; "a 
frame of reference, narrative, metaphor, philosophy, or theme that is developed in the 
therapist-client interaction" (Stiles, 1994). In this context a problematic experience is 
defined as "a feeling, idea, memory, impulse, wish or attitude that is threatening to 
the client" (Stiles et al., 1992, p. 81). The model also posits a sequence of eight 
predictable stages through which a client progresses during this process of 
assimilation. These stages are presented in the assimilation of problematic 
experiences scale (APES) which articulates the therapeutic impacts associated with 
each stage of the model (see Table 2.1). 
Description of the theory behind the assimilation model has been articulated in 
a number of articles (e. g., Stiles, et al., 1990; Stiles, et al., 1992). However, as a 
concise description of the change processes posited by the assimilation model the 
APES is the specific text subjected to detailed analysis in this chapter. 
METHOD 
This chapter presents a detailed deconstruction of the assimilation of problematic 
experiences scale (APES). Deconstructionism is a process developed in philosophy 
(e. g., Derrida, 1972/3,1978) which has been adopted in the social sciences and 
utilised in the study of a variety of phenomena, e. g., automatic teller machine 
messages (Manning, 1992), objectivity and subjectivity (Parker, 1994), and Ilongot 
culture (Rosaldo, 1989). 
Deconstructionism rests on three primary assumptions. The first is that 
ideology, ways of understanding and evaluating reality, imposes limits on expression. 
So, "clarify(ing) what is marginal, absent, or excluded" (Waitzkin & Britt, 1989, 
p. 586) is offered as a means of assessing the values and interests on which any 
particular text is premised. A second assumption of deconstructionism is the 
importance of dichotomies. Dichotomies are argued to artificially limit ways of 
understanding to binary oppositions (e. g., inner-outer, female-male, subject-object), 
one side of which is commonly privileged in any particular text. Deconstructionism 
seeks to explicate this process and subvert the subsequent restrictions in meaning. 
35 
Chapter 2 
Third, is the assumption that there is no one true meaning of a text but fluid 
understandings which change across time and context. Thus, the process of 
deconstruction is advocated as a way to expose how seemingly self-evident meaning 
is crafted within the organisation of a text and to reveal how alternative meanings are 
always possible. This involves close and critical reading of the text with a view to 
articulating the assumptions on which it is based, seeking out paradoxes and 
contradictions (disruptions) undermining its logic. This procedure appears particularly 
relevant to the study of the assimilation model which was specifically aimed to be "a 
concise, internally consistent, researchable model" (Stiles et al, 1990, p. 41 1). Thus, as 
an analytic process, deconstructionism entails three primary moves; "looking at 
silences and gaps, dismantling dichotomies, and analyzing disruptions" (Feldman, 
1995, p. 51). 
A deconstructive analysis may be understood as offering a critique of the text 
under scrutiny. Gergen (1993) however argues that there are some significant 
shortcomings associated with the growing prevalence of critique in academic 
psychology. First, he suggests that critique is often symbiotic and binary. That is, in 
serving as negation of a pre-existing framework "the opposing sides come to depend 
on the image of the other for their very sustenance" (Gergen, 1993, p. 137). Moreover, 
although the aim of critique may be to undermine totalitising forms, one ideology 
may merely be replaced with another. So, following from the first, the second 
limitation of critique is suggested to be the danger of promoting atomisation and 
antagonism within the academic community. The third limitation alluded to is that 
much of contemporary critique can be understood as self-negating in that it is subject 
to the same deconstructive moves as that which it aims to undermine. 
It may be that aspects of these limitations identified by Gergen (1993) arise 
from the understanding of critique as synonymous with criticism. Although this may 
be an integral feature of critique, Cameron (1990) points to a more specialised 
meaning of the term. She suggests that "to undertake a critique of something is to 
examine the conditions on which it exists" (p. 2). Thus, the following deconstructive 
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analysis of the APES does not merely offer criticism and promote an alternative 
discursive approach, it offers a foundation for understanding why the assimilation 
model might be considered an acceptable and useful account of psychotherapy change 
processes at this particular socio-historical juncture. 
ANALYSIS OF THE ASSIMILATION OF PROBLEMATIC EXPERIENCES 
SCALE (APES) 
The description comprising each stage of the assimilation model, as represented in the 
assimilation of problematic experiences scale (APES), will be presented followed by 
a detailed, deconstructive analysis. 
0. Warded Off. 
Content is unformed; client is unaware of the problem. An experience is considered 
warded off if there is evidence of actively avoiding emotionally disturbing topics (e. g. 
immediately changing subject raised by the therapist). Affect may be minimal at level 0, reflecting successful avoidance; vague negative affect (especially anxiety) is 
associated with levels 0.1 to 0.9. 
During this initial 'warded off stage the client is described as "unaware of the 
problem". As being 'unaware' presupposes something about which one could be 
aware, the client is characterised as oblivious to a problem which is assumed to exist. 
This is so, although describing the client as 'unaware' suggests that s/he does not 
report or complain of the difficulty. However, it is stated that "an experience is 
considered warded off if there is evidence of actively avoiding emotionally disturbing 
topics". So, the assumption of a pre-existing problem is maintained through pointing 
to the client's avoidance of certain topics of discussion. 
In this segment it can be observed that there is a change from describing the 
client as "unaware" to considering her having "warded off". Furthermore, there is a 
change in description from reference to "the problem" to that of "an experience". 
Such descriptions carry particular implications. That is, first, describing the client as 
"unaware" of the problem may merely indicate that s/he is not in possession of 
relevant information. However, the phrase "warded off" denotes the successful end 
point of defensive, psychological avoidance. Moreover, if something is considered 
completely 'warded off this implies that it is excluded from awareness. This changed 
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description therefore suggests that the client is "unaware of the problem", not perhaps 
because the situation itself is unclear, but due to her/his own defensive, psychological 
mechanisms. Second, although the term "problem" may refer to anything considered a 
difficulty, "an experience" indicates an event or situation that the client has gone 
through or the psychological effect of such an encounter. It is therefore further 
implied that the client is "unaware of the problem" because s/he has defensively 
avoided and so is oblivious to the psychological effect of it on her/him. 
This set of descriptions from the warded off stage of the APES thus imply the 
following two seeming paradoxes. First, it is suggested that the client can be unaware 
of her/his experience of a problem when by definition an experience presupposes 
awareness. Second, it is suggested that s/he can be actively avoiding an experience of 
which s/he is unaware. How are these two paradoxes accounted for within the APES? 
The initial statement that "content is unformed" may provide an explanation 
for the first paradox; being unaware of one's own experience. Although it is not clear 
to what the term "content" refers, it is connected via a semi-colon to the description of 
the client as "unaware of the problem". So, it is possible to understand 'content' as 
referring either directly to the nature of the problem or to how this problem is 
discussed within therapy. The implication of suggesting that "content is unformed", 
though, is to suggest that the client might be unaware of her/his experience of a 
problem because the experience does not have 'shape' or 'form'. However, it is usual 
to consider an experience immediate to the individual who has it, so how might the 
characterisation of an experience as "unformed" be understood? Perhaps "unformed" 
refers to a lack of coherence in the client's understanding of what s/he has 
experienced? It may be argued, though, that an incoherently understood experience 
might more likely be regarded as puzzling or worrying than for the client to be 
"unaware" of it. The APES does suggest the client has little psychological 
involvement with the problem through characterising her as 'avoidant'. However, as 
suggested above, this itself may be considered paradoxical as active avoidance 
requires an account of the client's motivation to behave in such a way. 
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The APES does provide an alternative means of managing the first paradox; 
the implication that one can be unaware of one's own experience, which also offers an 
account of the second; avoidance of an experience about which one is unaware. That 
is, as well as indicating that "content is unformed" it is stated that the client's 
experience may be considered "warded off". This latter phrase implies the workings 
of unconscious and defensive psychological processes. Thus the client may be 
considered "unaware of the problem" through invoking the workings of unconscious 
processes. Moreover, avoidance of such a problem could then be explained in terms 
of unconscious motivation. Thus, in order to account successfully for both the client 
being unaware of her/his experience of the problem and her/his active avoidance of it, 
it appears necessary to appeal to a psychodynamic understanding of psychological 
functioning, rather than rely on positing "unformed content" of which s/he is 
oblivious. 
In order to account for the client's motivation to avoid without invoking 
unconscious processes it would seem necessary to understand her/him, contrary to 
description, as having some awareness of the problem. And, the "warded off" stage of 
the APES does in fact allow this inference to be made. That is, it is stated that "vague 
negative affect (especially anxiety) is associated with levels 0.1 to 0.9". This suggests 
that the client does have some affective awareness of the problem throughout most of 
this stage with which to furnish a motivational explanation for her/his described 
avoidance behaviour. However, maintaining that "affect may be minimal at level 0, 
reflecting successful avoidance" appears still to require some appeal to unconscious 
motivation as "minimal" implies little or no affective awareness. 
A further point can be made in relation to the description of the client's affect 
during this warded off stage. Suggesting that "minimal" affect at level 0 reflects 
"successful avoidance" and that "levels 0.1 to 0.9" are associated with "vague 
negative affect" implies that the client experiences increased and discomforting 
feelings as s/he less successfully avoids her/his experience of the problem. The 
connection between negative affect and less successful avoidance suggests that the 
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client's "anxiety" is caused by the presence if not increasing awareness of the problem 
itself. However, it is possible to account for such negative affect in an alternative 
way. That is, the assumption that a specific problem exists despite the client's lack of 
complaint may itself provoke anxiety if a client is unable to provide what appears 
expected of her/him (i. e., an account of a problem). This is so particularly in light of 
an alternative understanding of the warded off stage suggesting that the client's lack 
of complaint, or her/his being "unaware of the problem", is indicative of there in fact 
being no, 'hidden' problematic issue. 
A final point of interest in relation to the description of affect in this warded 
off stage is the statement that the client is actively avoiding "emotionally disturbing 
topics". Given that the client is described as feeling at most only vaguely negative it 
seems reasonable to assume that, within the terms of the APES, s/he is unlikely to 
report or experience the avoided topic as particularly disturbing. A question is 
therefore raised as to the origins of the description of the avoided topic as 
"emotionally disturbing". A reasonable possibility is that this description entails an 
implicit clinical judgement regarding the high emotional charge of certain topics in 
themselves, or specifically in relation to particular clients. However, it may be 
suggested that alternative descriptions of the avoided topic are possible and which 
might, in fact, more easily account for both the characterisation of the client's 
behaviour as avoidant ands her minimal affect. For example, the avoided topic could 
have been described as uninteresting or irrelevant to her/him. Given such alternatives, 
it is possible to speculate on why the description of such a topic as "emotional 
disturbing" might have been selected. It may be suggested that this particular 
description, as opposed to the alternatives offered, supplies the motivational 
implication that the client is avoiding the topic due to its problematic content. It can 
therefore be understood as an inference from a perspective which both presupposes 
and further implicates the existence of a specific problematic issue. 
The APES maintains the characterisation of the client as avoidant through 
suggesting that this is evidenced by her/his behaviour in therapy. For example, with 
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regard to avoiding emotionally disturbing topics, it is suggested s/he may 
"immediately chang(e) the subject raised by the therapist". Two points will be made 
in relation to this statement. First, alternative accounts may also furnish reasonable 
explanations for the client's change of topic. For example, s/he could be understood as 
considering the subject of minor relevance and thus wish to pursue alternative 
matters. Second, if the client is to be understood as avoiding certain topics it is 
possible that s/he might be able to account for this as a deliberate act and, as opposed 
to being "unaware of the problem", to be able to offer a full account if choosing to do 
so. The important point here is that alternative accounts of the client's behaviour, as 
described in the warded off stage, may be offered which do not require inference to 
reasons opaque to the client or of "unformed content" to which s/he is oblivious. 
Considering the client's behaviour warding off or avoidant, therefore, can be seen to 
be premised on the assumption of the existence of a hidden problem rather than being 
evidence for this. 
1. Unwanted Thoughts. 
Content reflects emergence of thoughts associated with discomfort. Client prefers not 
to think about it; topics are raised by therapist or external circumstances. Affect is 
often more salient than the content and involves strong negative feelings - anxiety, fear, anger, sadness. Despite the feelings' intensity, they may be unfocused and their 
connection with the content may be unclear. Levels 1.1 to 1.9 reflect increasingly 
stronger affect and less successful avoidance. 
'Unwanted thoughts' describes the set of therapeutic impacts associated with the 
second stage of the APES. During this stage there is described as being the 
"emergence of thoughts associated with discomfort" that the client "prefers not to 
think about". Furthermore, s/he is characterised as managing "less successful 
avoidance". 
Analysis of this stage will commence with the observation that the description 
of there being an "emergence of thoughts" can be understood in two similar but 
distinguishable ways. Thus the term 'emergent' may imply the revelation of 
something pre-existent or, on the other hand, may indicate the generation of 
something new. The former of these meanings would appear to be the understanding 
most compatible with the APES. That is, the client is described as managing "less 
i-; -7rF NEED 
41 ±)`T 
Y 
Chapter 2 
successful avoidance" during this second stage. So, the implication becomes available 
that her/his 'emerging but discomforting thoughts' are related to the assumed, pre- 
existent problem about which s/he was characterised as "unaware" but avoidant in the 
initial stage. Moreover, in this previous warded off stage it was suggested that the 
client was oblivious to her/his "experience" of the problem as content was "unformed" 
or/and "warded off'. As articulated above, an implication of these descriptions is to 
suggest that the client is unaware of something which s/he psychologically 'owns' due 
to the workings of her/his own inner, psychological processes. It is therefore further 
implied that the discomforting thoughts described as emerging during the second 
stage are revealed from within the client her/himself. 
It is interesting to note that a number of descriptions of the client's thoughts 
are offered during this stage; "unwanted", 'emergent', "associated with discomfort" 
and those the client "prefers not to think about". However, given that thoughts imply 
a private, intra-psychic process, it seems pertinent to enquire into the evidence for 
utilising such descriptions of the client's thoughts in the APES. 
A justification for characterising the client's thoughts as 'discomforting' is 
alluded to in the statement that "content reflects emergence of thoughts associated 
with discomfort". That is, it is suggested discomforting thoughts are reproduced or 
evidenced in the "content" of something. However, as in the former stage, it is not 
clear to what the term "content" refers. Here it could be understood as referring to 
content of the client's 'mind'; the contents of her/his thoughts, or as a scale designed 
for use with therapy dialogue, to content of the therapy conversation. If "content" 
refers to the client's 'mind', this begs the question as to how a description of the 
client's thoughts was obtained, if not through the client's self-report during therapy. 
The statement that "content reflects emergence of thoughts associated with 
discomfort" therefore appears to necessitate that the description of the client's 
thoughts presented in the APES is grounded in the therapy conversation itself. It may 
be argued, though, that it is very possible that a client may not actually refer to her/his 
thoughts in the therapy conversation at all or describe them in terms similar to that 
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found in the APES. What seems more likely is that description of the client's thoughts 
is an extrapolation from what s/he says in therapy. 
However, two observations can be made with regard to such a process. First, 
extrapolation from what someone says to a characterisation of their thoughts is an 
interpretative enterprise. Second, the APES offers a blanket characterisation of the 
client's thoughts at this particular stage in the process of change, e. g., "unwanted" and 
"associated with discomfort". So, as both interpretative and blanket it seems relevant 
to enquire into how the particular characterisation of the client's thoughts presented in 
the unwanted thoughts stage of the APES was selected. 
One way of addressing this issue is to speculate on the implications made 
available by the particular descriptions offered. Thus, it can be suggested that 
characterising the client's thoughts as "associated with discomfort" makes the 
implication available that they are "unwanted" because they are emotionally 
disquieting. This then provides a reason for describing the client as preferring "not to 
think about it" as it is understandable that one should avoid painful topics. So, within 
this context, the statement that "topics are raised by therapist or external 
circumstances" carries the implication that certain topics are not raised by the client 
because of their emotional charge. Moreover, the suggestion that avoided topics are 
"raised by therapist", the psychological expert, suggests that such topics can and 
perhaps should be considered relevant to the client's problems. The set of descriptions 
comprising the unwanted thoughts stage of the APES therefore has the effect of 
construing the client's behaviour as defensive at this point in therapy. This is 
concordant with the description of her/his behaviour as avoidant in the warded off 
stage. In addition, the focus on the client's thoughts makes the implication available 
that it is the client's cognitive processes that are the phenomena of primary 
importance in the investigation of therapeutic change. 
As in the former warded off stage, however, rather than consider the client 
defensive there are alternative possible understandings of her/his behaviour. For 
example, the client may not raise certain topics because s/he considers them irrelevant 
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to her/his issues and/or it has merely not occurred to her/him to so. Topics "raised by 
therapist or external circumstances" might therefore represent a novel perspective to 
the client on her/his issues. This would therefore be compatible with the 
understanding of the client's thoughts as 'emergent' in terms of the generation or 
creation of something new. The important point is that an account of the client's 
"unwanted thoughts" can be offered which does not rely on the revelation of pre- 
existent, emotionally charged but formerly occluded psychological content. 
The description of the client's affect at this unwanted thoughts stage is also 
interesting; "often more salient than content" and although 'intense' "may be 
unfocused and their connection with the content may be unclear". Reference is 
therefore made to a connection between the client's affect and 'content' which, as 
suggested above, may most coherently be understood during this stage of the APES in 
terms of the content of the dialogue between client and therapist. Describing the 
connection between the client's affect and 'content' as "may be unclear" suggests that 
it may alternatively not have been unclear. This, plus raising the issue of there being a 
connection at all, suggests that a link between the client's affect and content of the 
therapy conversation does in fact exist. A possible explanation for the lack of clarity 
in this connection is suggested by the description of the client's feelings as possibly 
"unfocused". That is, it is implied that the link between the client's affect and the 
content of the therapy dialogue is confused as the client's feelings are chaotic or 
mixed-up. Such description therefore excludes an alternative possibility that the 
connection is unclear because the topics discussed are not immediately relevant. 
A final point in relation to description of the client's feelings will be made 
with respect to the suggestion of there being "increasingly stronger affect" with "less 
successful avoidance". In the initial stage of the APES, successful avoidance was 
associated with minimal affect and the client having psychologically warded off 
her/his experience of a problem. The implication therefore becomes available that in 
this second stage "less successful avoidance" is connected to a change in the client's 
psychological process; that s/he is not able to 'ward off as effectively as before. 
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However, as with the former stage, if the client does experience "strong negative 
feelings" this may be accounted for in alternative ways. For example, there could 
have been changes in the client's circumstances or her understanding of her/his 
situation. So, unlike that offered in the APES, such an account does not require the 
existence of a problem psychologically belonging to the client but outside of her/his 
awareness. 
2. Vague Awareness. 
Client acknowledges the existence of a problematic experience and describes 
uncomfortable associated thoughts, but cannot formulate the problem clearly. Affect 
includes acute psychological pain or panic associated with the problematic thoughts 
and experiences. Levels 2.1 to 2.9 reflect increasing clarity of the experience's content 
and decreasing intensity and diffusion of affect. 
During the 'vague awareness' stage the client is described as "acknowledg(ing) the 
existence of a problematic experience". Two important implications can be drawn 
from this description. First, characterising the client as "acknowledg(ing)" a difficulty 
suggests that s/he is recognising or admitting something which s/he did not previously 
do. This implies that what the client acknowledges was present prior to her/his 
recognition of it. Second, as the term 'experience' presupposes an individual who 'has' 
the experience, describing the object of the client's acknowledgement a "problematic 
experience" suggests a focus on the client's difficulty in terms of her/his 
psychological ownership of it. With these two implications it is therefore suggested 
that the client is beginning to admit, or realise, her/his psychological ownership of a 
pre-existent problem. 
Characterisation of the client in the vague awareness stage continues with the 
statement that s/he "describes uncomfortable associated thoughts" in relation to 
her/his problematic experience. So, it is suggested that the client will offer a 
description of her/his "thoughts" during this stage of the APES. It may be argued, 
though, that a blanket claim that clients will describe or refer to their thoughts during 
the therapy conversation would be difficult to maintain. However, the claim might be 
understood in a more general sense as suggesting merely that the themes a client 
raises during therapy are indicative of what is 'on her/his mind'. But even so, 
characterisation of the client's thoughts from what s/he says in therapy is still an 
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interpretative enterprise. This therefore contrasts with the suggestion in the APES that 
characterisation of the client's thoughts issues directly from her/his self-report in 
therapy. 
If the description of the client's thoughts in the vague awareness stage is an 
extrapolation from what s/he says in therapy, it is likely that other alternative 
descriptions might have been possible. An issue is therefore raised as to why the 
particular description of the client's thoughts as "uncomfortable" was selected. One 
way of approaching this issue is to examine the specific effects of describing the 
client's thoughts as "uncomfortable". It may be suggested that such a description 
functions to sustain two particular assumptions. First, although the client is described 
as unable to "formulate the problem clearly" characterising her/his thoughts as 
"uncomfortable" makes the assumption that they are "associated" with her/his 
"problematic experience" appear reasonable. Second, claiming the presence of such 
disturbing thoughts further substantiates the assumption that a "problematic 
experience" does in fact exist. 
Although the client is described as reporting "uncomfortable associated 
thoughts" s/he is also characterised as unable to "formulate the problem clearly". This 
suggests that s/he is unable to comprehend and express her/his difficulty 
comprehensively or coherently. However, the statement that the client cannot 
formulate the problem "clearly" implies the possibility that its articulation could be 
clear and thus that a difficulty does in fact exist. Why, therefore, should the client's 
comprehension of this difficulty be obscured? 
A possible reason is suggested in the description of there being "increasing 
clarity of the experience's content" as the client progresses through this vague 
awareness stage. That is, suggesting there is "increasing clarity" implies that there has 
been a general lack of understanding regarding the "content" or nature of the problem 
up to this point. If, as is implied in the APES, the client's problem is to be understood 
as belonging psychologically to her/him, it would seem necessary to account for this 
lack of understanding as a peculiarity, or at least effect, of the client's own 
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psychological processes. If, on the other hand, the client's psychological ownership of 
the problem was not assumed, such lack of clarity regarding the nature of the problem 
may be accounted for in alternative ways. For example, it could be that the client's 
specific circumstances might make it difficult for her/him to acquire relevant 
information or particular aspects of her/himself or her/his life have not yet become 
defined as problematic. 
Some final points will be made in relation to description of the client's 
feelings during this vague awareness stage. It is suggested that levels 2.1 to 2.9 reflect 
the operation of two processes; (1) "increasing clarity of the experience's content and" 
(2) "decreasing intensity and diffusion of affect". In referring to the 'content of an 
experience', the first of these processes can be characterised as mental or intellectual. 
The second process describes the client's affective improvement. Although it is not 
explicitly stated that the client's affective improvement is linked to her/his increasing 
intellectual clarity regarding the problematic experience the implication is made 
available that such an association exists. This is so due to the association forged 
between the client's mental processes and her emotional distress during description of 
this vague awareness stage. That is, first, the client is described as expressing some 
"uncomfortable associated thoughts" in relation to a problematic experience. Thus, in 
describing the client's thoughts as "uncomfortable" is it suggested that they are 
associated with some emotional distress. Second, the client's affect is characterised as 
including "acute psychological pain or panic associated with the problematic thoughts 
and experiences". Characterisation of the client's cognitions as "problematic", and 
thus as difficult or puzzling, makes the implication available that they are related to 
her/his "psychological pain and panic". So, it would appear reasonable to assume that 
the cognitive therapeutic impact of "increasing clarity of the experience's content" 
may be understood as associated with the affective therapeutic impact of "decreasing 
intensity and diffusion of affect". Thus, it is implied that the client's movement 
toward emotional recovery is linked to her/his increasing ability to comprehend the 
nature of her/his problem. 
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However, it can be suggested that instead of improving, alternative accounts 
of the client's affect might also be tenable here. For example, it would be reasonable 
to argue that a client might become more upset as the nature of a problem becomes 
clearer. This could occur, for example, as distressing implications are thus revealed or 
because the emerging issue seems particularly difficult. Focusing on increased 
understanding as the source of the client's emotional improvement can therefore be 
argued an assumption privileging intellectual or at least mental processes. Such an 
assumption would contrast a possible alternative account which might, for example, 
stress the therapeutic impact of emotional support from the therapist. 
3. Problem Statement/Clariftcation 
Content includes a clear statement of a problem - something that could be worked on. Affect is negative but manageable, not panicky. Levels 3.1 to 3.9 reflect active, 
focused work toward understanding the problematic experience. 
'Problem statement/clarification' describes a stage during which it is suggested that 
"content includes a clear statement of a problem". Although it is not directly specified 
to what the term "content" refers, there is indicated to be a "statement" and thus a 
declaration regarding the nature or account of a difficulty. Within the context of a 
scale designed for use with therapy dialogue, it seems reasonable to assume that it is 
to be understood such a statement appears in the 'content' of the therapy conversation. 
It is therefore suggested that a point has been reached in therapy when an account of 
the nature of a problem is articulated. Moreover, as "a clear statement" within this 
wider "content" of the therapy dialogue it is implied to be a discrete, overt expression 
of the problem. 
This "clear statement of a problem" is described as being "something that 
could be worked on". Although this description indicates that the articulation of a 
difficulty is the starting point of further effort, it can be interpreted as referring to two 
distinguishable processes. First, the suggestion that there is "a clear statement of a 
problem" may indicate merely that comment is made in therapy obviously pertaining 
to the nature of a difficulty. With such an understanding it is possible that subsequent 
"work" refers to refining this statement and sophisticating its, otherwise provisional, 
account. On the other hand, if "clear" is understood as meaning 'free from 
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complication', the implication becomes available that the problem statement is to be 
taken as definitive or at least accurate for the particular client. Thus, with this 
understanding, it would be the implications of reaching such a definitive account of 
the problem that is suggested to require further effort, i. e., what having such a 
difficulty means for the client. 
The APES provides an extended description of the nature of the "work" 
entailed during the problem statement/clarification stage which might throw light on 
this ambiguity. It is stated that work is "toward understanding the problematic 
experience". As increased "understanding" could refer to either fuller comprehension 
of a provisional account or of the wider implications of a definitive problem, this does 
not itself clarify the nature of the processes involved. However, the suggestion that 
progress is made toward understanding "the problematic experience" provides two 
relevant implications. First, as suggested previously, describing the difficulty a 
"problematic experience" indicates an event or situation that the client has gone 
through or the psychological effect of such an encounter. Moreover second, 
describing the difficulty "the" problematic experience implies the assumption that one 
definitive issue is being explored. These implications therefore suggest that the work 
of this problem statement/clarification stage entails going beyond the problem 
statement, so investigating its wider implications, with the assumption that its account 
relates to a definitive issue. However, an ambiguity remains in that an interpretation 
is still available that the statement is only an approximate representation of the 
problem and thus provisional. 
It is stated that this "work toward understanding the problematic experience" 
occurs during "levels 3.1 to 3.9" and, by implication, not at level 3.0. In contrast, 
though, through not specifying when the problem statement may occur, the claim that 
"content includes a clear statement of a problem" implies that such a statement could 
occur at any point in the therapy conversation during this stage. However, it is a 
problem statement which is described as being the starting point for further effort; the 
"something that could be worked on". Thus, although it is not specified in the APES, 
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it seems necessary that a clear problem statement must occur at level 3.0, prior to and 
enabling the "work towards understanding" during levels 3.1 to 3.9. This observation 
is important for if such a statement must occur at level 3.0, it is the defining 
characteristic of a client's progress into the problem statement/clarification stage, so 
providing a specific marker for coders utilising the scale. 
Such a marker would most likely be of benefit to coders, however, there are 
some problems with the interpretation that a clear problem statement must occur at 
level 3.0. First, there is no express stipulation in the APES that a problem statement 
must occur at this point. So, the possibility is maintained that one may not be found at 
point 3.0. Here there appears a potential inconsistency with the fuller description of 
this problem statement/clarification stage which implies that the problem statement is 
the starting point for the work of levels 3.1 to 3.9. Second, it is stated in the APES 
only that "content includes a clear statement of a problem". So, the possibility of 
content including several other perhaps less clear or even more developed problem 
statements is not excluded. Thus, to use a problem statement as a marker of level 3.0 
a coder, presumably, must be certain that it is the first one articulated. 
Other more general points may be suggested in relation to the description of 
the problem statement. Although "a clear statement of a problem" may in fact occur 
and be "something that could be worked on", the APES does not consider whether 
this statement should issue from the client or therapist nor whether it should be agreed 
by both parties. Moreover, in making no reference to such details they are implied to 
be of little consequence. However, it may be argued, first, that as a scale designed 
with regard to therapeutic impact, the client's ability to produce a clear statement of a 
problem might be a more persuasive indication of her/his progress than one offered 
by the therapist. Second, concerning the issue of agreement, it would seem that if 
consensus were not reached the problem statement must clearly be awarded 
provisional, rather than as the APES perhaps implies, definitive status. 
It has been argued that the problem statement/clarification stage contains 
certain ambiguities. First, it is not clear whether the stage involves working on the 
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fuller comprehension of a provisional account of a difficulty or on the wider 
implications of a definitive problem. Second, it has been argued that the problem 
statement is implied to be definitive while, at the same time, the possibility of there 
being more than one, and thus provisional, problem statements is not excluded. The 
upshot of such indefiniteness is that the problem statement/clarification stage is 
ambiguous with regard to the processes it maps. However, an interpretation of this 
stage can be offered which attempts to encompass these ambiguities. That is, with an 
initial problem statement occurring at level 3.0, the work of levels 3.1 to 3.9 could be 
understood to entail developing the accuracy of this account in subsequent problem 
statements with an increasingly deeper comprehension of its implications and 
meaning for the client. However, producing such an interpretation requires going 
beyond what is strictly provided in the APES description and management of its 
ambiguities and potential inconsistencies. 
Some further points can be made with regard to the characterisation of the 
"work" of the stage as "active, focused" and aimed towards "understanding". First, 
selecting the terms "active" and "focused" suggests that these are aspects of the work 
particularly worthy of comment. As such, it is implied that until now the work has not 
been active or focused and thus that there is an initiation of agentic and directed 
effort. Second, such effort is stated to be "towards understanding the problematic 
experience". The term "understanding" can indicate knowing of the intuitive, 
empathic or intellectual kind. In this regard it is interesting to note that the client's 
affect at this stage is characterised as "negative but manageable, not panicky". The 
term 'panic' indicates the tendency to be affected by frantic or sudden fright and thus 
the inability to carry out concentrated, rational effort. So, explicitly stipulating the 
client is "not panicky" makes the implication available that the processes involved are 
rational. 
The privileging of intellectual factors in the mechanisms of change, argued 
with regard to the former vague awareness stage, is therefore echoed in this problem 
statement/clarification stage. So, by implication "understanding the problematic 
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experience" is suggested to be the product of an active and directed rational or at least 
intellectual process. As such, understanding the problem is implied to be under the 
control of the client, be this with the therapist's help. Thus, the alternative possibility 
that understanding the problem is restricted by factors outside the client or therapist's 
command, e. g., access to information such as the motivations of other people, is 
apparently excluded. 
4. Understanding/Insight. 
The problematic experience is placed into a schema, formulated, understood, with 
clear connective links. Affect may be mixed, with some unpleasant recognitions, but 
with curiosity or even pleasant surprise of the "aha" sort. Levels 4.1 to 4.9 reflect 
progressively greater clarity or generality of the understanding, usually associated 
with increasingly positive (or decreasing negative) affect. 
In the 'understanding/insight' stage it is stated that "the problematic experience is 
placed into a schema". The term "schema" commonly means a plan, outline or 
standard formed from past experience used to evaluate and understand the new. In the 
discipline of psychology the term usually denotes prototypic cognitive representations 
used to organise information. Description of the understanding/insight stage continues 
stating that the problematic experience is placed into a schema, "formulated, 
understood, with clear connective links". Thus, 'schematisation' is associated with the 
ability to specify in detail, comprehend the meaning of and identify links with other 
things. It is therefore suggested that making sense of the problematic experience is 
related to it existing in a particular cognitive form. 
Suggesting that "the problematic experience is placed into a schema", though, 
raises a question as to how such a process was triggered? As the APES represents a 
progressive process, it might be assumed that the "active, focused work toward 
understanding" indicated in the former problem statement/clarification stage might be 
such a mechanism. However, as it is directly specified that the problematic experience 
is "understood" in this latter understanding/insight stage a more basic question is 
raised as to what reference to a "schema" adds this description? (see Fiske & Linville, 
1980). This issue seems particularly relevant when considering that the APES is 
designed for use by coders evaluating therapy dialogue. That is, a "schema" is a 
psychological construct denoting a cognitive representation which is not directly 
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observable to coders. It might be argued stating that a 'schematised' experience is 
"formulated, understood with clear connective links" does offer observable evidence 
for coders to judge when this process has occurred. However, on the other hand, it 
may also be suggested that an ability to specify a problem in detail and relate it to 
other things does not provide evidence for the operation of a particular cognitive 
process. The question therefore remains as to why, rather than merely indicate that 
the problematic experience has been "understood", the schema concept has been 
incorporated into the understanding/insight stage of the APES? 
One approach to this issue is to examine the implications such a description 
makes available. So first, as suggested, describing the experience as "placed into a 
schema" attributes the understanding of the problem, and thus a process of change, to 
the operation of a particular cognitive mechanism. This echoes the peculiarity 
psychological emphasis in the description of the client's difficulty as a problematic 
"experience" and the focus on intellectual or mental processes observed in the former 
stages. Second, describing the experience as "placed" into the schema is not neutral 
with regard to agency. That is, the term 'placed' suggests a deliberate rather than, for 
example, random action. Schematisation is therefore implied to be in some way 
controllable. Incorporation of the schema concept in the description of the 
understanding/insight stage therefore implies the operation of a cognitive and agentic 
process of understanding a difficulty in therapy. 
Description of the understanding/insight stage continues stating the client may 
have "some unpleasant recognitions". The term 'recognition' indicates either 
identification of something already known or acknowledgement of its existence or 
validity. Therefore, describing the client as making some "recognitions" in relation to 
understanding the problematic experience suggests, as observed in former stages, the 
existence of a problematic experience prior to the client's awareness of it. In this 
understanding/insight stage, the client's recognitions are characterised as "unpleasant". 
However, the origins of this particular description are unclear. That is, describing the 
client's recognitions as unpleasant could be understood as suggesting they are 
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inherently distasteful and thus obviously and objectively so. On the other hand, 
'unpleasant' could refer to the client's own particular evaluation of her/his recognitions 
which may or may not concur with that of others. In this latter case, describing her/his 
recognitions as unpleasant would have to rely on the client's direct self-report in 
therapy or on an interpretation of her/his reaction. 
Description of the client's recognitions appears in the extended statement that 
"affect may be mixed, with some unpleasant recognitions, but with curiosity or even 
pleasant surprise". "Mixed affect" appears to refer to the contrast between the client's 
"unpleasant recognitions" and "pleasant surprise". So, "unpleasant" is indicated to 
refer to the client's emotional state and thus her/his own evaluation of or reaction to 
her/his recognitions. Description of the client's recognitions as unpleasant therefore 
must rely on the client's self-report or an interpretation of what s/he says in therapy. 
This is so, although as suggested above, the description may have the effect of 
implying an objective evaluation. 
It may be asked, though, why the complexity of characterising the client's 
affect as both "pleasant" and "unpleasant" is required? It can be suggested that 
describing the client's recognitions as "unpleasant" is functional in maintaining the 
assumption that they are in fact related to a pre-existent problematic experience; 
something one would expect to be discomforting. However, it is not so evident that 
unpleasant recognitions should bring "pleasant surprise". This pleasant surprise is 
suggested to be of "the 'aha' sort". In the discipline of psychology the 'aha experience' 
refers to the process of insight learning whereby a solution to a problem emerges 
spontaneously and seemingly unconnected to prior effort. It is possible, though, to 
imagine that a client might not find it pleasant to know more about something she 
experiences as uncomfortable. So, why should the client be characterised as reacting 
perhaps with "pleasant surprise" in the APES? 
In approaching this question it is interesting to note that the client is also 
described as 'curious' during this understanding/insight stage. As such it is implied 
that s/he is interested in acquiring knowledge. It is therefore implied that the 
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acquiring of knowledge, even about something discomforting, is motivating to the 
client. Moreover, "progressively greater clarity or generality of the understanding" is 
described as "usually associated with increasingly positive (or decreasingly negative) 
affect". The gaining of knowledge is therefore linked to the client's emotional 
improvement. Thus there can understood to be a privileging of the intellectual in that 
it is insight into and clarity regarding the nature of the problem that is implied to 
motivate the client and affording her/him improved affect even though this insight is 
with regard to unpleasant things. 
It is possible, though, to imagine clarity with respect to the nature of a 
problem increasing rather than decreasing the client's distress. Although this is not 
strictly contrary to the APES description, it is a possibility which is not alluded to. 
Thus, it may be interesting to speculate on the origin and function of the 'curious and 
positive' client suggested in the understanding/insight stage. It can be suggested that 
such a description characterises the model client; an interested and co-operant 
participant the therapeutic endeavour. The APES therefore could be regarded as 
describing how a client 'ought' to react or feel in order to be helpful in relation to the 
clinical or therapist's perspective. Thus, there can be understood to be a moral 
implication to this description in that it is implied the client should be interested in 
exploring even unpleasant facts in order to solve her/his problems. 
The final three stages of the APES; 'application/working through', problem 
solution' and 'mastery' refer to a point after a problematic experience is characterised 
as having been identified and understood. These stages describe increasingly effective 
management of this problem by the client, adaptive changes and integration of 
solutions into everyday life. These stages will be discussed together as offering a 
particular conception of the appropriate outcome of successful therapeutic 
intervention. 
5. Application/working through 
The understanding is used to work on a problem; there is reference to specific 
problem-solving efforts, though without complete success. Client may describe 
considering alternatives or systematically selecting courses of action. Affective tone is 
positive, business-like, optimistic. Levels 5.1 to 5.9 reflect tangible progress toward 
solutions of problems in daily living. 
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6. Problem Solution. 
Client achieves a successful solution for a specific problem. Affect is positive, 
satisfied, proud of accomplishment. Levels 6.1 to 6.9 reflect generalizing the solution 
to other problems and building the solutions into usual or habitual patterns of 
behavior. As the problem recedes, affect becomes more neutral. 
7. Mastery 
Client successfully uses solutions in new situations; this generalizing is largely 
automatic, not salient. Affect is positive when the topic is raised, but otherwise 
neutral (i. e. this is no longer something to get excited about). 
These final stages will be discussed in relation to three over-arching themes or values 
emphasised in these descriptions of therapeutic impact; agency, rationality and 
control. Although addressed separately these themes overlap and are not to be 
understood as mutually exclusive. 
Agency, the power to act on rather than merely react to the world, is stressed 
in the first two of these final stages of the APES. This occurs through offering an 
account of the personal effort required of the client in the successful resolution of a 
problem. Thus 'understanding/insight' is not considered the end point of therapy but 
the basis of the following stage of 'application/working through' in which 
"understanding is used to work on a problem". So, in requiring further "work", the 
successful resolution of a problem is linked with the client's agency in terms of 
her/his making a directed effort toward this goal. This work is alluded to through the 
suggestion that there is "reference to specific problem-solving efforts". As an 'effort' 
suggests an actual attempt, the client is indicated to have active endeavours at 
problem-solving to report during therapy. Moreover, although during this stage 
problem-solving is suggested to be "without complete success" the client's affective 
tone is described as "positive, business-like, optimistic". The implication therefore 
becomes available that, despite initial failure, the client is hopeful of success and so 
committed to the active pursuit of problem-solving. 
Agency also appears as a theme in the following 'problem solution' stage. This 
stage is initiated by the "client achiev(ing) a successful solution for a specific 
problem" and being "proud of (the) accomplishment". Describing the client as 
'achieving' a solution and this as an "accomplishment" implicates the client's agency 
in having succeeded in bringing something to completion. However, a successful 
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solution is described in relation to only one specific problem and the continuing 
process during this stage is suggested to "reflect generalizing the solution to other 
problems". Problem solution is therefore suggested to entail not merely the resolution 
of one issue but the ability to use this solution adaptively and thus agentically. 
Moreover, it is indicated that the client is required to "build(ing) the solutions into 
usual or habitual patterns of behavior". In describing the client's usual way of 
behaving "habitual" it is implied to be automatic. So, the aim of building the new 
problems solutions into this habitual behaviour suggests that, at this stage, the client 
must make an active or voluntary effort to change her/his reactions. 
The final stage, 'mastery', is described as a point at which the "client 
successfully uses solutions in new situations". The term 'mastery' suggests proficiency 
and control. However, the generalisation of the problem solution to new situation is 
characterised as "largely automatic". So, having implicated the necessity of the 
client's agency in the adaptive utilisation of a successful problem solution, in the 
mastery of this problem the client is described as relatively passive. Thus, the final 
stage of successful therapy is characterised as one in which the client no-longer has to 
make an active effort. Agency is therefore indicated to be an integral part of problem- 
solving but no-longer necessary once the solution is integrated into normal behaviour. 
The second theme focused on in the final three stages of the APES is that of 
rationality. Rationality refers to the employment of reason and logic and is 
emphasised through the description of strategies for effective action in these last 
stages of successful therapy. So, during 'application/working-through', problem- 
solving efforts are suggested to entail the client "considering alternatives or 
systematically selecting courses of action". Problem-solving is therefore presented in 
terms of thoughtful reflection, logical reasoning and methodical planning. It is also 
indicated that although problem solving efforts are "without complete success" there 
is "tangible progress toward solutions". By implication therefore it is suggested that 
the client is testing out the potential of various, selected possibilities. Thus, 
57 
Chapter 2 
description of client problem-solving during this application/working through stage 
suggests the rational utilisation of the hypothetico-deductive method. 
The following stage, 'problem solution', reflects "generalizing the solution to 
other problems" to the extent that at the final 'mastery' stage this process is "largely 
automatic". So, having generated and tested approaches to the problem, the client is 
characterised as using inductive methodology to generalise this solution to other 
problems. Thus the complete resolution of problems is conceptualised in terms of the 
client's utilisation of the scientific method. The successful client is therefore presented 
in the image of the rational scientist. 
The third theme observed to saturate these final three stages of the APES is 
that of control. That is, the identified emphasis on agency and rationality suggest that 
the solution to the client's problems is reliant on the tenacious application of the 
correct method. Thus the implication becomes available that problem solution is 
under the client's control. Moreover, describing the end point of successful therapy 
'mastery', implies that control is a central aim of the therapeutic endeavour. Control is 
also emphasised in description of the client's behaviour during these final three stages. 
In the 'application/working through stage' the successful client is described as 
"systematically selecting courses of action". So, by implication the benefits of 
planned and thus controlled procedures is suggested in contrast to perhaps random or 
spontaneous activity. Moreover, in the 'problem solution' stage describing the client as 
"building the solutions into usual or habitual patterns of behavior" suggests a 
deliberate and thus controlled moulding of otherwise automatic reactions. 
Emotional control is also suggested in several ways in these final stages. The 
client's affect during the 'application/working through' stage is described as "business- 
like". S/he is therefore suggested to be controlled, centred and focused on the work at 
hand. Moreover, during the 'problem solution' stage the client's affect is described as 
"become(ing) more neutral" so that at 'mastery' the problem is now "no longer 
something to get excited about". So, a consequence of the client having modified 
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her/his own behaviour is suggested to be emotional control; "positive [... J but 
otherwise neutral affect" regarding the formerly problematic issue. 
DISCUSSION 
As articulated in the introduction, deconstructive analysis entails three primary 
moves; analysing disruptions, identifying silences and gaps, and dismantling 
dichotomies. Discussion of the above analysis of the assimilation of problematic 
experiences scale (APES) will therefore be structured in relation to these three 
procedures. Before proceeding with this discussion though it is important to note that 
as the analysis has been of the APES the points raised are in relation to the 
assimilation model as it is articulated in the APES. However, as the APES as a 
concise description of the therapeutic impacts posited by the model it should be 
compatible with the general literature on the assimilation model. This literature will 
therefore be drawn on at points in the discussion where some amplification regarding 
the theory behind the model is necessary. 
The analysis of disruptions involves explicating the paradoxes, contradictions 
and ambiguities inherent within a text. These are aspects often obscured in a 
conventional 'reading for information'. Thus, in bringing such disruptions to the 
foreground a deconstructive analysis reveals a text to be fragmented and problematic. 
Analysis of the APES identified two seeming paradoxes in the initial warded 
off stage; (1) that the client can be unaware of her/his experience of a problem when 
by definition an experience presupposes awareness, and (2) that s/he can be actively 
avoiding an experience of which s/he is unaware. The possibility that the therapeutic 
impacts described in the warded off stage might be accounted for by 'unformed 
content' (terminology compatible with the idea of a cognitively unassimilated 
experience) was argued to be untenable. That is first, it was suggested that 'unformed' 
content might more likely be regarded puzzling or worrying rather than the client be 
'unaware' of it. Second, it was argued that this would not provide an explanation for 
the client's described avoidance behaviour. In contrast, it was argued that the above 
paradoxes may be successfully accounted for by invoking a psychodynamic 
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understanding of unconscious psychological processes including unconscious 
motivation, i. e., resistance (particularly at point 0.0). 
The assimilation model is described as integrative and as drawing on a number 
of different conceptual schemes including cognitive-behavioural and psychodynamic 
theory (Stiles et al., 1990). However, the central hypothesis of the assimilation model 
draws on cognitive theory (assimilation of a problematic experience to a schema). A 
question is therefore raised regarding the compatibility of a psychodynamic and 
schema accounts of change within one model of change. 
The idea of an unconscious is compatible with a cognitive account of 
psychological functioning. However, Power and Brewin (1991) suggest that the 
unconscious is understood in different ways in cognitive science and psychodynamic 
theory. The distinction of particular relevance here is that the Freudian account 
includes provision for repressed information in principle accessible but rendered 
inaccessible to consciousness ('repressed unconscious', Eagle, 1988; Moore, 1988; 
'inhibited dynamic unconscious', Horowitz, 1988). This contrasts the cognitive 
science account which characterises the unconscious in terms of habitual sensory and 
motor patterns, and specialist programmes such as face recognition ('computational 
unconscious', Horowitz, 1988). Clearly, the description of the client's avoidance of a 
problematic experience of which s/he is yet unaware in the warded off stage of the 
APES is in line with the psychodynamic rather than cognitive account of unconscious 
processes. This is so although Stiles has stated that "(t)heoretically, considering such 
experiences as unassimilated differs from considering them as having been previously 
processed, symbolized, and then repressed, as some psychodynamic accounts seem to 
imply" (Stiles, 1994, p. 3). Power and Brewin do attempt an account of the 
unconscious incorporating both psychodynamic and cognitive theories, however they 
conclude pessimistic of the possibility of including the notion of repressed but 
formerly conscious material in such a model. 
In relation to the assimilation model, the indication is that although combining 
aspects of several different understandings of psychological functioning might be 
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useful clinically it may be premature theoretically. Moreover, if revised in light of the 
contemporary theoretical debates it is likely that the APES would be required to be 
more specific regarding the psychological processes it maps. For example, if 
maintaining a cognitive account, in line with Power and Brewin, it may be necessary 
to specify that the warded off experience referred to in the initial stage must have 
never been conscious to the client. In this regard, the phrase 'problematic experience' 
might be potentially misleading as an 'experience' implies something about which one 
has been aware. However, although such tightening of description might be required 
by theory it is also likely to restrict the kinds of clinical material for which the 
assimilation model could meaningfully account. 
A further disruption identified in analysis of the APES was the particular 
ambiguity in description of the problem statement/clarification (4th) stage. That is, 
first, the description logically requires a problem statement at the beginning of this 
stage however this is not directly stated. Second, it is not specified whether there is 
one or many problem statements or, related to this, whether the statement is to be 
understood as definitive or provisional. Furthermore, it is not identified whether the 
problem statement issues from client or therapist or whether or not it is agreed. So, as 
with the description of the warded off stage which evokes a psychodynamic 
understanding within a more explicitly cognitive account of change, description of the 
problem statement stage is flexibly ambiguous in relation to the processes it maps. 
Such flexibility may be useful in accounting for clinical data, however, by the same 
token, it may provide an inadequate description for coders to identify a client's 
progress through this stage. Moreover, an ambiguous description of a stage suggests 
some lack of clarity in the theoretical underpinnings of the model. 
The second primary move in deconstructive analysis is identification of 
silences and gaps. This analytic procedure is derived from the assumption that 
descriptions are necessarily premised on an ideology. Assessment of the ideology on 
which a particular text is based is explicated through an examination of the alternative 
viable meanings marginalised or excluded from its account. Several such gaps were 
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identified in the analysis of the APES. These were; (1) absence of factors other than 
the psychological with regard to the client's problem, (2) marginalisation of factors 
other than intellectual and (3) omission of factors outwith the client or therapist's 
control in the promotion of the client's improvement. 
Although distinguishable, these three gaps are closely related to each other. 
The implication that the client's improvement is a controllable process is first raised 
in the problem statement/clarification (4th) stage with reference to the client initiating 
agentic and directed problem-solving efforts. Agency and control then appear as 
themes in the remaining stages. However, control is characterised in terms of client 
change as a rational, cognitive and intellectual process; a theme appearing in all but 
the warded off (1st) stage and emphasised most strongly in understanding/insight 
(5th). In turn, the idea that client change is a psychological process is enabled by the 
assumption of the client's psychological ownership of the problem and subsequent 
implication of her/his aberrant psychological processes. This theme saturates the 
warded off (1st) stage and appears, though in declining importance, in all the early 
stages (excluding problem statement (4th)) until understanding/insight (5th). 
So, the analysis of the assimilation of problematic experiences scale (APES) 
demonstrates it to be premised on a notion of change in psychotherapy as a 
controllable, psychological and intellectual process. Such an account echoes Pilgrim's 
(1992) identification of a tendency toward psychological reductionism in 
psychotherapeutic thinking. In line with the assumptions of deconstructive analysis, 
such an account can be understood to evoke two binary oppositions and to privilege 
one side of each dichotomy. That is, first, emphasis on the psychological and 
controllable evoke an 'inner-outer' dichotomy privileging the 'inner'. Second, the 
focus on the intellectual and controllable evoke a 'rational-emotional' dichotomy 
privileging the 'rational. '. 
The first dichotomy was identified as 'inner-outer'. It was suggested that the 
APES privileged the 'inner' in its focus on the psychological and controllable. First, in 
relation to the psychological, it can be observed that drawing on both cognitive 
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science and psychodynamic theory, the APES focuses on processes occurring within 
the client's head. Thus the client's problem and processes of change are individualised 
as a matter of personal psychology (for critical review see Waitzkin, 1989; Waitzkin 
& Britt, 1989). Second, the implication that processes of change are controllable 
contributes to the emphasis on the 'inner' in placing the client's improvement within 
her/his personal sphere of influence. To examine the exclusion of 'outer' conditions 
(e. g., situational, social and cultural) from the account of change offered in the APES 
the ways in which the process of change is maintained as psychological and 
controllable will be explicated in more detail. 
First, analysis suggested that the APES maintained an account of the client's 
processes of change as a psychological matter. This was accomplished, for example, 
through the suggestion in the warded off stage that certain client behaviours (changes 
of topic) may indicate avoidance of a problematic experience. That is, as the client is 
also characterised as 'unaware' of this problem during this warded off stage the 
implication becomes available that her/his avoidance is motivated by psychological 
defences. It was suggested, however, that such behaviour could also be accounted for 
in other ways. For example, the topic may have been considered by the client to be of 
minor relevance to her/his problems. In fact, the analysis demonstrated that 
considering the client's behaviour 'avoidant' is premised on the assumption of the 
existence of a warded off problematic experience rather than being evidence for this. 
Analysis also suggested that, although presented as unproblematic, many 
descriptions of the client or of her/his self-report in therapy were necessarily 
interpretative or, at least, speculative. However, such descriptions had the effect of 
promoting the psychological assumptions on which the APES is based while 
excluding alternative possibilities. For example, the client is characterised as having 
some 'unpleasant recognitions' in the understanding/insight (5th) stage. Analysis 
suggested that although such a description implies 'unpleasant' to be an inherent 
feature of the client's recognitions and thus to be an objective evaluation the 
description must rely on either the client's self report in therapy or an interpretation of 
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her/his reaction. The term 'recognitions', though, was observed to indicate either 
identification of something already known or acknowledgement of its existence. 
Describing the client as making some 'unpleasant recognitions' was therefore argued 
to sustain the assumption that a hidden problematic experience existed prior to the 
client's awareness of it. 
The omission of 'outer' conditions from the account offered in the APES is 
also sustained by the assumption that the client's process of change is a controllable 
matter. That is, in the problem statement/clarification stage (4th) stage the client's 
successful progress is predicated on her/his initiation of agentic and directed effort. 
Moreover, the successful mastery of her/his problems in the final three stages is 
accounted for in terms of the tenacious application of the correct methodology. Thus 
'outer' conditions which might conceivably contribute to the genesis of the client's 
problems and place restrictions on her/his personal control resolving these problems, 
are omitted from the account offered in the APES (see Sampson, 1981). 
The second dichotomy was identified as 'rational-emotional'. It was suggested 
that the APES privileged the rational in marginalising factors other than intellectual 
processes in the promotion of the client's improvement; an understanding which is 
also supported by the emphasis on control. For example, this is apparent during the 
understanding/insight (5th) stage where the client is described as 'curious' and thus 
motivated to learn more even though this may be about unpleasant things. Moreover, 
in the final stages of successful therapy there is an emphasis on rationality in the use 
of the correct (scientific) methodology in order to master a problem. It can be argued 
that such an emphasis therefore marginalises potential alternative processes such as 
emotional support from the therapist in the promotion of the client's improvement. 
The implication that processes of change are controllable also contributes to 
the emphasis on the 'rational' in the 'rational-emotional' dichotomy. That is, rationality 
and control have been characterised as qualities associated with the ideal self of 
contemporary Western culture (e. g., Foucault, 1971; Gaines, 1992; Hermans, 
Kempen, & van Loon, 1992). Emotion, on the other hand is negatively evaluated in 
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relation to thought and, amongst other things, associated with the irrational and 
uncontrollable (Lutz, 1988). Thus, it has been suggested that "(e)motion, like mental 
illness, in psychiatry's psychology, is an assault on and an insult to the ideal self" 
(Gaines, 1992, p. 16). It can therefore be argued that an emphasis on control suggests 
a valuation of the rational and marginalisation of the emotional. 
So, two dichotomies were identified as underlying the account of the 
processes of change in successful psychotherapy offered in the assimilation of 
problematic experiences scale (APES); 'inner-outer' and 'rational-emotional'. 
Moreover, it was argued that the APES privileged the 'inner' and 'rational' sides of 
these dichotomies. In relation to dismantling dichotomies, the first stage of 
deconstructive analysis is to reverse the hierarchy of the oppositions (Wood, 1979). In 
a move toward this reversal, it may be argued that 'psychological' problems may be 
viewed as an effect of socio-cultural conditions. For example, Westkott (1986) has 
investigated the historical and cultural conditions of female dependency, Hare-Mustin 
and Marecek (1986) suggesting that "(w)ithout social change, autonomy may not be a 
realistic goal of therapy for women" (p. 205). Moreover, Mac an Ghaill (1994) has 
explored the way in which schooling produces a range of masculinities which young 
men come to inhabit which are then policed by themselves and others. 
The marginalisation of emotional factors in the process of change may also be 
traced to cultural factors. In a cultural constructivist reading of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manuals (DSM-I to III-R) Gaines (1992) identifies north-European- 
Protestant assumptions regarding psychological functioning. Specifically, this is 
identified with regard to viewing emotional extremes as problematic; a view 
contrasted to Latin-Mediterranean ethnopsychiatry. 
Having demonstrated how it is possible to reverse the hierarchy of 
dichotomies, the next stage of deconstructive analysis is to prevent the old opposition 
from being re-established through providing a transformation; "the irruption 
emergence of a new 'concept', one which nolonger allows itself (not that it ever did) 
to be understood on the earlier ground. " (Wood, 1979, p. 24). In this respect, 
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discursive psychology (e. g., Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Potter & Edwards, 1992) will 
now be discussed as having the potential to more fully challenge dichotomies such as 
'inner-outer' 'rational-emotional', and offer an alternative perspective from that 
offered in the assimilation model to the processes of change in psychotherapy. 
From a discursive perspective, change is conceptualised as a process of 
negotiation between client and therapist. That is, for example, the formulation of 
something as a 'problematic experience' is viewed as a discursive achievement. Thus, 
it is unnecessary to presuppose that if articulated only later in therapy a 'problematic 
experience' had previously existed but in a hidden realm of the client's psyche. 
Rather, the psychotherapy dialogue is considered one of many sites in which the 
client's reality is accounted for and awarded meaning. As Anderson and Goolishian 
state; "(the) resource for change, the not-yet-said, is not "in" the unconscious or any 
other psychic structure. This resource is not "in" the cell of the biological structure, 
nor is it "in" a social structure such as the family. This resource is in the "circle of the 
unexpressed"" (italics in original, 1988, p. 381). 
Rather than view process of change as 'inner-outer' and/or 'rational-emotional', 
a discursive approach would explicate how participants themselves orient to such 
categories. For example, Chapters 5 and 6 investigate how a client and therapist 
debate differing accounts of the client's problems structured around an 'inner-outer' 
dichotomy, i. e., the client situating her problems in the 'outer' circumstances of her 
life as wife and mother, the therapist offering a (re)formulated understanding in terms 
of the 'inner' conditions of the client's personal psychology. Moreover, Chapter 7 
looks at how a change in the client's account of her feelings toward her mother 
becomes understood as a revelation of formerly obstructed emotion. 
Another feature of the discursive approach is that such an account 
demonstrates how sense is achieved through drawing on meanings inherent in the 
local socio-cultural context. In doing so, however, discursive psychology can be 
understood as privileging the 'outer' side of the 'inner-outer' dichotomy. In a 
development of a theory of subjectivity for critical discursive psychology Parker 
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implicitly addresses this point. He suggests that "(t)he 'model' of the person which 
critical psychology has been searching for but has so far been unable to find is one 
which conceives of subjectivity as the point of contact between the individual and the 
social (rather than opting for one or the other). " (italics in original, Parker, 1992, 
p. 117). Parker offers the beginnings of such a model utilising studies demonstrating 
the suffusion of psychoanalysis through contemporary Western culture, e. g., in 
America (Berger, 1965), Britain (Bocock, 1976), and France (Moscovici, 1976). 
Parker argues that psychoanalysis has had a powerful influence on the discourse of 
selfhood in Western culture (1995) and can be considered both socially constructed 
and 'real' (Parker, 1993). That is, psychoanalytic understanding of subjectivity can be 
understood as socially constructed in presenting a culturally and historically relative 
model of the person. However, it can also be considered true for contemporary 
Western culture in that subjects inhabit the psychoanalytic subject positions or 
'discursive complexes' that have thus been provided. 
A benefit of these ideas for the current study is that it offers a foundation for 
understanding why the assimilation model might be considered an acceptable and 
useful account of psychotherapy change processes at this particular socio-historical 
juncture. As suggested in the analysis and earlier in the discussion, the warded off 
(1st) stage of the assimilation of problematic experiences scale (APES) is difficult to 
interpret without invoking a psychodynamic understanding of unconscious 
psychological processes. However, it may also be argued that the first five stages 
(warded off, unwanted thoughts, vague awareness, problem statement/clarification, 
understanding/insight) lend themselves to the straightforward psychodynamic 
understanding of the lifting of a repression. It can be argued that it is through being 
interpretable in psychoanalytic terms, and thus drawing on cultural 'common-sense', 
that the APES offers a viable framework for mapping processes of change in 
psychotherapy for contemporary Western subjects. 
Such an understanding, though, also highlights certain drawbacks to the 
assimilation model and the APES as a scale for use by coders assessing 
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psychotherapy tapes and transcripts. That is, first, if the initial five stages are as easily 
or better understood in terms of psychodynamic processes, incorporation of concepts 
drawn from cognitive science appears redundant. This is so particularly if, as argued, 
there are theoretical problems with the compatibility of psychodynamic and schema 
accounts within the one model of change. Second, if the psychodynamic model of the 
subject is embedded in our cultural common-sense and the APES is interpretable in 
this light, there is an argument that coders using the APES may be understanding the 
stages psychodynamically rather than in terms of the assimilation processes it posits. 
In a theoretical development of the model, Stiles (1994) uses the notion of 
semiosis to amplify understanding of change offered by the assimilation model. 
Semiosis refers to "the creation and elaboration of signs, or of meaning-making 
during conversation" (p. 1). In this way assimilation of a problematic experience is 
understood in terms of "establishing ways to think and talk about" (Stiles, 1994, p. 4) 
problematic experiences. Such an understanding of the assimilation model is not 
incompatible with the position of discursive psychology. However, as the analysis 
presented here suggests, in accounting for change the APES implies the existence of 
abnormal psychological process within the client's head, locates problems within the 
individual client, and fits the process of change into a pre-hypothesised sequence of 
stages. In contrast to this a discursive approach would examine how the existence of 
particular psychological process or the source of particular problems becomes 
established within the therapy conversation. Moreover, a discursive analysis would 
seek to explicate the specific contours of actual sequences from the psychotherapy 
dialogue and posit local and revisable micro-theories of change from this empirical 
basis. 
Accordingly, the first chapter analysing extracts from psychotherapy (Chapter 
4) illustrates how a discursive approach may be utilised in relation to change process 
research through offering an alternative perspective on material already demonstrated 
to be understandable in terms of the assimilation model. But first Chapter 3 
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introduces the background to the analysis of therapy interaction presented in Chapters 
4to7. 
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Background to analysis 
This third chapter introduces the background to the discursive analyses presented in 
Chapters 4 to 7. These analyses comprise studies from three cases of therapy and 
explore the links between therapy process and outcome in relation to the question 
'how does change occur in psychodynamic-interpersonal psychotherapy? '. The design 
utilises a comparative case study methodology in line with a tradition of clinical 
research (e. g., Davidson & Costello, 1969; Freud, 1901/1953; Kazdin, 1986). 
The Second Sheffield Psychotherapy Project 
The parameters on which cases of therapy could be selected were set by the large 
comparative study of individual psychotherapy process and outcome from which the 
present research draws: the Second Sheffield Psychotherapy Project (SPP2; Shapiro, 
Barkham, Hardy, & Morrison, 1990; Shapiro, Barkham, Rees, Hardy, Reynolds, & 
Startup, 1994). This project sampled professional, managerial and white-collar 
workers suffering from depression and/or anxiety who considered their problems to 
be affecting their work. Screening criteria excluded three categories of client; those 
with (1) more than two years continuous history of psychiatric disorder prior to 
referral; (2) those having had treatment similar to that offered in the study within the 
previous five years; (3) those having undergone a significant change in psychotropic 
medication during the previous six weeks. 
The design called for 120 cases comprising 30 cases in each of four 
therapeutic conditions; two therapy methods (psychodynamic-interpersonal (PI) & 
cognitive-behavioural (CB)) and two treatment durations (8 & 16 one-hour weekly 
sessions). The five project therapists (2 female, 3 male) were each required to treat 24 
clients; six in each of the four conditions. Three cases were excluded due to pre- 
treatment gain and missing data. The project therefore provided an archive of 117 
audio-taped therapy cases of clients meeting a DSM-III diagnosis of major depressive 
episode. 
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Clients were assigned to treatment conditions at random following a full 
clinical assessment. The initial assessment comprised the Present State Examination 
(PSE: Wing, Cooper, & Sartorius, 1974), the Personality Disorders Examination 
(Loranger, Susman, Oldham, & Russakoff, 1987), and items from the Diagnostic 
Interview Schedule (Eaton & Kessler, 1985) sufficient to make a diagnosis of major 
depressive episode, generalised anxiety disorder, and panic disorder. All clients were 
required to meet a diagnosis of major depressive episode. In addition, clients were 
required to meet a criteria of 5 on the Index of Definition of the PSE indicating 
confidence in the PSE diagnosis. Severity of clients' symptoms for the purpose of 
allocation to one of three severity groups (high, moderate, low) were obtained from a 
criterion measure of depression; the Beck Depression Inventory, designed to tap 
recent depressive symptomatology (BDI: Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 
1961). 
At the second part of the intake assessment clients were presented with a list 
of individualised problems derived from the initial assessment interview. Clients were 
asked to select a total of 10 items, 2 from each of 5 categories: symptoms, mood, self- 
esteem, relationship, and specific performance (Personal Questionnaire: Mulhall, 
1976: Phillips, 1986). Informed consent proceedings were used such that clients knew 
they were taking part in a research project and knew that they were receiving one of 
four possible treatments. After therapy was completed (i. e., when the client knew the 
content of the therapy tapes) clients' permission was sought to release these tapes for 
research purposes. 
Other studies using this data set include Agnew, Harper, and Shapiro 
(Resolving a challenge to the therapeutic relationship: A single case study, 1993), 
Shapiro, Barkham, Reynolds, Hardy, & Stiles (Prescriptive and exploratory 
psychotherapies: Toward an integration based on the assimilation model, 1992), and 
Stiles, Reynolds, Hardy, Rees, Barkham, and Shapiro (Evaluation and description of 
psychotherapy sessions by clients' using the session evaluation questionnaire and the 
sessions impacts scale, 1994). 
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Eight-session psychodynamic-interpersonal psychotherapy 
The present study focuses on a detailed analysis of three cases of therapy in order to 
maintain the possibility of linking therapy process with the measures of macro- 
outcome obtained in SPP2. Such a procedure might have been compromised had 
extracts had been sampled across a wider number of cases. Moreover, as the two 
therapy methods utilised in SPP2 had been specifically selected for their differential 
rationales it was considered appropriate to focus on the process of one therapy type in 
detail in this thesis. 
The orientation of interest was the psychodynamic-interpersonal 
psychotherapy (PI). The particular variant of PI therapy used in SPP2 was based on 
Hobson's conversational model (Hobson, 1985). It has several key features. First is 
the assumption that clients' problems arise from disturbances in personal 
relationships. Second, the therapeutic relationship itself is regarded as a vehicle for 
the manifestation, exploration and modification of such problems. And third, 
intervention consists of the therapist's use of certain conversational strategies; posing 
"hypotheses to be explored in relation to the client's behaviour and experiences within 
the therapy situation" (Shapiro & Firth, 1985, p. 7-8), the use of negotiation, metaphor 
and the development of a'common feeling language'. In contrast, CB therapy focuses 
on problem identification and solution and so is more task oriented and therapist 
directed. PI therapy was selected for two reasons. First, as a process-oriented, 
exploratory therapy it was assumed to offer greater potential than CB therapy for 
studying clients' accounts of their depression. Second, as intervention focuses on 
conversational strategies it seemed particularly compatible with discursive analysis. 
Third, the author had a particular interest in studying a form of psychodynamic 
psychotherapy as research has suggested that psychoanalytic ideas have had a 
formative influence on contemporary Western culture (see Chapter 2, pages 66-67). 
In understanding the extracts presented in the thesis it is important to note that, as 
therapy was carried out in a research context, the therapist was under particular onus 
to adhere to manualised therapeutic guide-lines. 
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In order to investigate differentials in process and so identify elements 
contributing to successful therapy both 'successful' and 'poor' outcome cases were 
selected for study. As discursive analysis does not require a mass of data and, 
furthermore is a relatively labour intensive approach, the 8-session PI therapy (as 
opposed to the 16-session) was selected as a more practical time period for 
investigation. 
Case selection 
Three cases of 8-session PI therapy were selected for detailed study. This comprised a 
pilot study of a successful case and then comparative poor and good outcome cases. 
Case selection was made on the basis of client BDI scores. 
Table 3 1: BDI scores for all 30 cases of 8-session PI therapy 
Case 
7 wks 
before 
session 1 
4 wks 
before 
session 1 
Prior to 
session 1 
2 wks 
post- 
therapy 
12 wks 
post- 
therapy 
52 wks 
post- 
therapy 
1 - 23 - 1 4 27 
2 32 19 30 24 19 7 
3 - 22 26.25 27 30.45 32 
(A) 29 25 27 2 4 5 
5 17 15 7 2 0 0 
(C) 21 20 24 0 0 0 
7 17 10 8 1 1.05 4 
8 19 24 23 16 13 - 28 24 22 23 19 10 
10 31 28 21 23 7 3 
11 20 22 9 3 3 11 
12 22 19 14 7 9 3 
13 22 17 18 6 9 6 
14 40 36 26 16 20 26 
15 22 13 18 19 16 23 
16 26 16 15 17.85 14 15.47 
17 36 25 25 13 12 7 
18 17 12 15 1 0 0 
19 20 18 15 13 11 6 
20 33 29 28 10 12 5 
21 22 20 22 19 22 20 
22 23 17 19 17 11 3 
23 17 16 12 1 0 0 
24 27 26.25 31 24 35 25 
25 27 30 21 16 16 2 
26 29 16 15 8 4 1 
27 16 12 13 19 12 17 
28 17 17 12 - 15 - 29 19 18 22 15 6 21 
30 26 15 21 20 12 15 
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The BDI was administered to all clients on three occasions before therapy 
commenced; 7 weeks, 4 weeks and immediately prior to the first session. The 
measure was administered again at three occasions after therapy completion; 2 weeks, 
12 weeks and at one year follow-up. Possible BDI scores range from 0-63, guide- 
lines suggesting the following severity categories: 
Table 3.2: BDI severity categories 
BDI Category 
0-9 Normal 
10-15 Mild 
16-19 Mild-moderate 
20-29 Moderate-severe 
30-63 Severe 
Case (A) 
BDI scores (Table 3.1) indicated that case (A) had a particularly successful outcome. 
That is, the client's scores suggested a moderate-severe depressive episode at all 
assessment points prior to therapy commencing (29,25,27), this falling to well 
within normal range after therapy completion (2,4,5). Change therefore met the most 
stringent criteria of clinical significance offered by Jacobson and Truax (1991). 
Moreover, as material from this case had already been transcribed during the course 
of previous research (Field et al., 1994) the case was utilised as a pilot study 
exploring how discursive analysis of process might be linked with client self-report 
measures of outcome. 
Case (B) 
BDI scores indicated that case (B) had a particularly poor outcome. The client's 
scores remained within the moderate-severe range before therapy (28,24,22), at the 
first assessment point 2 weeks post-therapy (23) and at the top of the mild-moderate 
range 12 weeks after therapy completion (19). Although the client's score fell to 
almost normal levels at one year after therapy completion (10), and cannot be 
discounted, this was considered to be of less import to micro-level process research 
than assessments immediately prior to and following the course of therapy. 
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Case (C) 
BDI scores indicated that case (C) had a particularly good outcome. The client scored 
within the moderate-severe range before the start of therapy (21,20,24), her scores 
however suggesting no depressive symptomatology at all three assessment points up 
to a year after therapy completion (0,0,0). So, as in case (A), the client's 
improvement met Jacobson and Truax's (1991) most stringent criteria for clinical 
significance. 
Although these three cases were selected for detailed study on the criteria of 
client BDI scores they offered a particularly appropriate data set for intra-group 
comparison as certain important features of these cases were similar. That is, all three 
cases comprised female clients of similar age (40-50 yrs) who were in full-time, 
professional employment. Moreover, the therapist in each case was male. In fact, 
cases (B) and (C) offered a particularly good comparison as they were among the 
least and most successful cases of 8-session PI therapy of one of the SPP2 therapists. 
Theme selection 
One problematic theme was selected for detailed study from each of these three cases 
of therapy. Problematic themes were selected from the Personal Questionnaire (PQ) 
data (lists of 10 individualised statements identifying two of the clients' most salient 
issues). Items were elicited from clients before the start of therapy. All 10 statements 
were rated each week immediately prior to session. The task required the client rate 
how much each problem had bothered them during the week on a 7-point scale with 
anchor points of 1 ('not at all') and 7 ('maximum possible'). Tables 3.3,3.4 and 3.5 
below present the PQ information obtained for each of the selected cases detailing (1) 
the client-specified problem, (2) PQ scores in session order for that item, (3) mean 
score and (4) range for that issue (session 4 PQ data were not completed by the client 
in cases (A) and (C)): 
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Table 3.3: PO information for case (AL(good outcome) 
P item (case A) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Mean Range 
1. Fear of becoming ill and taking time 5 5 5 - 5 7 4 2 4.7 2-7 
off work 
2. Feeling wound up and panicky 6 4 6 - 6 5 3 1 4.4 1-6 
3. Difficulties looking after my 7 7 4 - 5 2 1 1 3.9 1-7 dementing mother 
4. Working more slowly than I should 3 5 4 - 4 5 3 2 3.7 2-5 do 
5. Feeling I'm not contributing enough 3 4 4 - 3 2 2 1 2.7 1-4 time to mmarriage at the moment 
6. Feeling people at home aren't doing 2 3 5 - 3 2 1 1 2.4 1-5 their share of the work 
7. Feeling scared that I will become 7 7 5 - 6 7 4 1 5.3 1-7 
depressed again 
8. Feeling flat and empty inside 6 6 3 - 5 4 2 1 3.9 1-6 
9. Feeling that people might notice 7 7 7 - 6 6 4 2 5.6 2-7 
that I'm not in control at work 
10. Feeling I'm being blamed for 2 2 2 - 3 1 1 1 1.7 1-3 
keeping my mother at home 
Table 3.4: PO information for case (B' (poor outcome) 
PQ item (case B) 1 2 1-3 4 5 6 7 8 Mean Range 
1. Worrying about things 6 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 4.9 4-6 
2. Not having time to relax 5 5 6 4 4 4 5 5 4.7 4-6 
3. Difficulty seeing any future 6 6 5 4 4 3 4 4 4.5 3-6 
4. Feeling disenchanted with work 6 6 6 5 4 5 5 4 5.1 4-6 
S. Difficulty shouldering all the 
responsibility at home 
5 6 6 5 4 5 5 5 5.1 4-6 
6. Not feeling attractive to people 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 T 5.0 5-5 
7. Retreating and becoming detached 
fromm husband 
6 6 5 5 5 4 5 5 5.1 4-6 
8. Lack of self-confidence 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5.4 5-6 
9. Feeling irritable with eldest 
- 
3 2 2 2 2 5 3 2 2.6 2-5 
10. Having to push myself to do things 
because I'm so tired 
5 5 5 4 4 5 4 4 4.5 4-5 
76 
Chapter 3 
Table 3.5: PO information for case (C) (good outcome) 
PQ item (case C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Mean Range 
1. Difficulty thinking clearly 6 5 4 - 2 2 2 2 3.3 2-6 
2. Feeling wound up and anxious 5 6 6 - 3 2 2 2 3.7 2-6 
3. Difficulty planning and organising 
my work 
5 4 3 - 2 1 2 1 2.6 1-5 
4. Not doing things at work that I 
know I should do 
3 5 2 - 2 1 1 1 2.1 1-5 
5. Feeling angry with people at work 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1.0 1-1 
6. Feeling irritable at work 5 4 1 2 2 1 2 2.4 1-5 
7. Difficulty standing up for myself 
with others 
5 6 5 - 4 2 2 2 3.7 2-6 
8. Feeling that I have let my family 
down 
6 5 5 - 4 2 2 2 3.7 2-6 
9. Feeling I'm being blamed for the 
breakdown of my marriage 
6 5 7 - 3 2 2 2 3.9 2-7 
10 Feeling uncertain about the future 
at work 
2 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1.1 1-2 
One successfully resolved issue was chosen for detailed analysis from each 
successful case and an unresolved issue from the unsuccessful case. It was decided to 
select problematic themes which reflected the general outcome of the case to allow a 
clear division in the outcome of the material studied. However, as can be seen from 
the PQ data (Tables 3.3,3.4 & 3.5), most PQ items do in fact reflect the general 
outcome of each case. 
Resolution of a problem was judged by reduction in PQ score from an initial 
rating of at least 5 ('considerably'), suggesting that the issue was problematic 
immediately prior to the client commencing therapy, to a score 2 ('very little') or less 
at the assessment point immediately prior to the final session. Selection of an 
unsuccessfully resolved problem was based on there being no ultimate improvement 
by the final assessment point from a PQ score of 5 or more. On a practical level, as 
therapy dialogue had to be selected from audio-tapes, the potential ease with which 
themes could be differentiated from other topics was taken into consideration. Thus, 
for example, although the PQ item 'worrying about things' from case (B) fulfilled the 
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criteria for an unsuccessfully resolved item, it was considered too general for 
selection as a problematic theme for detailed study. Moreover, to enable a comparison 
between cases, themes were also selected for face similarity across cases. 
Case (A) 
One successfully resolved problematic theme was selected from this more generally 
successful case. The theme chosen for detailed analysis concerned the client's 
difficulties with respect to her mother (Table 3.3). This theme was specified by the 
client in the two relationship problem statements elicited from her at the intake 
assessment: 'difficulties looking after my dementing mother' and 'feeling I'm being 
blamed for keeping my mother at home'. On PQ score, both items were resolved by 
the end of therapy with the former fulfilling the criteria for a successfully resolved 
issue utilised in the current study. That is, PQ scores for 'difficulties looking after my 
dementing mother' ranged from maximum possible severity (7) immediately prior to 
the first session to a minimum score (1) immediately prior to the final session. As all 
this client's items were successfully resolved, this particular item was utilised as 
transcription of relevant material was available from previous research on clients' 
problems with authority figures (Field, 1995). 
Case (B) 
Reflecting the domestic and family theme, the item selected from case (B) was 
'difficulty shouldering all the responsibility at home' (Table 3.4). This item was 
selected for its poor outcome. Client PQ scores prior to sessions one and eight 
indicated a 'considerable' problem (5) with scores ranging between 'moderate' (4) and 
'very considerable' severity (6) throughout therapy. 
Case (C) 
Continuing to reflect the domestic and family theme, the successfully resolved PQ 
item selected from case (C) was 'feeling that I have let my family down' (Table 3.5). 
PQ scores indicated that this item was of 'very considerable' severity (6) at the start of 
therapy falling to 'very little' difficulty (2) immediately prior to the final session. 
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Critique 
of case and theme selection procedure 
Both case and theme selection were made with regard to self-report questionnaire data 
gathered from clients. However, within a discursive research approach both 
diagnostic categories such as 'depression' and outcome definitions like that provided 
by the BDI can be regarded as artifacts constructing the phenomenon they aim to 
evaluate (Gaines, 1992; Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988; Smith, 1983). Furthermore, 
client problem statements, like those of the PQ, could be considered artificially 
constraining the variable ways clients' may define aspects of their problems 
throughout therapy. This study acknowledges these potential criticism of selection 
procedures. The use of such criteria though is defended on the grounds that the aim of 
this research is to offer a discursive approach to material which would be understood 
as successfully or unsuccessfully resolved within a traditional clinical setting. 
Selection of dialogue for analysis 
In order to obtain transcripts of therapy dialogue for detailed study, conversation 
pertaining to the selected problematic themes from each case was gathered from 
audio-tapes of therapy. 
Case (A) 
In case (A) Field et al. (1994) identified sessions 1,3,5 and 7 as reflecting a range of 
therapeutic impacts from 'no change' to 'high change' while covering the range of PQ 
severity scores for the selected theme (7,4,5,1). Extracts were therefore selected 
only from these four sessions. This procedure was accomplished by Field et al. in two 
stages. First, two research assistants independently selected extracts pertaining to the 
client's difficulty with her mother from audio-tapes guided by a manual (Field, 1991 - 
see Appendix 1 for precis). Both were psychology graduates in their mid-twenties; 
one female and one male. If both specified confidently that a passage was relevant it 
was transcribed and divided into therapist-client adjacency pairs (i. e., two consecutive 
conversational turns). Second, these adjacency pairs were then judged for their 
meaningfulness when considered in isolation. This task was accomplished by three 
researchers selected for their familiarity with the case; the therapist, an experienced 
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male clinical psychologist and female psychology post-graduate (first author of the 
former study). This process yielded 24 adjacency pairs; 2 from session 1,3 from 
session 3,9 from session 5 and 10 from session 7. For the purposes of the current 
study consecutive dialogue was re-united. 
Case (B) 
For case (B) extracts pertaining to the client's 'difficulty shouldering all the 
responsibility at home' were selected from audio-tapes of all eight sessions of therapy. 
Material was selected by three psychology graduates. All were in their mid- or late- 
twenties; two were male and one female (the author). One was working as an assistant 
psychologist in a psychiatric hospital and the others were doctoral students in clinical 
related research. Selection of material was organised in such a way that each session 
of therapy had extracts chosen independently by two of the three listeners using 
selection instructions prepared by the author (Appendix 2). The listeners were 
instructed to be as inclusive as possible in their selection of material as (1) there was 
considered to be no absolute criterion on which passages could be considered 
irrelevant and (2) the aim of this procedure was merely to collect material for further 
study. All identified passages were therefore fully transcribed. This provided 16 
passages varying in length from a few lines of dialogue to 5 pages of transcript. 
Case (C) 
A similar process to that accomplished for case (B) was carried out in the selection of 
material from case (C). Material relevant to the client's problematic theme 'feeling 
that I have let my family down' was selected from all eight, audio-taped session of 
therapy. Material was selected independently by one of the male listeners and the 
female listener involved in collecting material from case (B). As before, selection 
instructions were provided by the author (Appendix 3). Inclusive selection yielded 29 
extracts varying in length from a few lines of dialogue to 18 pages of transcript. 
Transcription 
Transcription was carried out by a number of different people. However, all 
transcripts were carefully checked against audio-tapes by the author until she was 
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satisfied with the level of accuracy. As much detail of the spoken text was 
incorporated in the written transcriptions as was considered useful for the type of 
discursive analysis to be carried out (see Cook, 1990). A modified version of 
transcription conventions developed by Jefferson (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984) was 
therefore adopted: 
(0) Pauses timed in seconds 
(, ) An untimed short pause 
word Stress on word by speaker 
(inaudible) Transcriber's doubt 
C: Client's turn 
T: Therapist's turn 
T: (mm) Overlapping utterance 
End of turn 
' 
Extract started or finished mid-turn 
s name) (son Names excluded for client confidentiality 
child (wife's) Clarification where required 
(whispered) Tonal information 
I.., ] Excluded text 
Analytic procedures 
Discourse analysis is not a methodology but may be considered a 'craft skill' 
developed though applying the theoretical perspective of discursive psychology to the 
analysis of texts. However, a guide to analytic procedures will be given here, 
although this will not be in the form of a set methodology. Rather, a description of 
how analysis was approached will be offered. 
In each case the first stage involved listening to audio-tapes of the complete 8- 
hour therapy in order to contextualise the extracts obtained for detailed study. In the 
second stage, all selected extracts were subjected to preliminary analysis. This 
involved paying close attention to both content (the meaning conveyed) and form 
(how this meaning was 'put together' or constructed). Detailed notes examining how 
the extracts appeared to 'make sense' were written from this close reading of the text 
from which patterns of consistency and variability in description were identified. 
Other features of interest were the implication particular accounts made available 
within the context of the therapy and from this, speculations made regarding the 
social actions or functions performed by these accounts. From this preliminary 
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analysis, then, key sections of text were identified for presentation which appeared 
significant in the preliminary analysis. The final stage entailed production of a 
detailed analysis of these key samples of text, linking analytic claims to specific 
extracts. This final stage is presented in full and comprises the analysis offered in 
each analytic chapter. 
Relevant case, theme and dialogue selection details, and analytic procedures 
will be reiterated in the method section of each of the following analytic chapters. 
Validity and evaluation criteria 
Many qualitative research approaches entertain different assumptions from the natural 
sciences regarding the nature of the investigative enterprise and the kind of 
knowledge which may be obtained (Rennie, 1994c). Independent evaluative criteria 
have therefore been developed for these approaches in the context of psychotherapy 
(Elliott, 1994; Rennie, 1994d; Stiles, 1993). However, in their original book Potter 
and Wetherell (1987) suggest three evaluation criteria pertaining specifically to 
discourse analytic research: (1) coherence of interpretation, (2) increased 
understanding of the subject matter, and (3) the raising of issues which would not 
have been found in other ways. 
As a developing approach Potter (in press) suggests four more quality criteria 
which may be applicable to different kinds of discourse analytic studies. First, studies 
aiming to show some regularity in a discursive phenomenon, e. g., that a question is 
followed by an answer, might offer an analysis of deviant cases in which this pattern 
is not followed. Deviant case analysis may disconfirm the pattern or demonstrate its 
genuiness through showing how a break in the pattern is attended to by the 
interactants. Second, there is a check on the analyst's interpretation of a text through 
the use of participants' own understandings. That is, a turn would be interpreted, e. g., 
as a confirmation, only if the participants oriented to the turn in this way in 
subsequent conversation. Third, the validity of earlier studies can be gauged from 
their ability to inform later research as this suggests they are demonstrating something 
useful about interaction. And, fourth, in presenting the extracts which are being 
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analysed and thus providing the 'raw data' discourse analytic research is more open 
than most approaches to the reader's own evaluation. As Rennie (1994d) suggests, 
analytic rigour can be judged by the plausibility and persuasiveness of the presented 
analysis which is always directly accountable to the data. 
The following four chapters present analyses drawn from the three selected 
cases of 8-session psychodynamic-interpersonal psychotherapy. These studies 
represent a developing approach to linking a discursive analysis of psychotherapy 
process with evaluation of theme outcome addressing the question 'how does change 
occur in psychodynamic-interpersonal psychotherapy? '. 
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Subject position and discursive processes 
of change in one successful case of psychodynamic- 
interpersonal psychotherapy 
This chapter introduces the first empirical study of extracts from therapy dialogue 
presented in this thesis. The study constitutes the initial stage of developing an 
approach linking discursive analysis of therapy process with evaluation of case and 
domain outcome. This is accomplished through demonstrating how a detailed analysis 
of dialogue pertaining to a client-specified, problematic theme offers an 
understanding of how this theme was successfully resolved; an outcome indicated by 
a client self-report measure. 
Another feature of this study is that it offers an opportunity to compare a 
qualitative, discursive approach with a quantitative, stage model approach to change 
process research. This is so as the text on which this analysis draws also formed the 
basis of a recent quantitative study assessing client change in terms of the assimilation 
model (Field et al., 1994). This former study was designed to test the stages of 
change predicted by the assimilation model (Stiles et al., 1990). The assimilation of 
problematic experiences scale (APES), which offers a concise description of the 
stages posited by the model, was subjected to deconstructive analysis in Chapter 2. To 
recap briefly, the assimilation model proposes eight consecutive stages of therapeutic 
impact on the client's cognitive representation of a problematic experience as this 
experience becomes assimilated to a schema: warded off, unwanted thoughts, vague 
awareness, problem statement/clarification, understanding/insight, application 
/working through, problem solution, mastery (see Table 2.1, p. 34). 
Field et al., articulate the methodological difficulties defining and identifying 
schemata from transcripts of conversation. Accordingly, the criterion of validity for 
schema identification they decided upon was observer consensus from independent 
review of the material (Horowitz, 1990). Six raters were familiarised with the 
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assimilation model and given a training of a minimum 7 hours practice rating. These 
raters then assessed 17 randomised client-therapist adjacency pairs (one therapist plus 
one client conversational turn, e. g., a question and a reply) for level of assimilation. 
These adjacency pairs were selected from the therapy discussions of a client-specified 
problematic theme. Results showed that ratings of schematic assimilation via the 
APES scale were significantly correlated with the chronological order of the 
adjacency pairs across therapy. Field et al. concluded that "(r)esults were consistent 
with the assimilation model's suggestion that problematic experiences tend to progress 
through predictable series of stages in successful psychotherapy (1994, p. 404). 
The present chapter offers an alternative, discursive approach to the clinical 
material studied by Field et al. In this way the differences between the approaches 
and the potential merits of a discursive analysis are highlighted. 
To recap again briefly, discourse analysis is a qualitative approach recently 
developed in social psychology for the study of written and spoken text (Edwards & 
Potter, 1992; Potter et al., 1993; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) (see pages 12-21). This 
approach focuses on the way in which language is used to construct versions of 
reality. In detailed analysis of text, descriptions of events, persons and circumstances 
are demonstrated to be variable and often inconsistent. Such inconsistency is regarded 
a natural feature of accounts and used in analysis as a means of assessing how that 
account functions in its interactional context. Accordingly, in the analysis presented 
here, the client was noted to offer inconsistent accounts of her ability to remember her 
childhood. This observation was utilised to understand what these differing 
descriptions accomplished in the context in which they were offered. However, this is 
not to suggest that such accounts are always cynically, or even deliberately, 
manufactured (Potter et al., 1993). 
A central focus of the present study is the concept of subject position 
(Althusser, 1971). Subject position is a concept drawn from perspectives viewing 
subjectivity and identity as linguistic constructions and hence to be located in 
discourse. However, this is not to suggest that selfhood, an experience or expression 
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of individual identity, does not exist or is not in some way real. It is to suggest that 
the kind of person one can 'be' is restrained, and enabled, by the acceptable linguistic 
descriptions available at a particular historico-cultural juncture. Accordingly, cross- 
cultural and historical investigations reveal differing ideas about the nature of the self. 
For example, Logan (1987) identifies the middle ages as the period during which the 
contemporary Western notion of the self as an autonomous subject first began to 
develop. Previous to this the individual had been merged in group life in which social 
role and group status were considered paramount. 
As an analytic tool, the concept of subject position offered the possibility of a 
case study tracing the effect of the client's characterisation of herself and her mother 
within the therapy dialogue without becoming involved in judging the accuracy of her 
descriptions. Moreover, in viewing such characterisation as drawing on recognisable 
cultural meanings the process of psychotherapy is immediately set within a wider 
social context. Accordingly, this study offers an analysis demonstrating the way in 
which the client characterises herself and her mother with regard to expectations and 
obligations sustained purely through being in a mother-daughter relationship. In 
orienting to the impersonality of such obligations, therefore, analysis becomes 
relevant beyond the specifics of this particular case. 
Hence, the aim of the present study is to demonstrate the merits of a discourse 
analytic approach to psychotherapy change process research and begin to develop an 
approach to linking discursive analysis of process with evaluation of domain 
outcome. This is achieved through offering a discursive analysis of selected extracts 
from the therapy discussions of a successfully resolved, client-specified, problematic 
theme. 
METHOD 
Case selection The case was a successful therapy of a female client who completed 8 
one-hour, weekly sessions of psychodynamic-interpersonal psychotherapy. This 
therapy was drawn from a pool of 117 cases comprising the Second Sheffield 
Psychotherapy Project (Shapiro et al., 1990). The case was selected on the basis of 
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the client's scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1961) which 
was the criterion outcome measure for the study. 
The BDI was administered on 6 occasions resulting in the following scores: at 
initial screening (29), intake assessment (25), immediately prior to the first session 
(27), 2 weeks after completing therapy (2), 3-months follow-up (4), and 1-year 
follow-up (5). At the intake assessment the client was interviewed by a trained 
assessor and obtained a diagnosis of Major Depressive Episode. The client's BDI 
scores indicated a moderate-severe depressive episode prior to commencing therapy, 
this falling to well within normal range after therapy completion. Change therefore 
met the most stringent criteria of clinical significance offered by Jacobson and Truax 
(1991). 
Written informed consent to use audio-tapes of this therapy for research 
purposes was obtained from the client after therapy completion. 
The client The client was female, in her early forties, in full-time white-collar 
employment and lived with her husband and elderly mother who she described as 
suffering from senile dementia. 
The therapist The therapist was male, in his mid-thirties and with two years post- 
qualification experience. He had received training within the project prior to seeing 
project clients as well as with an external supervisor. Peer group supervision was the 
norm. 
Theme selection At the second part of the intake assessment the client was presented 
with a list of individualised problems derived from the assessment interview. She was 
asked to select a total of 10 items, 2 from each of 5 categories: symptoms, mood, self- 
esteem, relationships, and specific performance. The problem chosen for detailed 
analysis concerned the client's difficulties with respect to her mother. This theme was 
specified by the client in the two relationship problem statements elicited from her at 
the intake assessment: 'difficulties looking after my dementing mother' and 'feeling 
I'm being blamed for keeping my mother at home'. All 10 personal statements were 
rated by the client each week immediately prior to session. The task required the 
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client rate how much each problem statement had bothered her during the week on a 
7-point scale with anchor points of '1' ('not at all') to '7' ('extremely'). The ratings for 
the 2 selected statements across the 8 sessions were as follows: difficulties looking 
after my dementing mother: 774-5211; and feeling I'm being blamed for keeping 
my mother at home: 222-3111. [Data from session 4 was missing]. Thus, both 
these problems were resolved by the end of therapy on the criterion of client personal 
questionnaire ratings of problem severity (Mulhall, 1976; Phillips, 1986). 
Selection of dialogue for analysis Sessions 1,3,5, and 7 were identified as reflecting 
a range of therapeutic impacts from 'no change' to 'high change' while covering the 
range of severity scores for the selected theme. Extracts were therefore selected only 
from these four sessions. This procedure was accomplished in two stages (Field et al., 
1994). First, two research assistants independently selected extracts pertaining to the 
client's difficulties with respect to her mother from audio-tapes of these session 
guided by a manual (Field, 1991 - for precis see Appendix 1). Both were psychology 
graduates in their mid-twenties; one female and one male. If both confidently agreed 
that a passage was relevant it was transcribed and divided into therapist-client 
adjacency pairs. Second, these adjacency pairs were then judged for their 
meaningfulness when considered in isolation. This task was carried out by the case 
therapist, an experienced male clinical psychologist and a female psychology 
postgraduate (first author of the former study, Field et al., 1994). This process yielded 
24 adjacent pairs; 2 from session 1,3 from session 3,9 from session 5, and 10 from 
session 7. For the purposes of the current study consecutive dialogue was re-united. 
For extended details of case, theme and extract selection see Field et al. 
(1994). 
Analytic procedures The first stage of analysis involved listening to audio-tapes of the 
complete 8-hour therapy in order to contextualise the extracts obtained for detailed 
study. In the second stage, all selected extracts were subjected to preliminary analysis. 
This involved paying close attention to content (the meaning conveyed) and form 
(how this meaning was constructed or 'put together'). Detailed notes examining how 
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the extracts appeared to 'make sense' were written from this close reading of the text 
and patterns of consistency and variability in descriptions identified. In focusing on 
change processes, particular attention was directed to points during which the client's 
account appeared to change significantly. During this preliminary analysis, then, key 
sections of text were identified for presentation. The final stage entailed the 
production of a detailed analysis of these key samples of text, linking analytic claims 
to specific extracts. This analysis was then revised in light of 'audit' comments offered 
by other researchers. This analysis is presented in full below. 
ANALYSIS 
Therapy commenced just after the client had made the decision to place her elderly 
mother in care and covers a period over which the client's mother entered respite and 
then finally permanent care. Analysis first explicates the three subject positions 
identified as characterising the client's account; the client as dutiful daughter, as 
damaged child, and the client's mother as the bad mother. Second, session five is then 
focused on as a turning point in the therapy. The process of change is linked to the 
discursive management of the client's positioning as dutiful daughter. Finally, an 
examination is made of the client's account of her recovery from depression which is 
shown to be linked to the subject positions of the bad mother and the damaged child. 
The dutiful daughter The first subject position typifying the client's account is that of 
the dutiful daughter. This can be identified in the first session during discussion of the 
client's depression: 
Extract (1)4. ' Session (1) 
I T: What have you (. ) what have ygu done to 
2 (tails off). 
3 C: (upset) Exactly (. ) yg& (. ) or Nly am I 
4e this you know? I can't think of any 
5 icular reason why I should be like that 
6 or why I'm so frightened of illness (. ) um (. ) 
7 me mum lives with us (. ) and she's eighty-four 
8 (. ) and (. ) um (. ) (upset, whispered) I'm 
9 sorry (. ) er (. ) she's lived with us for 
10 seventeen years (. ) she has senile dementia 
11 (. ) and I finally made the decision last week 
4.1 Extract numbers do not necessarily correspond with those in the former study (i. e., Field et al., 
1994). 
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12 that she has (upset) to go into permanent 
13 (whispered) care (. ) because I can't cone with 
14 it any more er (. ) my own doctor seems to 
15 think that's sort of the problem (. ) but I feel 
16 very guilty but I really can't cone (whispered) 
17 any more (9) so I'm just waiting to hear now 
18 (9) (in tears) I wish she'd dig (whispered) 
19 before I have to send her in (. ) (very upset) 
20 I'm awfully sorry. 
The client indicates her dutifulness toward her mother in several ways in this 
first extract. First, the length of time the client's mother has been living with her, 
"seventeen years" (line 10), suggests a prolonged commitment even though the 
decision has now been made "that she has (upset) to go into permanent (whispered) 
care" (lines 12-13). However, second, having lived with the client for all this time, 
suggesting that her decision to place her mother in care has been "finally made" (line 
11) implies that it has been a drawn out process. The decision therefore is suggested 
to have been made reluctantly and with some consideration. Third, she uses the 
phrase "permanent (whispered) care" (line 12-13) instead of 'a home' or other 
alternative. As such, the importance of her mother being looked after properly is 
emphasised rather than her just residing elsewhere. Fourth, the client offers a reason 
for having her mother 'go into care'; it is "because I can't cone with it any more" (line 
13-14). Thus, in specifying a reason, it is implied that the inevitable mental and 
physical decline of her mother suggested by the diagnosis "senile dementia" (line 10) 
is not to be considered sufficient justification, in itself, to stop looking after her at 
home. Furthermore, in stating that she cannot cope "any more" (line 14 & 17) it is 
indicated that the client has attempted to manage the situation up to this point and 
thus that she is not giving up at the first difficulty. 
Although the client indicates her dutifulness toward her mother, another 
interesting feature of this extract is the way she introduces the idea that looking after 
her mother may be linked to her depression. Thus, she states; "I can't gDWbuwith it any 
more er (. ) my own doctor seems to think that's sort of the problem (. )) but I feel very 
guilty" (line 13-16). The idea that the problem may be her inability to cope with her 
mother anymore is presented as her 'doctor's' opinion. This lends the speculation 
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particular credibility. That is, issuing from a medical professional, the suggestion that 
the client can no-longer cope with her dementing mother is implied to be an informed 
opinion. Moreover, as a 'doctor' suggests someone outside the immediate situation, 
the opinion is implied to be reasonably objective. 
The client, however, distances herself from the suggestion that looking after 
her mother may be linked to her depression. First she indicates that she, herself, 
cannot account for her depression (lines 4-5), so indicating that she has not 
necessarily accepted her doctor's suggestion as true. Second, that she feels "very 
guilty" (line 16) implies that such an idea is, actually, troubling to her. Thus, the 
client retains her positioning as dutiful daughter; something which might have been 
compromised had she been more directly blaming. However, in raising the issue, the 
implication becomes available that the client's mother might be a cause of or at least 
aggravation to the client's depression. 
The bad mother The client as dutiful daughter is a subject position readily identifiable 
in the client's account throughout therapy. The other two subject positions, the bad 
mother and damaged child, are easier to identify in later sessions. These latter subject 
positions can be found in the early sessions of therapy but appear in an ambiguous 
and implicit form. For instance, the client's mother as the bad mother is only 
implicitly suggested in discussion of the client's marriage during the third session: 
Extract (2) Session (3) 
1 C: ... I always sort of think that I'm (. ) if 2 there is to bý one (. ) the bad (laughs) 
3 half of the relationship (. ) and it's funny 
4 because (. ) you've made me remember 
5 something actually (. ) um (. ) before (. ) I 
6 think it was before I was married to him (. ) 
7 and I remember me mum saying to me (. ) and 
8 as I said (. ) she rarely said anything 
9 (. ) or discussed anything (. ) and she said if 
10 anyone (. ) is to go off the rails in that 
11 relationship it will be yQM (. ) and at the time 
12 I thought she hasn't got a clue (. ) she 
13 doesn't know what she's (laughs) talking 
14 about (. ) and I mean she couldn't possibly know 
15 (husband's name) well enough to know that 
16 (. ) um (. ) how secure he would be (. ) how 
17 stable he would be (. ) but she was right (. ) 
18 so maybe shed see something in me that 
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19 (. ) I didn't even know about myself at the 
20 time (. ) I don't know? 
Several features of this extract are suggestive of the client's mother as the bad 
mother. First, the client states that her mother predicted she would be the one to "go 
off the rails" (line 10) in her marriage. This phrase is commonly used to indicate a 
person who has begun to live or behave in an unbalanced way, usually with the 
connotation that such behaviour is also morally questionable. It is therefore indicated 
that the client's mother had been willing to be critical of her to the extent of 
questioning the client's potential to act appropriately and ethically as a wife. Second, 
the client suggests that she did not take the opinion seriously at the time because her 
mother "couldn't possibly know" (line 14) her husband-to-be well enough to compare 
her to him unfavourably. Such criticism is therefore implied to have been based on 
little or no evidence when it was offered. The implication therefore becomes available 
that the criticism may have been unjustifiably negative. Third, the client offers a 
statement regarding her own pervasively low self-evaluation with respect to her 
marriage; "I always sort of think that I'm (. ) if there is to b one (. ) the bad (laughs) 
half of the relationship" (lines 1-3). The implication therefore is also available that 
her mother's criticism has had a long-term, negative effect on the client's self- 
evaluation. 
The client concludes, though; "but she was rigli (. ) so maybe she did see 
something in me that (. ) I didn't even know about myself at the time" (lines 17-20). 
This might indicate a certain respect for her mother's insight as it is suggested that her 
opinion was subsequently validated. However, the extent, circumstances and 
destructive effect of the criticism have also been implied making her mother's 
articulation of such insight appear rather thoughtless and destructive. 
By the seventh session the client is more explicit in the presentation of her 
mother as the bad mother, for example during the report of a conversation had with a 
relative about her birth: 
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Extract (3) Session (7) 
1 C: ... I think I was unexpected and (. ) er (. ) 2 me eldest sister-in-law (. ) I once said 
3 something about me mum (. ) looking after me mum 
4 (. ) and she said (. ) um (. ) well oh (. ) er (. ) 
5 I said (. ) I ventured to say (. ) that we'd 
6 never really been that close (. ) me mum and I 
7 (. ) and she said (. ) no (. ) well your mum never 
8 wanted you (laughs) anyway she said in fact (. ) 
9 she'd tried to take tablets to get rid of you 
10 (2) and that hurt (. ) that hurt more than 
11 anything... 
In this extract, the client comments that she did not achieve a "close" (line 6) 
relationship with her mother. In itself this may not be unusual. However, this 
comment is suggested to have been reacted to by her sister-in-law with a statement to 
the effect that the client's mother "never wanted" (lines 7-8) her and had even "tried to 
take tablets to get rid" (line 9) of her. It is therefore implied that her mother's 
attempted destruction of her as an unborn child was connected to their subsequently 
poor relationship. Thus, rather than just not 'close', the distance between them is 
suggested to be a product of her mother's more profound rejection of her. 
The damaged child The third session sees the introduction of the third subject position 
typifying the client's account; the client as damaged child. As with the bad mother, 
this positioning is only hinted at during this early session, in this instance through the 
client's description of her inability to remember her childhood. This will be explicated 
through contrasting an account offered in session three with one the client offers in a 
later session. So, first consider this extract from session three: 
Extract (4) Session (3) 
1 C: No (. ) I can't go back past um (. ) past 
2 meeting (husband's name) really (. ) 
3 T: (right) 
4 C: I can't go back (. ) um (. ) I remember 
5 basic things (. ) I remember (. ) um (3) 
6 (laughs) where I lived (. ) I mean that 
7 sounds silly (. ) but you know what I mean 
g (. ) I remember that sort of thing (. ) but I 
9 really (. ) when people talk about their 
10 childhood it bothers me sometimes (. ) 
11 because it's like amnesia (. ) I re cannot 
12 remember (. ) IQ not remember i (") I cant 
13 rem-ember being five years old (. ) I can't 
14 remember being In years old... 
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Although indicating that she can remember "basic things" (line 5) from her 
childhood, the client describes how "when people talk about their childhood it bothers 
me sometimes (. ) because it's like amnesia" (line 9-11). A contrast is, therefore, 
drawn between other people's ability to talk about, and so by implication remember, 
their childhood and her own inability to do so. Now consider the following extract 
from session seven in which the client and therapist discuss the events from the 
client's life covered during therapy: 
Extract (5) Session (7) 
1 C: ... I've talked about them all (. ) from 2 childhood adolescence right through 'til now 
3 () and let them go. 
4 T: Mm (. ) even though they're (. ) even though 
5 they're so vivid? 
6 C: Yeah (. ) and they g (. ) um (. ) I don't (. ) 
7I suppose because I've kept them () and I 
8 suppose I'll always be able to remember 
9 them () but they're not important any more (. ) 
10 um for whatever reason if I was to think of 
11 one of the incidents (. ) like when I was 
12 molested () JUn I would even feel (. ) feel 
13 afraid (. ) just thinking about () on my own 
14 () and I would try to stop meself from 
15 thinking about it () from recalling it 
16 (. ) from being able to remember it (. ) I 
17 would try and force it away... 
In this seventh session the client recounts how she has discussed many events 
from her life including those "from childhood" (lines 1-2). So, in having "talked 
about them" (line 1) it is indicated that she must have had some memory of the 
incidents. She also states, in relation to such events, that she has now "let them go" 
(line 3). It is, therefore, implied that she had previously 'held onto' and thus 
remembered them for a significant time. Moreover, the client agrees with the therapist 
that these events are "vivid" (line 5), stating that this might be "because I've k9z 
them" (line 7) and that she presumes she will "always be able to remember them" 
(lines 8-9). So, in having 'kept' something 'vivid' it is suggested that some clear 
memories of childhood events have remained available to her throughout her life. 
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As well as suggesting that she has always had some memory of her childhood, 
another interesting feature of this extract is the description of the type of events these 
memories relate to. That is, they are described as things which are "not important any 
more" (line 9) and so, by implication, to have been of significance to her in the past. 
Moreover, the client offers an example of one of the incidents; "when I was molested" 
(lines 11-12), so indicating a particularly distressing event. Thus, although the 
indication that the client remembers some events from childhood appears consistent 
with her statement in session three that she only remembers "basic things" (extract 4, 
line 5) like where she lived (extract 4, line 6), the implication that she remembers 
significant and traumatic events does not. 
How might this inconsistency in the client's description of her memory of her 
childhood be understood? In the seventh session (extract 5) the client does suggest 
that remembering some childhood incidents offered particular difficulties. That is, in 
relation to being molested, she states; "I would try to stop meself from thinking about 
it (. ) from recalling it (. ) from being able to remember it (. ) I would try and force it 
away" (lines 14-17). So, she indicates that she 'tried' not to remember this event. 
Conceivably, such an attempt may be described as 'memory loss' early in therapy. 
However, describing 'not remembering' as both a struggle and as only an attempt, the 
implication remains that these memories were available to trouble her and so could 
not be "like amnesia" (extract 4, line 11). A perhaps more plausible explanation is 
that, given the client has made reference to having been molested, her report of 
memory loss in the third session might be understood as a device relieving her from 
talking about such distressing things early in therapy. However, another explanation 
is to regard inconsistency as an inherent feature of accounts. From a discursive 
perspective, such inconsistency is regarded as an indication of an account's 
contextually functional nature. That is, memory claims can be approached as a social, 
accounting activity (Edwards, Potter, & Middleton, 1992). Thus, it may be suggested 
that the client's reported memory loss can be understood as an account oriented to the 
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interactional context of its telling; a context which has changed between sessions 
three and seven. 
Exploring this discursive perspective further, it might be fruitful to speculate 
on the function(s) the client's third session report of having little memory of 
childhood might serve. To achieve this it is necessary to examine the implications 
made available by this particular account (see extract 4). So, first, it is interesting to 
note the strength of the client's claims; "I really cannot remember (. ) I dp_ not 
remember jr" (lines 11-12), and that it is 'like amnesia'. If, as suggested possible 
above, the client merely did not want to discuss her childhood early in therapy she 
might have been expected to have either stated her wishes, avoided or at least de- 
emphasised the topic. However, rather, she draws attention to the issue through 
stressing her memory failure and, by implication, to suggest its inherent importance. 
Second, likening her memory loss to "amnesia" (line 11) suggests that she ought to be 
able to remember what she cannot and thus implies her experience is abnormal. 
Third, she states that the loss "bothers" (line 10) her. So, furthermore, it is indicated 
to be disturbing and thus problematic. 
Thus, the client's third session account makes the implications available that 
her memory loss is important, abnormal and problematic. Such an account can be 
seen to contrast other possible descriptions that may have been offered, e. g., that the 
loss was due to normal fading over time or to her childhood having been particularly 
uneventful. In speculating on the functionality of her account, therefore, it can be 
suggested that, particularly within the context of psychotherapy, presenting her 
childhood memory loss as important, abnormal and problematic suggests the 
existence of disordered psychological processes. An obvious implication is, therefore, 
that the loss might be due to repressed childhood trauma, so invoking the subject 
position of the damaged child. As psychodynamic concepts, like that of the defence 
mechanisms, have been suggested to permeate our culture (Moscovici, 1976) allusion 
to these mechanisms by lay-persons in the construction of versions of events and 
experiences may not be unusual (Hoffman, 1992; Walker, 1988). 
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The dutiful daughter, the bad mother and the damaged child are subject 
positions abstracted from the client's account. Analysis now focuses on the fifth 
session as a turning point in the therapy when a resolution, vis-ä-vis issues 
surrounding the client's mother, is accomplished. This resolution is linked to the 
subject position of the dutiful daughter. (The pivotal value of this session is also 
suggested by the client's PQ ratings of problem severity). 
The client's guilt In the fifth session the client discusses how she feels now that her 
mother has been temporarily hospitalised awaiting a place in permanent care. During 
this conversation she states: 
Extract (6) Session (5) 
1 C: ... when 
I go to see her I feel very guilty (. ) 
2 um (. ) that perhaps I ought to carry on and try 
3 and keep her at home and look after her... 
The client states that she feels "very guilty" (line 1) visiting her mother in 
hospital while looking to place her in care. In this context, the client's 'guilt' has two 
important implications. First, in feeling guilty it is implied that she could be 
considered to have done something wrong. The client's suggestion that she perhaps 
"ought" (line 2) to keep her mother at home implies this is something which could be 
regarded as her duty. So, in looking to place her mother in care, the implication 
becomes available that she might be considered to have failed in her responsibilities 
toward her. However, second, guilt indicates that the client is aware of and troubled 
by this failure. Thus, although suggesting she has failed in her responsibilities, feeling 
guilty also sustains the client's inherent dutifulness. The first stage of examining the 
process of change focused on in this fifth session, therefore, will be to examine how 
the client herself manages these two implications of 'feeling guilty'. So, consider the 
following extract from slightly later in the session: 
Extract (7) Session (5) 
1 C: ... and when 
I come home at night (. ) I take 
2 over another job if you like (. ) straight 
3 from the one I've left (. ) and I'm very often 
4 up through the night with her and before I 
5 go to work I have to see to her... 
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In this extract the client suggests that she has to "take over another job" (lines 
1-2) when she gets home, look to her mother sometimes during the night and always 
before going to work in the morning. She therefore describes a situation making 
tremendous demands on her time and energy. So, although it is not made explicit, it is 
suggested that the client has given as much to the care of her mother as could be 
expected of anyone. This theme appears again slightly later in this session: 
Extract (8) Session (5) 
1 C: ... um (. ) people 
keep saying to me you know 
2 (. ) you've done your bit (. ) and all this 
3 (. ) and really (. ) she will be much better 
4 off I don't need them to tell me that (. ) I 
5 do know that (. ) I do know even if I give up 
6 work and stay at home all the time (. ) that 
7I can't give her the care and attention that 
8 she needs (. ) um so why the guilt? why must I 
9 feel mo damn guilty? 
In stating "people keep saying to me you know (. ) you've done your bit" (lines 
1-2) the client indicates that she is regarded by some as having fulfilled her duties 
toward her mother. Furthermore, these people are reported to be of the opinion that 
her mother "will be much better off" (lines 3-4), presumably in care. It is, therefore, 
suggested that such a move would actually be beneficial to her mother. Note how 
these suggestions are presented as issuing from other "people" (line 1). As in extract 
one, with the presentation of her doctor's opinion, this has certain consequences. First, 
the idea that the client has 'done her bit', is articulated while she, herself, remains 
neutral in her endorsement of this view. By implication, the client's dutifulness 
toward her mother is suggested without the client contravening the cultural norm of 
presenting positive claims about oneself modestly. Second, reporting what 'other 
people' say also offers a persuasive account of her dutifulness as the client's own 
opinion could be undermined as self-serving. That is, she can be understood as 
orienting to the possibility that her decision to place her mother in care may be 
regarded as selfishly motivated. Moreover, the client states; "I do know even if I give 
up work and stay at home all the time (. ) that I can't give her the care and attention 
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that she needs" (lines 5-8). Thus in drawing attention her mothers needs, it is 
indicated to be her mother's welfare that is of primary concern. Placing her mother in 
care is, therefore, further implied to be an extension of the client's dutifulness toward 
her. Thus, in these two extracts the client suggests that she has been and is being 
dutiful in her mother's care. 
At the end of extract 8 the client asks; "so why the guilt? " (extract 8, line 8). 
She therefore indicates that her feelings of guilt are a puzzle. That is, feeling or being 
'guilty' requires a cause; something one could be regarded as having done wrong. In 
this question, therefore, the client can be understood as orienting to the conundrum 
that if placing her mother in care is motivated by a concern for her mother's welfare 
her guilt must be without cause. This idea is made more explicit later in this fifth 
session: 
Extract (9) Session (5) 
1 C: ... something 
inside me does tell me that I 
2 don't y any reason to be guilty (. ) but 
3 I'm not convinced by me... 
In the statement; "I don't have any reason to be guilty" (lines 1-2) the client 
explicitly indicates that she has not done anything wrong to be guilty about. In such 
circumstances, as in extract 8, therefore, feeling guilty would be unjustified and 
unnecessary and so constitute a puzzle. The client presents this idea as issuing from 
to something inside" (line 1) suggesting a part of her unclear and unfamiliar, even to 
herself. However, as such, this is an opinion for which she does not have full 
responsibility and so can express without suggesting acceptance. In this context, the 
statement "but I'm not convinced by eng" (lines 2-3), is particularly interesting. That 
is, first, in not being 'convinced' it is suggested that the client is not fully persuaded of 
the idea that she has 'no reason to be guilty'. Second, as such, it is implied that she 
does, in fact, feel guilty and possibly with reason. However, third, in raising the issue 
of being convinced, the client's suggestion that she is not convinced 'by me' makes the 
implication available that she might be persuaded her guilt is unnecessary by someone 
else. Thus, rather than having a specific referent, 'something inside' can be understood 
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as a useful rhetorical device with which to express a possible solution to a dilemma 
without the individual having to 'own' it. 
It was suggested that the basis of the process of change in session five is the 
management of the implications made available by the client's guilt in no-longer 
looking after her mother at home. That is, 'guilt' was suggested to have the 
consequence of (1) implying she has done something wrong, while (2) sustaining her 
inherent dutifulness through indicating that she is troubled by this failure. From the 
analysis of extracts 7 to 9, it can now be suggested that early in the session the client 
undermines the implication that her guilt indicates she has done something wrong 
through suggesting her past and present dutifulness toward her mother, even in 
placing her in care. An implication of maintaining her guilt, therefore, is that it 
functions primarily to sustain her dutifulness. In this context, though, the client is in 
danger of compromising her dutiful positioning if she relinquishes her guilt. This 
particular difficulty is, however, managed by the client subtly through raising the 
possibility of placing the responsibility, and thus any subsequent ramifications of 
persuading her do so, onto another authority. 
Negotiation of change The second stage in examining the processes of change 
focused on in this fifth session is to examine how the client's account of her 
dutifulness toward her mother is developed in subsequent interaction with the 
therapist. Thus, consider the following extract drawn from a discussion slightly later 
in the session regarding how the social worker is looking for a place for the client's 
mother in permanent care: 
Extract (10) Session (5) 
1 T: If you (. ) for ygg to give yourself 
2 something is actually (. ) it's a statement 
3 about what = feel about yjm. 
4 C: Yeah (. ) it would be much easier (. ) to ring 
5 the social worker and (upset) say stQp 
6 trying to sort it out (. ) just let her come 
7 home (. ) Ell sort it out (. ) IFll take care 
8 of it (. ) L_11 do what's necessary but I'm 
9 not going to do that (sighs)... 
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In this extract the client indicates that she will accept the social worker's help 
and thus that she is committed to placing her mother in care. However, this is not 
suggested straightforwardly and can be understood as an account, in some way, 
enabled by the therapist's comments. So, the extract commences with the therapist's 
comment that "for ygu to give yourself something is actually (. ) it's a statement about 
what y feel about yam. " (lines 1-3). He, therefore, suggests that the client 'giving 
herself something' would be an indication of her self-evaluation; presumably being 
rewarding toward herself indicating some self-worth. Although the therapist merely 
offers a statement, a certain implication becomes available through this statement. 
That is, as a feeling of self-worth is a generally desirable state, it is implied that the 
client being generous toward herself would be justifiable. 
In reply, the client links this idea of 'giving herself something' with the issue 
of her mother's care. She states; "it would be much easier (. ) to ring the social worker 
and say trying to sort it out (. ) just let her come home" (lines 4-7). She, therefore, 
draws a contrast between having the social worker 'sort it out' and letting her mother 
come home. However, that it is 'easier' to 'stop' the social worker, it is suggested that 
accepting help is, actually, the more difficult option. How might this be understood 
given the client has previously indicated both that she cannot cope with her mother at 
home any more (extract 1) and the amount of time and energy doing so entails 
(extract 7)? It appears that, particularly in this context, suggesting it would be easier 
to have her mother home implies that the difficulty accepting help from the social 
worker concerns something more important than the demands her mother's care 
makes on her. The client has already implied that it could be regarded as her duty to 
look after her mother at home (extract 6), so accepting help in order to place her 
mother in care would appear incompatible with this. She could be understood, 
therefore, as implying that accepting help is difficult because she places more value 
on fulfilling her duty than on losing the burden of caring for her mother. 
The client indicates, though, that she is "not going to do that" (line 9); not 
going to stop the social worker, so, by implication, will accept help and commit to 
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placing her mother in care. Again, how might this be understood given that it has 
been indicated to be the more difficult option? Implying that she places more value on 
fulfilling her duty than on losing the burden of caring for her mother suggests that 
any action she takes in this regard is not motivated by selfishness; a possibility that 
would compromise her positioning as dutiful daughter (see also extract 8). So, with 
the implication available from the therapist's turn that being generous toward herself 
would be justifiable, and thus not selfish, an account becomes available in which 
placing her mother in care does not mean severely risking her dutifulness. Discussion 
continues on this theme later in the session: 
Extract (11) Session (5) 
1 T: ... if I do things 
because I care about 
2 C: (yes) 
3 T: then (. ) the world will be different for me 
4 C: (maybe) 
5 T: that's the (. ) that's the risk (. ) that's the 
6 thing that you take in your hand and you say 
7 this is maybe something which is different for 
8 11g now 
9 C: (yes) 
10 T: (. ) I mean it's it feels like an incredibly 
11 courageous 
12 C: (yes) 
13 T: a (. ) decision (. ) I mean it's not a small 
14 decision (. ) it's not as if you're taking 
15 something and saying I'll test this out. 
16 C: Oh (. ) it's for good (. ) I kwx wherever she 
17 goes (. ) whatever they decide (. ) ajg j where 
18 
, going 
I4 g4 IQ Sk (") that I won't hayg 
19 to do anytýhýng else other than visit her 
20 T: (mm) 
21 C: any more (. ) and that's for mg. 
In this extract, the client states; "I know wherever she goes (. ) whatever they 
decide (. ) 914 !a where g'k going IQ g I. 4 i" (lines 16-18). She, therefore, 
explicitly articulates her commitment to having her mother looked after permanently 
in care. Moreover, the client suggests; "I won't hm to do anything else other than 
visit her (T: mm) any more (. ) and that's for fig" (lines 18-21). So, particularly with 
the stress on the word 'me', she indicates that in only having to visit, placing her 
mother in care would be done, at least in part, for the client's own benefit. This 
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account, therefore, contrasts the client's former management of her dutifulness, 
particularly in terms of her own unselfishness. 
How might this change be understood? The client's account was offered in 
reply to some comments of the therapist. He suggests; "if I do things because I care 
about me (C: yes) then (. ) the world will be different for me" (lines 1-3). 'Caring 
about oneself implies regarding it legitimate to fulfil one's own needs. Suggesting 
that acting in this way 'the world will be different', indicates that as it will invoke 
complete change this is contrary to how the client has currently been behaving. 
Moreover, given that the client is suffering from depression, suggesting that things 
will be 'different' implies that they will be better. So, the therapist's statement makes 
the implication available that improvement in the client's condition may reside in her 
beginning to regard it as permissible to fulfil her own needs. 
However, the solution of 'caring about me', which might be considered an 
indication of selfishness, is offered in a context where the issue of selfishness is 
pertinent in its undesirability. How does the therapist manage this dilemma? He 
describes 'caring about me' as "the risk" (line 5) but also as "an incredibly courageous 
(C: yes) a (. ) decision" (lines 10-13). As such, it is suggested this would be a brave 
move demanding respect, particularly as being a 'risk' it will not guarantee results. So, 
as a decision commanding respect, the client fulfilling her own needs is indicated to 
be legitimate in a way in which selfishness, as inherently negative, could not. In this 
context, therefore, the client's account of placing her mother in permanent care "for 
mg" (line 21) which, when her duty was construed in terms of looking after her 
mother at home could have been considered selfish, appears sanctionable, and indeed 
necessary, if an improvement in the client's depression is to occur. 
In extracts 10 and 11, therefore, the therapist implies that the client is justified 
in being generous towards herself and fulfilling her own needs. Such suggestions can 
be understood as premised on, and offering a solution to, the dilemma created by the 
client's positioning as dutiful daughter. That is, the client implies that as dutiful 
daughter she has unselfishly looked after her mother at home with all the demands 
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this involved. So, making the implication available that looking after her own needs is 
both legitimate and perhaps necessary offers a way of the client retaining a moral 
positioning while placing her mother in care as, from this perspective, such action is 
not necessarily selfish or undutiful. 
The client's account of her recovery from depression This final section now focuses 
on how the client produces an account of her recovery from depression. The cause of 
her depression had been an issue concerning the client throughout therapy. Earlier in 
therapy she reported her doctor's opinion that looking after her mother could be 
considered such a cause (extract 1, lines 12-15). It is an idea alluded to again early in 
the fifth session as the client discusses who she has told about her depression: 
Extract (12) Session (5) 
1 C: ... my 
immediate family and friends know 
2 obviously (. ) that I had one (. ) or have had 
3 more than one (. ) (. ) um (. ) and sort of tend 
4 to say to me now (. ) um (. ) over this business 
5 with me mum (. ) well (. ) you couldn't have her 
6 back (upset) you'd be ill again [... ] ti 
7 suggestion i (. ) that I would have another 
8 breakdown or (. ) become ill or have a 
9 depression (. ) whatever (. ) whatever you want 
10 to call it (. ) and that sets me off thinking 
11 (. ) (laughs) (. ) again (. ) I'm back to the 
12 same old question C) why? why does it make 
13 any difference? are we saying that depressions 
14 are the result of (. ) extra (. ) work? extra 
15 pressure? um (. ) because there are JQLs of 
16 people that are in l position... 
The client states that the family and friends who know about her depression 
suggest, with regard to her mother, that "you couldn't have her back (upset) you'd be 
il, again" (lines 5-6). She expands on this indicating that they are suggesting if her 
mother came home she might "have a depression" (lines 8-9). The implication is, 
therefore, that the people close to her regard caring for her mother at home connected 
to, if not the cause of, her depression. However, the client goes on; "are we saying 
that depressions are the result of (. ) extra (. ) work? extra pressure? um (. ) because 
there are 1= pf people that are in that position" (lines 13-16). She, therefore, 
questions the cause of her depression beyond that implied by her family and friends 
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thereby suggesting that she does not fully accept that looking after her mother is such 
a cause. Specifically, the client suggests that 'lots of people' are in the situation of 
having 'extra work' and 'extra pressure'. It is therefore implied that, as presumably 
these people are not all in therapy for depression, the cause must be something other 
than these added demands. 
The causes of, and the client's recovery from, depression are explored in more 
depth during the seventh session. In this session the client talks more about her 
childhood (see extract 5). For example, the following extract is drawn from an 
account of a family holiday in which the client's father was taken ill and had to be 
rushed home: 
Extract (13) Session (7) 
I C: ... so me mum went with him and she left me 2 there (. ) on me own and that wasn't (. ) 
3 wasn't good um (. ) but then I thought 
4 (sighs) (. ) she didn't treat me bad (. ) she 
5 just didn't she just wasn't aware of me... 
In this extract the client recounts how her mother went with her sick father 
and "left me there (. ) on me own" (lines 1-2). Although details of the situation were 
not offered, the client describes her reaction; "that wasn't (. ) wasn't good" (lines 2-3). 
Her mother's action is, therefore, implied to have been a source of distress to the 
client at the time. The client goes on to reflect that her mother "didn't treat me bad (. ) 
she just didn't she just wasn't aware of me" (lines 4-5). So, rather than actively 
abusive, the client suggests her mother was merely 'unaware' of her. However, in the 
context of an example of having been left on her own, likely in an unfamiliar place, 
during a family crisis it is thus implied that her mother was incognisant of, or at least 
insensitive to, her child's emotional needs. 
Similarly, towards the end of the seventh session the client discusses a 
childhood incident when she was molested but did not tell her parents. Reflecting on 
her mother's likely reaction to the incident she states: 
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Extract (14) Session (7) 
1 C: ... I still can't help w ndering if she would 2 have blamed me (. ) I always felt that she 
3 thought there was something really bbd about me 
4 (. ) I always felt that (. ) always (. ) and 
5 certain things she's said made (. ) made me feel 
6 (. ) like (. ) made me feel like that (. ) um. 
The client states that she "still can't help wondering if she would have blamed 
me" (lines 1-2). It is therefore suggested to have been possible her mother may have 
regarded the client as responsible for having been molested. Given that such an 
opinion would be contrary to the contemporary account of a child's responsibility, 
such a speculation is serious indeed as it positions her mother not only as 
unreasonable but, possibly, reprehensible. The client continues; "I always felt that she 
thought there was something really bad about me" (lines 2-3). With respect to an 
evaluation of a person, the phrase 'something really bad' implies a pervading 
malevolency. Moreover, the client suggests this 'feeling' as to her mother opinion of 
her came from "certain things she's akd" (line 5) and, as such, to be grounded in 
comments actually articulated by her. So, the client's speculation that her mother may 
have thought her responsible for having been molested is suggested to be justified by 
indications the client had that her mother thought her malevolent. 
In extracts 13 and 14, therefore, the subject positions of the damaged child 
and the bad mother are strongly implied. It is in this context that the client produces 
an account of her recovery from depression: 
Extract (15) Session (7) 
1 C: ... now me mum's gone (. ) um (. ) a lot of 2 badness has gone with it (. ) and that has to be 
3 (. ) I mean (. ) on the outside of things (. ) um 
4 (. ) people looking in would say that's simply 
5 because I haven't got to look after her (. ) 
6 the physical (. ) um (. ) side of it again (. ) 
7 not having to get her up (. ) not having to 
8 see to her (. ) but I know it's not that (. ) 
9 it's (. ) it's a lot more than that (. ) it's (. ) 
10 um (. ) it i letting go (. ) it's letting go of 
11 (. ) of everything that was ever W when I 
12 was young (. ) somehow me mum () and I didn't 
13 know until (. ) really (. ) until she went (. ) 
14 somehow she reminded me of all those things 
15 (. ) um. 
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The client states; "now me mum's gone (. ) um (. ) a lot of badness has gone 
with it" (lines 1-2). In connecting her mother's placement in care with the departure of 
'a lot of badness' the client's mother is suggested to be linked with something 
poisonous or sinister. Furthermore, that 'this badness has gone with it' suggests that 
her mother's departure has released the client from its effects. The client expands on 
this suggesting that "on the outside of things (. ) um (. ) people looking in would say 
that's simply because I haven't got to look after her (. ) the physical side" (lines 4-6). 
The expressions; 'on the outside of things' and 'people looking in', suggest those 
uninvolved in and distant from the situation. Their suggestion that the reason for the 
'badness' departing with her mother is 'simply because I haven't got to look after her' 
is therefore implied to be at least ill-informed. Moreover, in being 'simple' this 
account is suggested to be naive or unsophisticated. In fact, the client directly states; 
"I know it's not that (. ) it's (. ) it's a lot more than that" (lines 8-9). In being 'more', 
therefore, having less work to do is accepted only as part of the explanation. 
Furthermore, suggesting 'I know' in contrast to those 'outside of things' implies that, 
unlike them, she is intimately involved in the situation and so in better position to 
know the truth. An account of her recovery based on having less work to do is 
therefore rejected by the client an inadequate explanation (see also extract 12). 
Alternatively, the client indicates that the reason the badness has gone with 
her mother is that "it's letting go of (. ) of everything that was ever ¢ when I was 
young" (lines 10-12). So, placing her mother in care is connected specifically with 
being released from negative aspects of her childhood. She explains; "me mum (. ) and 
I didn't know until (. ) really (. ) until she went (. ) somehow she reminded me of all 
those things" (lines 12-14). Being able to 'remind her of all those things' implies that 
the client's mother was intimately linked with these negative aspects of the client's 
childhood. Moreover, 'all those things' implies that there were many such features. 
The positionings of her mother as the bad mother and the client as damaged child are, 
therefore, again suggested. However, that the client did not realise that her mother 
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reminded her of such things until after she left makes the implication available that 
motivation for placing her mother in care was not retribution. So, the client indicates 
that being released from something, perhaps, poisonous with her mother's departure is 
due to her mother's connection with a traumatic past rather than the work of looking 
after her. It is, therefore, implied that the client's depression was linked to poisonous 
effect of the 'bad mother's' presence in her home. 
In the seventh session, therefore, the subject positions of the bad mother and 
the damaged child, alluded to obliquely and ambiguously earlier in therapy (extracts 2 
& 4) are more explicitly expressed. Furthermore, these subject positions are utilised 
in an account of the client's mother as a cause of the client's depression over and 
above the effort of looking after her at home. It may be suggested that the subject 
positions of the bad mother and damaged child appear later in therapy in more 
explicit form as the criticism of her mother they imply cannot now severely 
compromise the client's positioning as dutiful daughter as this was fully validated in 
session five. Moreover, implicating her mother as a cause of her depression over and 
above the effort of her care, through the positionings of the bad mother and damaged 
child, further establishes the client's dutifulness in caring for a mother who, it is 
suggested, cared little for her. 
DISCUSSION 
The analysis of this successfully resolved theme within a more generally successful 
case approached the process of therapy as a discursive activity. This activity was 
viewed in terms of the utilisation of meanings embedded in linguistic resources; 
meanings, it is argued, that will be recognisable by most cultural members. In fact, 
subject positions such as the dutiful daughter, bad mother, and damaged child have an 
almost archetypal quality to them. Specifically, the process of change was argued to 
involve discursive management of the dilemma created by maintaining the client's 
moral positioning as dutiful daughter within the context of her placing her dementing 
mother in care. 
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The first part of the analysis explicated the three subject positions identified as 
characterising the client's account; the client as dutiful daughter, as damaged child, 
and the client's mother as the bad mother. The process of change was then linked to 
the discursive management of the client's positioning as dutiful daughter. It was 
demonstrated how a resolution occurred through negotiation with the therapist. 
Specifically, an account was accomplished in which the client's action of placing her 
mother in care was understood in such a way that it did not severely risk the client's 
dutifulness. Analysis then explicated how the client accounted for her own recovery 
from depression during the therapy dialogue. This was linked to the client's 
characterisation of herself as the damaged child and her mother as the bad mother. 
Utilising these positionings an account was formulated in which her mother's mere 
presence in her home was understood as a factor contributing to her depression. That 
is, looking after the bad mother was understood to be a contributing factor to the 
client's depression in terms of its psychological rather than merely physical stress. 
This was an important distinction for this particular client as physical stress was 
considered insufficient grounds to stop caring for her mother at home. This 
understanding itself appears linked to the client's positioning as dutiful daughter. 
An important feature of this analysis is the identification of the subject 
position of the dutiful daughter within the client's account. Our contemporary 
understanding of the dutiful daughter arguably draws on 18th and 19th century 
discourses of female subjectivity. During this period subject positions were provided 
for women based primarily on their domesticity so that "in opposition to the self- 
serving individualism that the business world required, women were held to be 
naturally selfless, desiring only to live for others" (Westkott, 1986, p. 214). Although 
the social and economic situation has changed, this picture of woman as carer can still 
be seen, as this case suggests, to influence the subjectivity available women today 
(e. g., Lemkau & Landau, 1986). In fact, such socio-cultural considerations are argued 
to be an essential element in understanding this client's particular dilemma. That is, 
this client's problem can be considered embedded in expectations and obligations 
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pertaining to mother-daughter relationships; moral standards delimited by social 
convention but open to dispute and negotiation in individual cases. In fact, the client's 
problem can be understood as rooted in the attempt to maintain a moral positioning in 
circumstances in which her dutifulness may be compromised. 
An interesting facet of the client's own management of this dilemma was her 
maintenance of the ideal of woman as carer. It was suggested that the process of 
change in session five involved the management of the implications made available 
by the client's guilt no-longer looking after her mother at home. The analysis 
suggested that the client obliquely undermined the possibility that her guilt indicated 
that she had done something wrong, for example through reporting what other people 
have said; "you know (. ) you've done your bit" (extract 8, lines 1-2). It was therefore 
argued that the client's guilt functioned primarily to sustain her inherent dutifulness. 
This is not to doubt the client's feelings, but to draw attention to the way in which 
guilt positions one as a moral being. Problem resolution then involved accounting for 
the client's action of placing her mother in care without severely compromising her 
dutifulness. This was aided by the client's positioning of her mother as the bad 
mother. That is, positioning her mother in this way offered a reason for placing her in 
permanent care as caring for such a person at home was suggested to be a 
contributing factor to the client's depression. Moreover, 'the bad mother' sustained the 
client's own dutifulness in having cared so long a mother who had cared little for her. 
The bad mother however is a subject position also premised on the ideal of woman as 
selfless carer, in this case of their children. The client therefore presents an 
understanding and implicitly negative evaluation of herself and her mother in terms of 
this historically created standard. 
The analysis suggests that the client's change was aided by the therapist's 
incorporation of the more traditionally masculine discourse of individualism. This 
was achieved through his alluding to the legitimacy of fulfilling one's own needs and 
introduced as a successful counter-point to the client's more traditionally feminine 
positioning premised on relationship and service to others. The therapist therefore 
110 
Chapter 4 
accepted and worked with the client's problem as she presented it, offering an account 
in which placing her mother in care is not necessarily selfish or undutiful. An 
alternative might have been for the therapist to question the client's evaluation of 
herself in terms of the standard of dutifulness. Although there is no way of 
ascertaining how successful this tack might have been, the current study demonstrates 
the therapeutic benefits of working with the client's problem as presented. 
Accordingly, the analysis suggests that the client's problem presentation itself 
implied the solution introduced by the therapist and subsequently accepted by the 
client. That is, the tension between 'duty to other' and 'duty to self, the themes 
underlying the client's problem, can be understood as an 'ideological dilemma'; a 
contrary theme constituting part of our cultural commonsense. Billig (1988) describes 
such contrary themes as "the preconditions for those dilemmas in which people are 
faced with difficult decisions [... ] enabl(ing) people to discuss and puzzle over their 
everyday life" (pp. 2-3). Stressing one side of the dilemma thus implies the other as 
solution or at least alternative. So, the client's stress on her duty to her mother and 
subsequent guilt over no-longer looking after her at home itself implies the 
contrasting theme that there is also a case that the client has a duty to herself. 
Moreover, the therapist can be understood to build on the idea implied in the client's 
account that looking after her mother could be considered a factor contributing to her 
depression. That is, placing her mother in care is legitimated through linking it to the 
client's recovery from depression. 
This discursive analysis, therefore, offers an understanding of therapeutic 
process based in a view of language use and cultural meanings rather than viewing 
mechanisms of change hidden within the client's head. Specifically, this case study 
demonstrates the importance of approaching participant's accounts as functional 
rather than purely descriptive. For example, the client's presentation of her problem 
made loaded implications available about its possible cause and potential solution. 
The analysis also demonstrates how the process of therapy may be intimately linked 
with the moral sphere, for example, in the negotiation of what constitutes legitimate 
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action. From the discursive perspective, therefore, problem resolution might more 
useful be considered problem dissipation; the co-evolution of new meaning within 
language (Anderson & Goolishian, 1988). Thus in offering a way of understanding 
the client's dilemma and the resolution of if as discursively managed and drawing on 
meanings embedded in wider cultural considerations the presented analysis can be 
understood as of general heuristic value. 
Evaluation criteria have been developed specifically for discourse analytic 
research: coherence of interpretation, increased understanding of the subject matter 
and the raising of issues which would not have been found in other ways. 
Regarding the first of these, coherence of interpretation can be judge through 
how well analysis accounts for variation in descriptions identified in the text. For 
example, the observation that the client's positioning of herself as damaged child and 
her mother as the bad mother was only alluded to obliquely in early sessions but 
articulated more fully later in therapy was accounted for in the presented analysis. 
That is, it was suggested that such positionings might have undermined the client's 
dutifulness toward her mother had they been articulated before this had been fully 
established during the interaction. Second, in linking processes of change to cultural 
meanings it is argued that this analysis has increased understanding of the subject 
matter through incorporating a dimension often de-emphasised in the conventional 
psychological account. And third, in doing so the analysis raises issues in relation to 
how moral, cultural and gendered issues are negotiated within the therapy dialogue. 
The present study was introduced as offering an opportunity to compare a 
qualitative, discursive approach and a quantitative, stage model approach to change 
process research. Some of the benefits of a discursive psychology will be explicated 
through drawing a contrast between the present research and the former study on this 
clinical material. 
Field et al. found a significant correlation between ratings of assimilation and 
the chronological order of adjacency pairs selected from therapy discussion of this 
client-specified, problematic issue. The approach utilised in the former study is 
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consistent with a tradition of good methodological practice in change process 
research. The following critique of this methodology is illustrated by reference to this 
former study but is to be understood as of general significance. 
First, to what extent did the study succeed in achieving consensus 
observations from independent review of the material? Field et al. report "the 
estimated reliability of a single rater's judgements - ICC(1,1) - was only . 
55, 
indicating that to obtain trustworthy APES ratings, the work of several raters must be 
pooled" (1994, p. 401). It is not disputed that pooling several raters work is often an 
appropriate strategy. However, there are problems with the use of such a technique in 
assessing a stage model of change in psychotherapy. That is, (1) rater consensus was a 
criterion of validity for the construct measured; the client 'schema'. Moreover (2) in a 
stage model each stage is qualitatively differentiated from the others. Accordingly, 
questions need to be raised about the use of research strategies which are so 
permissive in the extent of variability acceptable at the level of the individual rater. 
A second related point regards the utilisation of a particular model of change 
to rate adjacency pairs. In evaluating a model of change, the traditional methodology 
is to train raters in rating procedures and to familiarise them with the model under 
investigation. However, a growing number of perspectives within the analysis of text 
point to the inherent ambiguity of linguistic meaning (e. g., Derrida, 1967; Sacks, 
1964-72). Having raters evaluate extracts in terms of one model of change, therefore, 
can be understood as artificially constraining the possible ways such material may be 
interpreted. For example, it can be speculated that had raters been trained in another 
framework, e. g., the Experiencing Scale (Klein et al., 1986), a positive linear trend 
similar to that obtained by Field et al. with regard to the assimilation model might 
have been found. Hence, the finding from Field et al. appears to demonstrate client 
change in the direction of problem resolution and that the assimilation model was a 
viable interpretative framework. However, the finding does not demonstrate that 
change occurred by way of the mechanisms posited by the model; assimilation to a 
schema. 
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Third, if meaning is oriented to as an interactional achievement, the 
importance of the chronological order of the material under investigation becomes 
apparent. Presenting raters with randomised and decontextualised material, therefore, 
minimises the chance of raters having difficulties understanding the text within the 
framework offered through seeing how the text can be plausibly understood in other 
ways. An alternative, however, is to build up an understanding of the text sensitive to 
its own particular contours (see Patton, 1989). This leads into an articulation of the 
benefits offered by a discursive approach. 
The first benefit regards level of explanation (see Potter & Reicher, 1987). 
The raw material of most change process research is text; audio-tapes and transcripts 
of therapy dialogue. Utilising intra-psychic explanations, therefore, requires 
extrapolation to psychological process presumed to lie behind this text. A discursive 
approach does not deny the existence of intra-psychic events. It is argued, though, 
that description of such events are embedded in culturally relative, discursively 
constructed understandings. So, although discursive processes may indeed have 
psychological correlates, these may be understood in a variety of differing ways. The 
appearance of grounding texts in intra-psychic processes is therefore argued to be 
illusionary. One way of addressing the conundrum presented by differing intra- 
psychic explanations of change processes is to attempt to make the differing accounts 
compatible (e. g., Power & Brewin, 1991). An alternative, and perhaps simpler, 
solution is to focus analysis on the therapeutic dialogue without extrapolating to 
events inside the client's head. Locating the process of change in the therapy 
interaction, therefore, makes this a directly observable phenomenon. 
A second benefit regards the potential utility of discursive analysis to 
practitioners. It can be argued that, although understanding change in terms of, for 
example, cognitive or psychodynamic mechanisms may be useful theoretically, it may 
be less so to the practising psychotherapist. For example, understanding change in 
terms of assimilation to a schema or the lifting of a repression offers little indication 
of how this might be achieved during therapy. In contrast, a discursive approach 
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explicates the process of change in actual sequences of therapeutic interaction. 
Moreover, it offers a heuristic; a way of understanding the functional and constructive 
use of language and the interactional negotiation of meaning which might transfer to 
the consulting room. 
A third benefit of the discursive approach is an ability to work with the 
dynamic complexities and specific contours of a given text. This allows a flexibility 
and openness to the different ways change may be achieved in therapy; something 
which may be lost when attempting to fit process to a pre-determined model. 
Moreover, in presenting as much of the actual text as possible along with a detailed 
analysis of why analytic claims are being made, the process of understanding client 
change is open to inspection. The audience does not have to take the analyst's 
interpretation on trust and has the material available to challenge the analyst's 
understanding. 
A fourth benefit of a discourse analytic approach to change process research is 
that it incorporates a sensitivity to socio-cultural context through orienting to how 
historically and culturally situated meanings shape the reality in which we live. This 
is a dimension usually unarticulated in a traditional psychological account. Thus a 
discursive analysis maintains the complexities of cultural meanings on which 
psychotherapy as a human activity draws, rather than attempt to study change as if it 
occurred in a vacuum. 
Having discussed some of the benefits of the discursive approach to change 
processes in psychotherapy, some of the limitations of this particular study must now 
be considered. 
First, this study was conducted as a pilot case utilising extracts identified by 
(Field et al., 1994). In this former study extracts were selected from only 4 of the 8 
sessions of therapy. Moreover, therapist-client adjacency pairs were screened for their 
meaningfulness in isolation. It may be therefore that the choice of excerpts was 
inadequate for the purposes of this discursive study. For example, processes crucial 
for the understanding of this case might have taken place in the other sessions or in 
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other therapist-client exchanges. These possibilities are acknowledged. Accordingly, 
in the following three studies presented in this thesis (Chapters 5 to 7) problematic 
themes were traced through all 8 sessions of therapy and transcripts prepared 
encompassing all dialogue considered to pertain to the selected themes. 
Second, in attempting to account for client change across a number of sessions 
only a fraction of the dialogue pertaining to the theme could be presented in the 
analysis section. This means that the audience must take the researcher's selection of 
significant extracts on trust. Moreover, this selection procedure also necessitates that 
individual sequences were relatively decontextualised. In response, the following two 
studies focus on a micro-process as it occurred at various points in the therapy 
dialogue. In these chapters therefore no attempt is made to characterise a complete 
problem domain within one study. 
However, given these drawbacks the present study can be defended. First, 
utilising the same data base as Field et al. facilitates a comparison between the two 
studies. This was a primary aim. Second, session five was identified in the discursive 
analysis as the session in which the therapist and client negotiated new meaning for 
the client's predicament so facilitating her process of change. This concurs with the 
client's PQ evaluation of the severity of the problematic theme studied (session 5 ('5'), 
session 6 ('2')). And third, although necessarily selective in the extracts presented, the 
analysis offers a coherent and informative understanding of the processes of change 
involved. 
In light of the limitations of this pilot study, the following two chapters now 
present a further stage in the development of a discursive approach within 
psychotherapy change process research. These studies explore the process of problem 
(re)formulation in relation to one unsuccessful case and continue to address the 
question 'how does change occur in psychodynamic-interpersonal psychotherapy? '. 
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Problem (re)formulation in psychodynamic-interpersonal 
psychotherapy: Discursive analysis of client 
disconfirmationss. 1 
As indicated in the thesis introduction, the majority of reviewers have supported the 
finding that psychotherapy has been demonstrated, in general, to be effective (see 
page 1). Research is therefore being directed toward explicating the processes by 
which therapeutic success may be achieved. However, in doing so it is essential to 
examine unsuccessful as well as successful outcomes in order to understand what can 
go wrong. One unsuccessful case of psychodynamic-interpersonal psychotherapy is 
therefore the focus of Chapters 5 and 6. 
The following two studies represent a continued development of an approach 
linking discursive analysis of process with evaluation of therapy and domain 
outcome. Accordingly, in response to the limitations identified with the previous 
study, research on this unsuccessful case examines extracts selected from across the 
complete 8-session case. Moreover, analysis focuses on explicating a specific micro- 
process rather than attempt to characterise the complete process of change across the 
selected problem domain. The micro-process focused on is that of problem 
(re)formulation. This micro-process was identified in the discovery-oriented 
preliminary analysis of the transcripts selected as pertaining to the unresolved client- 
specified problem domain chosen for study. This chapter continues with an 
introduction to the first study from the second case of psychodynamic-interpersonal 
psychotherapy examined in this thesis. 
Psychotherapy, the 'talking cure', can be regarded primarily a conversational 
interaction. Thus, therapy talk is likely to share features in common with ordinary 
5.1 Sections of this chapter were presented at the international meeting of the Society for 
Psychotherapy Research, York, UK: Madill, A., Barkham, M., & Shapiro, D. A. (1994, July). A 
discourse analytic approach to change processes in psychotherapy. In D. A. Shapiro (Moderator), 
Qualitative approaches in psychotherapy process research and at the Psychology Postgraduate Affairs 
Group, Postgraduate Conference, Sheffield: Madill, A. Barkham, M., & Shapiro, D. A. (1994, July). 
Discourse analysis and psychotherapy: Representation and construction. 
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conversations. At most basic, psychotherapy is organised on a turn-by-turn basis, each 
turn projecting the relevance of a particular next turn. For example, a question makes 
an answer relevant. The turn-by-turn organisation of conversational interaction 
requires that meanings are necessarily constructed and negotiated between people. 
Turn-by-turn organisation is also a useful analyst's tool. That is, whatever next turn is 
produced displays the participant's understanding of the prior speaker's utterance. 
Moreover, as in ordinary conversation, turns in psychotherapy dialogue are designed 
to accomplish actions; identification of problems, interpretation, seeking clarification, 
etc. The links between therapy talk and ordinary conversation therefore suggest that 
conversation analytic studies could shed light on psychotherapy process. 
Research drawing on conversation analysis have already contributed to 
explication of therapy processes (e. g., Gale, 1991; Maynard, 1991; Peyrot, 1987). 
Accordingly, the present study builds on Davis' (1984,1986) work on the process of 
problem (re)formulation in psychotherapy in which she utilised a form of discursive 
analysis combining elements of conversation analysis (see pages 17-18) and 
comprehensive discourse analysis (Labov & Fanshel, 1977) (see pages 25-27). The 
topic of problem (re)formulation is important as identifying problems is a central 
requirement for therapeutic intervention: "the most common type of negotiation in 
therapy" (Peyrot, 1987, p. 261). Moreover, problem identification is often regarded a 
matter of straightforward and objective diagnosis (for critique see Harper, 1994). 
Davis' discursive analysis of an initial therapy session, however, demonstrated that 
the identification of a problem was "the result of considerable interactional 'work' on 
the part of the therapist" (Davis, 1986, p. 44). More specifically, she suggested that the 
client's presenting problems with respect to her pregnancy, position as housewife and 
mother and the inequalities in her relationship with her husband were transformed, or 
(re)formulated, by the therapist into an issue regarding her inability to talk about her 
feelings. Davis suggested that the process of problem (re)formulation occurred in 
three distinct stages; definition, gathering evidence, and finally organisation of the 
client's consent to work on the problem. 
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An important feature of Davis' research is the demonstration that 
psychotherapy processes are the product of interaction between client and therapist. 
That is, to understand process the researcher must pay attention to the joint 
production and negotiation of meaning carried out between participants (Friedlander 
& Phillips, 1984; Hill, 1982; Lichtenberg & Barke, 1981; Martin, 1984; Strong & 
Claiborn, 1982). To this end, the present study concentrates on explicating the 
rhetorical detail of specific sequences in which the client counters, or disconfirms, a 
(re)formulation of her problems offered by the therapist. This study therefore 
develops the understanding of this particular aspect of therapy interaction noted by 
Davis (1986). Davis' findings are also extended through linking discursive analysis of 
process with criterion measures of outcome as extracts were selected from the therapy 
discussions of an unresolved, client-specified problem from a more generally 
unsuccessful case. In this way, a primary aim of the current research is to contribute 
to the understanding of the unsuccessful resolution of the problematic theme studied. 
In doing so, there is a continuing demonstration of the utility of a discourse analytic 
approach for the understanding of change processes in psychotherapy. 
This current discourse analytic study also utilises concepts from the related 
field of conversation analysis. As suggested above, although the dialogue between 
client and therapist is framed by the institution of psychotherapy, participants are 
considered likely to draw on communicative competencies and discursive strategies 
they use in their daily lives. There is an analogy here with Atkinson's (1984) research 
on the use of rhetorical devices in political speeches. For example, he suggests that 
the use of contrastives, i. e. the juxtaposition of two contrasting items, is "massively 
recurrent across a range of environments, both interactional and textual, where 
persuading or convincing an audience is a central practical concern" (Atkinson, 1984, 
p. 404). Formulations, as focused on in Davis' work on psychotherapy and extended 
here, are another rhetorical strategy used in ordinary conversation. A formulation 
occurs when a participant in a conversation "says-in-so-many-words-what-they-are- 
doing-or-talking-about" (Heritage & Watson, 1979, p. 124). A primary function of 
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formulations, therefore, is to exhibit understanding and may occur through a 
participant providing an explanation, characterisation, explication or summary of 
what has gone before (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970). 
Formulations have been identified as having three central properties; 
preservation, deletion and transformation. That is, in producing a formulation, certain 
features of the preceding talk may be retained whilst other features are either glossed 
or recast. However, this is not to suggest that formulations are in some way 'defective' 
as adequacy is understood to be "exclusively decided by members on each occasion 
upon which formulations are produced and monitored" (Heritage & Watson, 1979, 
p. 160). This follows from the perspective that conversational meaning is not 
unambiguous, even for participants, and that formulations therefore enable the 
selection of one of many possible interpretations of preceding talk. However, in 
appearing to demonstrate understanding, rather than merely a candidate reading, 
formulations may actually provide a sense that meaning has been self-evident rather 
than, as suggested, a conversational achievement. By way of illustration Heritage and 
Watson (1979, p. 138) offer the following example of a formulation utilised here by 
the second participant: 
Participant (1): ... I just 
felt life wasn't worth it 
anymore - it hadn't anything to offer and 
if this was living I had had enough 
Participant (2): You really were prepared to commit 
suicide because you were a big fatty 
Heritage and Watson identify a subclass of formulations which may be used 
by the recipient of new information. This subclass is divided into 'gists' and 'upshots'. 
Gists, as in the above example, formulate the sense achieved up to a point in the 
conversation. Upshots, on the other hand, presume to indicate an implication or 
ramification of what has been said. Such strategies appear particularly relevant to the 
therapeutic setting in which the therapist is expected to comment upon the client's 
presentation of problems. 
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Formulations of all kinds require the recipient make a decision; they can be 
confirmed, disconfirmed, or a more general decision made regarding the 
appropriateness of the formulation. Confirmations are overwhelmingly preferred, 
possibly as they usually entail the least interactional work (Pomerantz, 1975). In 
contrast, disconfirmations, the focus of the present study, can be a particularly 
complex response to manage. This is so as they may appear to challenge the sense 
that participants have a mutual understanding. This in turn may be taken as a criticism 
or challenge and tend to precipitate the need to establish new collaborative meaning. 
The participant offering the disconfirmation often, therefore, orients to retaining 
interactional ease by presenting the disconfirmation in a mitigated or 'round-about' 
manner and combined with confirmatory elements. This occurs, for example, in the 
following extract in which the second participant offers a hedged disconfirmation to 
the first participants upshot formulation (from Heritage & Watson, 1979, p. 147): 
Participant (1): Yes so then you know you will get the 
results and you could get a job 
Participant (2): (Well look) you see, it's not just 
that gets me down... 
The aim of this study, therefore, is to show the utility of a detailed analysis of 
language in explicating psychotherapy processes. This is accomplished through 
demonstrating how a discursive analysis of client disconfirmation of therapist 
attempted problem (re)formulation may be informative regarding the implications of 
certain therapeutic interventions and contribute to understanding the poor outcome 
the client specified problem studied. Thus this chapter continues to address the 
question 'how does change occur in psychodynamic-interpersonal psychotherapy? '. 
METHOD 
Case selection The case was an unsuccessful therapy of a female client who 
completed 8 one-hour, weekly sessions of psychodynamic-interpersonal 
psychotherapy. This case was selected from the Second Sheffield Psychotherapy 
Project (Shapiro et al., 1990). This project provided an archive of 117 audio-taped 
therapy cases of clients meeting a DSM-III diagnosis of Major Depressive Episode at 
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intake assessment. The case was selected on the basis of client Beck Depression 
Inventory scores (BDI: Beck et al., 1961); the criterion outcome measure for the 
study. 
The BDI was administered on 6 occasions resulting in the following scores: at 
initial screening (28), intake assessment (24), immediately prior to first session (22), 
2 weeks after therapy completion (23), 3-months follow-up (19), and 1-year follow- 
up (10). The case selected for study was chosen as the client's assessment pattern was 
considered particularly unsuccessful in comparison with the other cases receiving the 
same treatment method and duration. Although the client's BDI score fell to almost 
normal levels at one year after therapy, and cannot be discounted, this was considered 
of less import to micro-level process research than assessments immediately prior to 
and following the course of therapy. 
Written informed consent to use audio-tapes of this therapy for research 
purposes was obtained from the client after therapy completion. 
The client The client was female, in her forties and in full-time white-collar 
employment. She lived with her partner and their two young children. The client's 
partner was separated from his wife (referred to therefore as (ex-)wife in the 
following analysis) and their child. However, he remained in regular contact with 
them. 
The therapist The therapist was male, of similar age to the client and with 18 years 
experience with psychodynamic-interpersonal therapy. As was the norm, the therapist 
was subject to peer group supervision. 
Theme selection At the second part of the intake assessment, the client was presented 
with a list of individualised problems derived from the assessment interview via a 
variant of the therapy questionnaire method (Mulhall, 1976; Phillips, 1986). The 
client was asked to select a total of 10 items, 2 from each of 5 categories: symptoms, 
mood, self-esteem, relationships, and specific performance. One unresolved 
problematic theme was selected for detailed study from this more generally 
unsuccessful case. The theme chosen for analysis concerned the client's domestic 
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circumstances: 'difficulty shouldering all the responsibility at home'. All 10 personal 
statements were rated by the client each week immediately prior to session. The client 
was required to rate how much each problem statement had bothered her during the 
week on a 7-point scale with anchor points of ' l' ('not at all') to '7' ('extremely'). The 
ratings for the selected statement across the 8 sessions was as follows: 56654555. 
A score of '5' (severity = 'considerably') indicated that this theme remained 
unresolved at therapy completion. 
Selection of dialogue for analysis In order to obtain transcripts of the therapy 
conversation pertaining to the selected issue, three psychology graduates listened to 
audio-tapes of the case for relevant passages. All three were in their mid- or late- 
twenties; two were male and one female (the author). One was working as an assistant 
psychologist in a psychiatric hospital and the others were doctoral students in clinical 
related research. Selection of material was organised in such a way that each session 
of therapy had extracts chosen independently by two of the three graduates using 
selection instructions prepared by the author (Appendix 2). As the aim of this 
procedure was to obtain relevant material for study, all selected passages were 
transcribed. This provided sixteen passages varying in length from a few lines of 
dialogue to five pages of transcript. 
Analytic procedures The first stage of analysis involved listening to audio-tapes of the 
complete 8-hour therapy in order to contextualise the extracts obtained for detailed 
study. In the second stage, all selected extracts were subjected to a preliminary 
analysis. This involved close and repeated reading of the text while making notes on 
patterns of consistency and variability in the interaction. During this process it was 
noted how the client's presentation of her problems was followed by some debate as 
to the source and nature of these issues. It was also observed that this continued 
throughout the therapy. This feature of the interaction was therefore deemed of 
interest. In the third stage, three extracts were selected for presentation and subjected 
to a detailed analysis which is presented in full below. The particular extracts were 
chosen as they offered good examples of client disconfirmation of attempted therapist 
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(re)formulation of her problems. The selected examples also range from the subtle to 
the dramatic and complex and, as such, demonstrate a variety of the micro-processes 
involved. This is in line with the theoretical sampling procedure of grounded theory 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
ANALYSIS 
The first full discussion of the client's domestic circumstances occurred during the 
second session of therapy. The first of the extracts selected for detailed analysis is 
taken from this initial discussion in which the client comments on the amount of time 
her partner spends with his (ex-)wife: 
Extract (1) Session (2) 
I C: ... he seems to spend an awful 
lot of time there 
2 and I find it very very difficult to cope with 
3 (. ) um although you know he says there's 
4 nothing in it and all the rest of it I still 
5 feel that there are things that he should do to 
6 make me feel (tails off). 
7 T: So he is spending time with bju (tails off). 
8 C: Just to go and visit you know 
9 T: (yes) 
10 C: but to me it's a lot of time because we have a 
11 very busy life (. ) um (. ) and j feel as if I'm 
12 left (. ) with you know collecting the children 
13 taking them home (. ) tea you know we've got a 
14 solid fuel cooker that needs stoking up and all 
15 the the rest of it fire to light and so (. ) and 
16 everything seems to be down tome and after 
17 work (. ) he's got lots of meetings and things 
18 but quite quite often if he's got a meeting 
19 he'll go there for an hour first and then go 
20 off and I feel I'm just left with everything 
21 (. ) um so I can support the way he wants to do 
22 things um. 
Client's description of a problem The client's account of an aspect of her domestic 
situation, her relationship with her partner, is presented in such a way that certain 
inferences about the source and nature of one problem are suggested. The extract 
begins with a complaint about the amount of time her partner spends with his (ex- 
)wife. That is, the client says "he seems to spend an awful lot of time there" (line 1). 
By describing the time spent there as 'an awful lot' she implies that it is excessive. 
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Thus the basis of her complaint about her partner is that he spends too much time 
with his (ex-)wife, further stating that she "find(s) it very very difficult to cope with" 
(line 2). Recipients are likely to make inferences about the reasons why the client 
finds the excessive time her partner spends with his (ex-)wife difficult to cope with. 
An obvious inference is that she is fearful or jealous of a possible resumption of their 
romantic involvement. She orients to this potential understanding through reporting 
that her partner "says there's nothing in it" (lines 3-4). This is an idiomatic phrase 
used to characterise a relationship as platonic in circumstances where the status of the 
relationship as such may be open to doubt. By using this phrase she therefore 
dismisses the implication that his visits may be motivated by a continuing romantic 
interest in his (ex-)wife. 
The client portrays the impression that her partner's statements are designed to 
reassure her. However, she implies that they do not remedy the situation because she 
"still feel(s) that there are things he should do" (lines 4-5). The phrase 'I still feel' 
suggests that she has not been reassured by his claim that 'there's nothing in it' as it 
has not fulfilled her needs or requirements. That is, that there are things he 'should' do 
indicates both that she regards there to be an onus on him to behave in a certain way 
and that he is not doing so. Furthermore, in the context of dismissing the significance 
of his verbal reassurances, that his behaviour should "make = feel (tails off)" (line 6) 
implies that she is suggesting that his actions ought to make her feel less anxious. The 
client therefore implies the problem is that reassurance about the nature of her 
partner's relationship with his (ex-)wife should be, but is not, reflected in his actions; 
thus her complaint that he spends too much time there. 
Therapist's problem (re)formulation The therapist then produces a gist of what the 
client has said. As mentioned in the introduction (see page 120), a gist is a subclass of 
formulation used by a recipient in order to summarise an understanding of new 
information. The therapist's gist of the problem is that "he is spending time with ha" 
(line 7). This preserves some aspects of the client's account but deletes others. 
Specifically, the therapist preserves the client's reference to her partner "spend(ing) 
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time" (line 7, line 1) with his (ex-)wife but does not repeat and thus deletes her 
reference to the amount; the "awful lot" (line 1) of time. Moreover, he does not 
recycle "there" (line 1) but adds "with her" (line 7). He therefore focuses on the fact 
that the client's partner is visiting his (ex-)wife rather than on the client's complaint 
regarding the amount of time he spends there or his behaviour toward the client 
herself. Thus the therapist preserves only the implication of a possible romantic basis 
of her partner's visits. In doing so, although not stating it directly, he makes an 
inference available that the problem may be the client's jealousy or insecurity insofar 
as 'spending time with her' suggests her partner's preference for his (ex-) wife's 
company. 
Client's disconfirmation In her reply, the client disconfirms the therapist's 
(re)formulation of her problem. Thus, she displays awareness of the potential 
inference the therapist has oriented to but dismisses it. That is, she suggests the 
contact between her partner and his (ex-)wife is "just to go and visit" (line 8). Use of 
the description 'just' implies that he goes to visit and nothing more. She therefore 
directly disconfirms sexual or romantic motivation. In contrast, her next utterance 
"but to me it's a lot of time" (line 10) re-emphasises that the problem is the excessive 
time he spends there. 
The client goes on to stress the legitimacy of this particular complaint in 
several ways. First, she describes their lives as "very busy" (line 11) thereby 
suggesting that they are very full. Second, she points to the inequalities in their 
domestic responsibilities stating that "everything seems to be down to me" (line 16) 
and lists the daily family and household activities her partner's absences leave her 
with to manage on her own (lines 12-15). Third, she mentions that her partner will 
"quite often" (line 18) visit his (ex-)wife before attending after-work meetings. It is 
therefore implied that he will find time to see his (ex-)wife in a busy day rather than 
come home to her. Suggesting that he often visits his (ex-)wife therefore functions to 
counter a possible objection that he does not have time to contribute to the domestic 
chores. Thus, the client suggests a further aspect of the problem is that in spending a 
126 
Chapter 5 
lot of time with his (ex-)wife her partner is not contributing to running the household 
he shares with her. 
The client completes this account with a statement of her grievances; "I'm just 
left with eve rY hing um so I can support the way he wants to do things" (lines 20-22). 
So, she again stresses the problem of her partner's lack of domestic contribution and 
in describing herself as "just left" (line 20) implies his general thoughtlessness 
towards her. Moreover, that she is left 'so I can support the way he wants to do things' 
suggests that she is being used primarily as a facilitator to his requirements. In this 
final statement therefore the client implicates her partner's selfish motives thereby 
presenting his behaviour as culpable. Thus, she disconfirms the therapist's 
(re)formulation through a clarification that the basis of her complaint is the 
unreasonable amount of time that her partner spends with his (ex-)wife and the 
implications this has for the inequalities in their contribution to the domestic chores. 
The analysis of this first extract demonstrates how identification of the client's 
problem is a product of ongoing negotiation within the therapeutic dialogue. It also 
demonstrates how this process can be quite subtle. A particularly interesting feature 
of this sequence is the contrast between the client's focus on her partner's behaviour; 
an externally located problem, and the therapist's (re)formulation of this through the 
implication of her possible jealousy to a problem that is internal to her. A similar 
pattern occurs later in the same session in a more dramatic example of problem 
(re)formulation and subsequent client disconfirmation. This sequence commences 
with the client extending her account of the inequalities present in the relationship 
with her partner which she introduced in the first extract as a means of legitimating 
her complaint about his behaviour: 
Extract (2) Session (2) 
1 C: ... um (. 
) and it's almost as well as if (. ) you 
2 know (. ) his career his what hg wants to do is 
3 paramount it's it's taken for granted you know 
4 if he's got a meeting this that and that well 
5 got a meeting and that's it if I have to do 
6 anything () you know I've got to sort of book 
7 in three weeks in advance you know say is it 
8 alrri ht for me to you know even a (work) 
9 meeting (. ) or anything like that. 
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10 T: Yeah this is maybe something which hits you 
11 very hard () particularly because of this idea 
12 that we've looked at already about you somehow 
13 having you know nothing inside the collapse the 
14 emptiness or whatever 
15 C: (mm) 
16 T: that somehow you can't you can't impinge on him 
17 you you don't really count for anything. 
18 C: Mm () I feel very nervous actually asking for 
19 anything () 
20 T: (mm) 
21 C: it takes me a long time to work up to it () 
22 T: (mm) 
23 C: even if it's something you know fairly 
24 insignificant 
25 T: (mm) 
26 C: in the lives of ordinary folk as it were (. ) 
27 T: (mm) 
28 C: um you know (. ) if um I don't know if I want to 
29 go into Sainsburys or something one evening (. ) 
30 there's always um I always have to take the 
31 children because he's always got something on 
32 you know and and 
33 T: (mm) 
34 C: and just saying well are you going to help me 
35 with the shopping tonight () it takes an 
36 awful an awful lot of effort to actually ay it 
37 because I know I'm frightened I suppose of the 
38 response because I think I know what it's going 
39 to be, () um (5)... 
Client's description of a problem This sequence begins with the client's description of 
certain expectations her partner has with respect to his working life. She states; "his 
career his what bI wants to do is paramount" (lines 2-3). So, in characterising her 
partner's 'career' as 'paramount' she suggests that his work has priority over other 
things. Moreover, she describes this as "taken for granted" (line 3) suggesting it is an 
unquestioned state of affairs. The client provides an example. If he has a work 
meeting "well got a meeting and that's it" (lines 4-5). She thereby suggests that the 
priority of her partner's career duties is something he will not negotiate and that he 
will just go to meetings when necessary. 
The client then describes some of her own expectations in similar matters, 
suggesting that they are rather different. So, when she has to do anything she must 
"sort of book three weeks in advance" (lines 6-7). She therefore indicates that, unlike 
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her partner who may have 'got a meeting and that's it', there is an onus on her to make 
her plans known well ahead in order to have the opportunity to fulfil them. Also, she 
must check with him, "say is it ri for me" (lines 7-8), suggesting that rather than 
'take it for granted' she must consult him about what she does and ask permission. 
Furthermore, that these contingencies apply to "anything" (line 6) she has to do 
implies that her life is regulated by such requirements. She then makes their career 
asymmetries particularly relevant by claiming that these procedures apply for "even a 
(work) meeting" (lines 8-9). By implication, it is indicated that her career does not 
have the same priority as his and, unlike him, she must surmount obstacles in order to 
pursue her own career or accomplish tasks. The basis of her complaint, then, is that 
these asymmetries in the relationship are unfair. 
Therapist's problem (relformulation The therapist replies by producing a formulation 
through offering an understanding of what the client has just described. He does this 
by way of a summary assessment. He suggests that the client's circumstances are 
"something which hits (her) very hard" (lines 10-11). He therefore orients to the 
problematic effect of the circumstances on the client rather than on the inequalities in 
her relationship itself. Thus he makes the client's personal response a relevant new 
topic for discussion. 
Having defined the effect of circumstances on her, the therapist produces an 
explanation for this through pointing to the cause. He suggests that circumstances 'hit 
her hard' because the client has "nothing inside the collapse the emptiness or 
whatever" (lines 13-14). He therefore suggests that such an effect is a manifestation 
of an underlying personal problem. This explanation is then justified through 
suggesting it is something they have discussed earlier in therapy; "this idea that we've 
looked at already" (lines 11-12), although it is not indicated whether agreement had 
been reached on this. Finally, the problem is then stated in terms of the client being 
unable to "impinge on" (line 16) her partner. However, the term 'impinge' implies that 
the client's difficulty is in actually asking rather than that fact that she has to ask. The 
therapist's description, therefore, transforms the client's suggestion that her having to 
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ask is, itself, unfair. Moreover, with the suggestion that she doesn't "really count for 
anything" (line 17) it is implied that the identified underlying personal problem is the 
client's low self-esteem or feelings of self-worth. 
Client's disconfirmation The client's reply commences with a statement as to her 
difficulty making demands on her partner; "I feel very nervous actually asking for 
anything" (lines 18-19). However, in this she does not repeat the term 'impinge' but 
uses the milder description of 'asking for anything'. So, although confirming the 
therapist's suggestion that she has difficulty actually making requests, this is presented 
in diluted form. Moreover, rather than characterise her feelings as being 'hit hard' the 
client describes herself as 'feel(ing) very nervous'. She thereby suggests the difficulty 
is less extreme. 
Describing her difficulty making demands on her partner, the client states that 
it takes her "a long time to work up to it" (line 21). Furthermore, she suggests that it 
is problematic for her to make even "insignificant" (line 24) requests. So, we are 
presented with a puzzle insofar as there is a discrepancy between the nature of the 
client's requests and the difficulty with which their production is associated. How 
does the client account for this? She first, continues by providing an example of an 
'insignificant' request: asking for help with the shopping (lines 28-29 and 34-35). In 
this regard she states that she always has "to take the children because he's always got 
something on" (lines 30-31). Several implications can be drawn from this. First, in 
making 'taking the children' relevant, she implies that he does not, but that she would 
like him to look after the children while she shops. Second, it can be inferred that she 
is at least inconvenienced by such lack of contribution as having to take the children 
shopping can be understood as adding to her work. Finally, that he does not 
contribute 'because he's always got something on' suggests that her partner gives 
precedence to his other commitments over helping her with such domestic chores. 
Thus, in this example the client reinforces the reasonable nature and ordinariness of 
her requests and orients to the asymmetries in their domestic and personal 
commitments. Moreover, the client introduces her partner's behaviour as relevant to 
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the problem, and by implying that he considers helping her even trivially with 
domestic chores a low priority she makes the implication available that his behaviour 
is unreasonable. 
Against the background of having described a trivial, 'anybody's' request, she 
re-emphasises the difficulty asking for help; "it takes an awful an awful lot of effort 
to actually sa it" (lines 35-36). Again, this raises the question as to why such a trivial 
thing is so difficult to ask for? The client addresses this issue indirectly through 
implication. First, she says, "I'm frightened I suppose of the response" (lines 37-38). 
Her fear, and thus difficulty, is therefore made contingent on her partner's answer to 
her request. Second, she is afraid "because I think I know what it's going to fig" (lines 
38-39). A feature of the problem is therefore implied to be the difficulty asking for 
something the client anticipates she will be refused. Finally, in juxtaposing the 
mundane and ordinary nature of her request with her partner's implied negative 
response, she further implies that his behaviour is unreasonable and thus problematic. 
So, the therapist's formulation characterising the problem as the client's low self- 
esteem, and therefore as internal to her, although not explicitly denied is implicitly 
disconfirmed through identifying the basis of her 'nervousness' in her partner's 
unreasonable behaviour and unwillingness to help. 
An observation can be made with regard to these first two extracts. That is, it 
is noticeable that the therapist's (re)formulations are produced with minimal warrant 
whereas the client's disconfirmations are made credible through a more lengthy 
account. Why should this be so? It can be suggested that in offering an extended 
rejection of the therapist's account the client mutes her disagreement thereby 
maintaining, at least the appearance of, co-operative interaction. Another possibility 
is that orientation to internal causes, as in the therapist's (re)formulations, are perhaps 
hard to refute as there is always the possibility of characterising the internal cause as 
subconscious and thus denied or repressed. This is so particularly in a situation in 
which one is in therapy and disagreeing with an expert in such matters. 
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A more complex example of the process of problem (re)formulation- 
disconfirmation appears in the following sequence drawn from the final discussion of 
the client's domestic problems during this therapy. Again the therapist can be seen to 
construct a problematic feature of such difficulties as internal to the client whereas 
she locates this problem in external circumstances. In contrast to the previous two 
extracts, however, this final example commences and concludes with a therapist 
problem formulation, analysis demonstrating how the client's disconfirmation is 
subsequently (re)formulated by the therapist as another manifestation of her 
underlying personal problem. Discussion prior to this sequence concerned the client's 
complaint that she cannot talk to her partner about her struggle to manage their older 
child. The therapist comments on this ten seconds after the client completed her turn: 
Extract (3) Session (6) 
1 T: I'm I'm looking at what you were saying 
2 about feeling alone with the problem 
3 C: (mm) 
4 T: which is partly about not being able to share 
5 it as you've decided to do here but it's also 
6 about feeling that you wouldn't get the support 
7 if you did (. ) or it's not (tails off). 
8 C: I think I'm more frightened of being condemned. 
9 T: Yeah. 
10 C: Um (. ) not for being a bad mother in inverted 
11 commas but for reacting too strongly to it 
12 T: (yes) 
13 C: and 
14 T: (mm hm) 
15 C: creating these 
16 T: (mm hm) 
17 C: um (tails off). 
18 T: Scenes (. ) 
19 C: (scenes) 
20 T: episodes (. ) 
21 C: (yes) 
22 T: sessions you called them (. ) 
23 C: (yes) 
24 T: yes (. ) yes (. ) yes so this is the this is once 
25 again it's the it's the gJjl and the sense of 
26 being open to accusation () which I still feel 
27 is aroused for you when you rush to your 28 mother's defence because you see your 
29 perception of n as blaming your mother is 30 really stemming from a sense that were 
31 blameworthy as a mother (5)... 
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Therapist's problem formulation The therapist begins by producing a formulation 
through offering a gist summarising an understanding of what the client has just said. 
He states; "I'm looking at what you were saying about feeling alone with the 
problem" (lines 1-2). In reporting that 'feeling alone with the problem' is something 
she has 'said', he suggests that this description has issued directly from the client 
herself. That is, he presents it as part of the client's own perspective. However, that he 
is 'looking at' it indicates that he has selected this particular aspect of her account for 
further discussion. As such he implies that the client's reaction to the problem is the 
relevant aspect of her account meriting his professional attention. 
The therapist then expands the formulation offering a further speculation 
regarding this matter. He states that 'feeling alone' is "partly about not being able to 
share it as you've decided to do here" (lines 4-5). He therefore suggests that the 
client's feelings arise, in part, from her 'not being able to share' her problem managing 
the elder child with her partner. The therapist then draws a contrast between the client 
'deciding to share' the problem with him but not with her partner. It is therefore 
implied that the issue is not perhaps that she is unable to talk about the problem per se 
but that she has chosen not to do so at home. But why should the client chose not to 
share the problem with her partner? The therapist suggests that 'feeling alone' is "also 
about feeling that you wouldn't get the support if you did" (lines 5-7). Two features of 
this are of particular interest. First, describing this as her 'feeling' of not receiving 
support focuses on her understanding as a subjective matter. Second, that she feels 
she would not get support 'if she did', raises the implication that sharing the problem 
with her partner is something which she may not have tried. So, 'not getting support' 
is implicated as the reason the client chooses not to share the problem with her 
partner. However, it is oriented to as a feature of the client's own anticipation of the 
unhelpful response she may receive from him. So, rather than address her partner's 
behaviour directly, the therapist's formulation implies that the client's problem is a 
consequence of her own self-defeating behaviour. 
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Client's disconfirmation The client offers a disconfirmation of this problem 
formulation through emphasising another matter; that she is "more frightened of 
being condemned" (line 8). The use of the qualifying term 'more' typically hedges the 
disconfirmation through suggesting that the therapist's formulation captures some 
features of the problem although not the most important. Thus she suggests the main 
problem is that she might be 'condemned' by her partner. She therefore indicates that 
what she is afraid of is her partner's judgement of blame and censure. Condemnation 
is an extreme reaction on his part to the client's implied or potential attempts to 
discuss the problem. Hence the justification for her fear. Furthermore, in describing 
herself as 'frightened' of such a reaction the client implies that such a judgement 
would have a significantly negative effect on her. 
The client then goes on to suggest the basis for her partner's condemnation. 
First, she discounts one explanation; it is "ni for being a bad mother" (line 10). This 
explanation was made available from the discussion immediately previous to this 
sequence which concerned the client's difficulty managing their elder child. She can 
therefore be understood as orienting to this context, raising the possibility that her 
ability as a mother could have been the basis of her partner's criticism of her. 
However, she dismisses this explanation suggesting rather, that the condemnation is 
for "reacting too strongly to it" (line 11) and 'creating scenes'. She therefore indicates 
that her partner may criticise her inappropriately strong response to her difficulty with 
the child. 
An implication of this presentation of the cause of her partner's criticism is 
that it raises the issue of the reasonableness of his behaviour. First, the description of 
being 'condemned' for 'reacting too strongly' suggests a mismatch between the 
severity of his judgement and the nature of the behaviour for which she is being 
criticised. Second, suggesting that 'being a bad mother' is not the cause of her 
partner's condemnation whereas over-reacting and creating scenes is, raises the 
implication that instead of appreciating her concerns he simply criticises her reaction. 
And, finally, suggesting that her partner will criticise her for being over-reactive 
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further implies that her reaction is considered inappropriate. This in turn implies that 
the child is not a great problem and consequently that he does not take her concerns 
seriously. The connotations of the client's problem account are, therefore, different 
from those of the therapist. That is, rather than merely the anticipation of her partner's 
lack of support, the nature of the problem is implied to be the lack of appreciation and 
the damaging and unreasonable criticism she may receive from him with respect to 
her problems. 
Thera bist's problem (re)formulation The therapist helps the client complete her 
account, offering the word "scenes" (line 18), which she repeats (line 19) and 
"episodes" (line 20) and "sessions" (lines 22) which she agrees with (line 23). He also 
suggests that 'sessions' was a term the client had used earlier (line 22). All this helps 
create the sense that the interactants have a mutual understanding of the topic under 
discussion. This is further suggested by the therapist's agreement with the client's 
account; "yes (. ) yes (. ) yes" (line 24). However, he goes on to produce another 
(re)formulation of the nature and source of the client's problem. 
The therapist commences the (re)formulation with a summary assessment 
offering an understanding of what client has said. He states; "this is once again it's the 
it's the g> and the sense of being open to accusation" (lines 24-26). The phrase 'this 
is once again' indicates that the client's account is another example of something 
already identified and so indicates the appearance of a common pattern. This pattern 
is identified as 'guilt'. However, although the client used the word 'condemned', which 
makes the topic of blame relevant, she used it to describe a feature of her partner's 
behaviour; that of criticising her for being over-reactive. So, in characterising the 
client's problem account as indicating 'guilt' and 'being open to accusation', being 
'condemned' is transformed into a feature of the client's own feelings. It is therefore 
suggested that 'guilt' is an underlying personal problem belonging to the client. 
Having characterised the client's guilty feelings as a recurring pattern, the 
therapist goes on to produce a specific example. He describes a feature of the client's 
behaviour in therapy stating; "you rush to your mother's defence" (lines 27-28). So, 
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'motherhood' is re-introduced as a topic in direct contrast with the client's problem 
description in which 'being a bad mother' was specifically discounted as relevant (see 
lines 10-11). In describing her reaction to 'defend her mother' as a 'rush', the therapist 
implies that she is hasty and unreflective in her response to such matters. As such, 
particularly in the context of psychotherapy, he may be understood as raising the 
possibility of the presence of unconscious defences. Moreover, the therapist produces 
two explanations for the client's reaction. First, from the client's perspective; "your 
perception of me as blaming you mother" (lines 28-29). Second, from his own; 
"really stemming from a sense that you were blameworthy as a mother" (lines 30-31). 
In characterising the client's perspective a 'perception' the therapist makes the 
subjectivity of her viewpoint relevant. On the other hand, his own perspective is 
precursed 'really' suggesting that this is the truth of the matter. By implication, 
therefore, further doubt is raised regarding the accuracy of the client's judgement on 
maternal issues and her imputed understanding of the therapist 'blaming her mother' 
suggested to be mistaken. Her reaction, rather, is accounted for as consequence of her 
own feelings of blameworthiness. This particular characterisation of the client's 
behaviour in therapy therefore functions to justify the status of the client's 'guilt' as an 
underlying and pervasive problem. 
The therapist therefore draws an implicit analogy between the therapist 
blaming the client's mother; construed as a distorted perception created by the client's 
own feelings of blameworthiness, and her partner condemning her; presented in terms 
of her own feelings of guilt. The client's account of the nature of her domestic 
difficulties implicating her partner's unreasonable behaviour is therefore 
(re)formulated by the therapist to that of the client's own guilty feelings about her 
ability as a mother. As such, the client's presentation of an externally located problem 
is again transformed to one considered internal to her. 
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DISCUSSION 
This detailed discursive analysis of interactional sequences between a client and 
therapist demonstrates the way in which differing versions of the source and nature of 
aspects of the client's domestic problems were presented within the therapy dialogue. 
In the sequences presented here, the therapist complied with various elements 
of the therapy protocol; a focus on or implication of the client's affect or reaction (all 
extracts); the use of hypothesis (extract 2), and reference to the therapeutic 
relationship as a vehicle for the manifestation of the client's problems (extract 3). 
However, the analysis demonstrated that the therapist's interventions, particularly his 
emphasis on the client's feelings or reactions, had the effect of transforming the 
client's account of externally located problems to internal ones (a pattern noted in 
other studies, e. g., Davis, 1984,1986; Sampson, 1977; Smith & David, 1975; 
Waitzkin & Britt, 1989). That is, the client's account of her partner's ineffectual 
reassurance, paucity of domestic contribution, career priority, and unreasonable 
criticism of her were (re)formulated by the therapist. Specifically, they were 
transformed to implicate the client's jealousy, low self-esteem, self-defeating 
behaviour and guilt about her ability as a mother. Each of these, however, was 
disconfirmed by the client. In doing so, though, she maintained the appearance of a 
co-operative encounter through producing 'round-about' (extracts I& 2) and qualified 
(extract 3) rejections. This analysis therefore demonstrates how the client and 
therapist produced contrasting accounts of the source and nature of the client's 
problems suggesting the absence of a consensus understanding by the final discussion 
of this topic during therapy (extract 3). 
A general question is therefore raised. Why should the therapist continually, if 
implicitly, (re)formulate the client's own perspective regarding the source and nature 
of her problems? The answer might be found in the principle of many 
psychotherapeutic approaches that progress requires the location of a core dynamic 
within the client. This is so as the client is considered the medium through which 
therapeutic change is promoted. From this perspective, one task of therapy will be the 
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identification of problems considered directly amenable to intervention (i. e., of 
problems that 'belong' or are internal to the client). The analysis presented in this 
paper demonstrates such a process but goes beyond mere documentation. Given that 
problem identification is central to therapeutic intervention it is reasonable to 
speculate that the lack of consensus regarding the client's problem contributed to the 
poor outcome in this particular domain. Moreover, demonstrating how the differing 
problem accounts were produced in the sequences studied here, raises questions about 
the nature, functions and legitimation of such alternative versions. 
The client was demonstrated to characterise her problems in terms of her 
partner's unreasonable behaviour. This account is, perhaps, relatively easy to 
understand as an interested version (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter et al., 1993). 
That is, in presenting her problems in such a way, the client can be understood to 
position herself as a victim thereby absolving herself of blame for the circumstances 
which cause her distress (Buttny, 1990; Edwards & Potter, 1993). However, the 
legitimacy of such an account may be sustained in many ways. For example, it carries 
the force of the client's direct and intimate acquaintance with her life situation 
(Watson, 1978). Furthermore, her account resonates with our cultural understanding 
of the domestic burden often placed on working mothers and the relative lack of 
importance traditionally awarded their careers in relation to that of their male 
partners. 
On the other hand, the therapist's perspective on the client's problems may also 
be considered interested and functional. As suggested, the function of internalising 
therapeutic interventions appears to be the transformation of a client's presenting 
problem into a form considered more suitable for treatment (Davis, 1986). This is 
legitimated by a tradition of good clinical practice and by the therapist's category 
entitlement. That is, his perspective is lent credibility through his being a member of 
a professional group expert in psychological matters (Coulter, 1991; Jayyusi, 1984; 
Sacks, 1974). However, category bound authority to speak does not, itself, guarantee 
an account's credibility and other specific tactics may be required to legitimate an 
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account (Potter, 1995). For example, the present analysis did identify a number of 
specific legitimation strategies utilised by the therapist within the interaction; 
connection made between an internalised account and ideas raised earlier in the 
therapy (extract 2), presenting internalising descriptions as issuing from the client's 
own perspective (extract 3), and the interpretation of the client's disconfirmation as, 
in fact, offering a further example of her underlying personal problem (extract 3). 
From the clinical perspective, a client's non-compliance with attempts to 
identify an internal dynamic may be understood in terms of resistance; that her 
account is a defensive externalisation of the problem. In fact, the therapist has a 
number of psychological mechanisms to draw upon in order to account for 'reality 
disjunctures' created during the dialogue (Pollner, 1975) (see extract 3). However, 
such an understanding appears to attend to the functional implications of the client's 
account; mitigation of personal blame, at the expense of the possible legitimations 
sustaining it. The concept of resistance can, itself, therefore be understood as a 
rhetorical device functioning to legitimate the therapeutic perspective; appealing to 
psychic forces rather than preferred accounts (Schafer, 1980). 
In this context therapies have been developed which aim to "equally attend(s) 
to intrapsychic and social/contextual variables" (Brown & Brodsky, 1992, p. 52) and 
therefore to the legitimacy of socio-culturally framed problem accounts. For example, 
feminist perspectives within psychotherapy have challenged the assumption that 
progress requires the identification of problems within the client. Critical 
perspectives, in general, point to the political implications, particularly for clients 
belonging to less privileged groups, of de-emphasising the effect of social context in 
the genesis of problems (Enns, 1993; Sampson, 1977; Waitzkin, 1989). Thus, in 
suggesting that therapy may proceed with the incorporation of such features, 
(re)formulating externalised presenting problems may be viewed as a choice rather 
than therapeutic necessity (Pilgrim, 1992; Polkinghorne, 1992). In a similar vein, 
Rennie (1994a) stresses the importance of "being sensitive and open to the client's 
thoughts about the best approach to treatment" (p. 55). He suggests that the main 
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implication of his research on client 'resistance' is that encouragement of the client's 
perspective is essential to offset the power differential in the counselling relationship 
and to "contribute directly to the establishment of a productive working alliance" 
(p. 55). 
The analysis presented in this study also raises an issue in relation to the mode 
of therapy utilised; a variant of psychodynamic-interpersonal therapy based on 
Hobson's conversational model (Hobson, 1985). This model delineates a number of 
therapeutic principles including an assumption that the client's problems arise from 
disturbances in significant personal relationships, the development of mutuality 
through negotiation and on the client's experiential field (Shapiro & Firth, 1985). 
However, the current study points to a possible inconsistency in this therapeutic 
rationale under certain circumstances. That is, although in the presented extracts the 
therapist complies with the model in his attempts to focus on the client's affect, this 
appears to be at the detriment of the development of mutuality as it had the effect of 
changing central features the client's account. 
Sass (1992) voices a reservation about the application of constructionist and 
relativistic positions to psychotherapy. He asks; "what is to prevent psychotherapy 
from turning into an elaborate workshop for rationalisation, a place for spinning self- 
justificatory fantasies and fostering all the subtle complacencies of narcissistic 
entitlement and self-satisfaction? " (p. 177). Such a criticism implies that self- 
justificatory accounts are dangerous, or at least inappropriate, to the therapeutic 
enterprise. What a discursive approach does is to point out that when all accounts are 
understood as constructed and inherently functional we begin to see how the 
legitimacy of different versions of reality are continually under negotiation. 
Prescribing forms of acceptable accounts before the therapeutic conversation begins, 
therefore, may have the effect of inhibiting the development of a mutual 
understanding through prima facie privileging of the clinical framework. However, 
this is not to suggest that a therapist should always defer to the client's account as the 
negotiation of new meanings may create possibilities for client change (Anderson & 
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Goolishian, 1988; Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988). It is only to speculate on the 
merits of sticking closely to therapy protocol should a client continue to disconfirm, 
for example, attempted internalising (re)formulation. This is particularly so in light of 
the above discussion of the possible legitimation of externally situated problem 
accounts and their incorporation into other therapeutic rationales. 
Accordingly, the analysis presented here suggests that the therapist's strict 
compliance with the therapeutic protocol contributed to the failure to resolve the issue 
selected for study. This speculation is supported by Rennie's suggestions, reported 
above, regarding the establishment of a working alliance and Anderson and 
Goolishian's (1988) linguistic systems approach; "initially, our client's determine their 
problem, not the therapist. Thus, the burden of diagnosis is switched from the 
therapist to the client. In other words, the first step toward a collaborative problem 
definition is making room for and grasping the client's view" (p. 389). However, this 
account of the poor outcome is also supported by the therapeutic rationale itself. That 
is, in stressing the importance of mutuality, the model suggests that success would, at 
least, require the achievement of some consensus regarding central features of the 
client's problems. A further aspect of this finding, therefore, is to demonstrate how 
clients are active participants in the therapeutic endeavour and to which therapeutic 
protocol must sensitively adjust. 
Thus, this study demonstrates the merits of a detailed analysis of language for 
understanding the psychotherapy process. Moreover, in identifying generic 
conversational strategies and demonstrating how these may be utilised in 
unproductive ways during therapy, findings are also of general relevance. A 
discursive approach also has the benefit of explicating the ways in which differing 
problem accounts may be constructed and legitimated during therapy. This offers a 
new perspective on and approach to understanding the processes of psychotherapy. 
The following chapter continues to explore the process of problem 
(re)formulation in relation to this unresolved problematic theme in this more 
generally unsuccessful case. 
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Discursive analysis of therapist initiated topic shifts: 
Problem (re)formulation, sequencing, and the construction 
of relevancy 
This chapter presents detailed discursive analysis of two extracts from a dialogue 
between client and therapist during psychodynamic-interpersonal psychotherapy. The 
specific focus of this study is how the therapist uses shifts in conversational topic to 
make particular states of affair relevant to the client's presenting issues. This work 
builds on the previous chapter's findings on the process of problem (re)formulation in 
psychodynamic-interpersonal psychotherapy. The material examined in both studies 
is drawn from therapy discussions of one particular unresolved, client-specified 
problem from a more generally unsuccessful case. This chapter therefore continues to 
investigate the processes contributing to the poor outcome of this particular problem 
domain. Acknowledging the importance of research to be relevant to practice, 
understandings of general significance are sought. 
To recap briefly, Davis (1984,1986) identified the process of problem 
(re)formulation in psychotherapy (see pages 118-119). She demonstrated how, during 
the conversation in an initial session of therapy, a therapist transformed the client's 
description her presenting problems. Specifically, the client's account implicating the 
difficulties of her situation as wife and mother was recharacterised by the therapist as 
a problem expressing her feelings. This transformation was shown to have been 
achieved by the therapist through the conversational strategy of formulation. 
Formulations are an everyday conversational device used by participants to 
negotiate joint understanding of the matter under discussion (see pages 119-121). 
This occurs when one interactant offers a 'candidate reading' of the sense achieved up 
to that point in the conversation. For example, this may take the form of offering a 
summary, implication or characterisation of what has gone before. However, in doing 
so, features of the preceding talk may be preserved, deleted or transformed (Heritage 
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& Watson, 1979). Describing the therapist's identification of a problem a 
'(re)formulation', Davis emphasises the use of this device to transform conversational 
meaning during the therapy interaction she studied. 
Davis (1986) identified the process of problem (re)fonnulation as occurring in 
three distinct stages. First, the client's problem was defined by the therapist. Second, 
evidence was gathered for this problem. And third, the client's consent was sought to 
work on it. The previous chapter concentrated on detailed discursive analysis of 
particular features of this process; client disconfirmation, or rejection, of attempted 
therapist problem (re)formulation. In concurrence with Davis, in the particular 
problem domain studied, (re)formulation was demonstrated to entail the 
transformation of externally located problems to those considered internal to the 
client. Accordingly, problems presented as stemming from her partner's behaviour 
were (re)formulated by the therapist to issues regarding the client's own jealousy, low 
self-worth and guilt about her ability as a mother. In particular, this former analysis 
demonstrated how the therapist's focus on the client's feelings or reactions, a feature 
of the therapy protocol, had this (re)formulating and internalising effect. 
An aim of the former study was to demonstrate how therapy process can be 
approached as an interaction unfolding in turn by turn sequences. In any conversation 
participants rely on a number of linguistic competencies in order to accomplish social 
actions; constructing the nature of problems, disconfirming, blaming, etc. By 
recognising that psychotherapy is essentially a dialogue, it is possible to identify the 
everyday conversational strategies and skills brought to bear during the interaction. 
This may be achieved through utilising the approach developed in conversation 
analysis and certain forms of discourse analysis. 
The present study contributes to the understanding of problem (re)formulation 
in psychotherapy through the detailed analysis of two extracts in which this process 
occurs with, and is developed through, the therapist's use of shifts in conversational 
topic. The study therefore pursues an aspect of problem (re)formulation noted, but not 
studied in detail by Davis (1986). Moreover, topic shift is considered an important 
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phenomena to study as it has also previously been linked both to the therapeutic 
alliance (Friedlander & Phillips, 1984) and to therapy outcome (Tracey, 1987). 
Although the process of topical flow has long been a subject of study (e. g., 
Harvey Sacks unpublished lectures 1964-72 quoted in Jefferson, 1984) it has also 
been suggested to be one of the most subtle and complex of conversational 
phenomena "and, correspondingly, the most recalcitrant to systematic analysis" 
(Atkinson & Heritage, 1984, p. 164). Offering an initial taxonomy, however, Sacks 
suggests that conversational topic shift may be divided into two major categories; 
'boundaried' and 'stepwise'. Boundaried shifts occur when one topic is closed and 
another completely new topic initiated. A disjunction is therefore created in the flow 
of conversation. Thus, in the following example, a boundaried topic shift is made in 
the second participant's second turn (from Jefferson, 1984, p. 193): 
Participant (1): I mean it's not good enough 
Participant (2): Hh it isn't it isn't 
Participant (1): No 
Participant (2): Hhhh and what've you been doing this last week 
Although boundaried shifts are not uncommon, the more usual feature of topical 
organisation is a flow of one topic into another. Such stepwise shifts involve the 
linking of the previous and new topics through the production of 'features in common' 
so that although the conversation may develop far from its starting point the change is 
systematically achieved. 
Conversation analytic research on topical flow has been conducted in relation 
to the discussion of personal problems or troubles during ordinary conversation. 
Jefferson (1984), for example, suggests that a 'troubles telling' has the effect of 
constraining the topic of subsequent discussion as participants are obliged to orient 
sensitively to the appropriateness of following talk. That is, the nature of troubles talk 
demands that following discussion "exhibit deference to it by preserving the 
interactional reciprocity that is a feature of such talk. " (Jefferson, 1984, p. 194). A 
radical change of topic, as in a disjunctive, boundaried break will most likely not 
successfully maintain such reciprocity. It may, therefore, be regarded an inappropriate 
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conversational move. A topic shift orienting to the interactional cohesiveness 
achieved in a prior troubles-telling might, therefore, be expected to be managed in (1) 
a stepwise fashion through the production of features in common and (2) to be other- 
attentive. For example, such a topic shift is made by the second participant in the 
following example (from Jefferson, 1984, p. 199): 
Participant (1): ... course I know Mister Cole's sick, let's God' let's hope he hope he gets well, but hhhhh I know the 
problem hhh you know, hh 
Participant (2): What does he have. 
Participant (1): Hh oh he's got this gallbladder... 
Although there is an introduction of a new topic; the nature of Mister Cole's illness, it 
is related to the concerns of the prior troubles-talk, is other-attentive and so orients to 
maintaining reciprocity. In fact, Jefferson (1984) suggests that such strategies 
constitute a special justification for a shift in topic after a troubles telling. 
The focus of the current study is the therapist's use of topic shift in the 
development of problem (re)formulation during therapy. Sacks noted that in order to 
achieve a shift from one topic to another, which addresses apparently unconnected 
matters, participants often produce a common feature. This is so, even though what is 
offered as a common feature may have only minimal relevance to the matter at hand 
(Sacks, lecture, February 19,1971, pp. 15-16, quoted in Jefferson, 1984, p. 198). The 
following analysis of two sequences from a therapy conversation demonstrate how 
the therapist produces features in common between disparate aspects of the client life, 
so construing their relevancy to her current domestic problems. 
The aim of this study therefore is to develop understanding of the process of 
problem (re)formulation in psychotherapy through exploring the therapist's use of 
topic shift within the context of his offering an understanding of one of the client's 
specified problems. In doing so a further aim is to explicate processes contributing to 
the poor therapeutic outcome of this problem domain and so address the question 
'how does change occur in psychodynamic-interpersonal psychotherapy? '. 
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METHOD 
For details of method see Chapter 5 (pages 121-124). 
ANALYSIS 
The first extract is drawn from the second session of therapy and demonstrates the 
way in which the therapist makes the therapeutic relationship relevant to the client's 
domestic problems. The sequence is drawn from a discussion of the issue of power in 
the therapeutic relationship. This was initiated by the client commenting that she felt 
her status diminished in relationship with the therapist. We enter the conversation as 
the client concludes a description of her experiences looking for a new house offered 
as an example of her dislike imposing on people; an issue she had related to her 
feelings in the therapeutic situation: 
Extract (1) Session (2) 
I C: ... I to to impose myself on people I hauet to 2 intrude upon their 
3 T: (mm hm) 
4 C: their privacy (. ) um and I suppose it's a bit 
5 symptomatic of that that I always feel as if 
6 I'm in the () under position. 
7 T: You're in the under position (. ) and you feel 
8 you mustn't you mustn't try and try and impose 
9 yourself (. ) 
10 C: (mm) 
11 T: but at the same time you feel bitter and 
12 resentful about being exploited pushed around 
13 C: (mm) 
14 T: and neglected () 
15 C: (mm) 
16 T: so there's a real conflict there you you 'r 't 
17 yourself to a role () to a relationship with 
18 somebody of of inferior in a way () 
19 C: (mm) 
20 T: and then you feel bad about the fact (. ) 
21 C: (mm) 
22 T: and so () I'm here I am trying to give y the 
23 power to chose what we talk about to use the 
24 time for yg-u and l those things and () 
25 there's a part of you not wanting to do that 
26 (. ) being frightened of maybe frightened of the 
27 responsibility frightened of something about 
28 what that could lead to (. ) 
29 C: (mm) 
30 T: so maybe there's part of you that's wanting to 
31 be taken. UM of by a powerful other person (. ) 
32 C: (mm) 
33 T: maybe it would be okay at home if you felt that 
34 you were being really taken care of and looked 
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35 of g, and supported (. ) then he could have all 
36 the power he wanted (. ) and that would be okay. 
37 C: Mm (5). 
38 T: And I feel in the position where () you 
39 know I'm offering to help you but I'm setting 
40 there are limits to what I can do. 
41 C: Mm. 
Client's description of ap or blem The client summarises her account of house-hunting 
stating; "I hate to impose myself on people I heg to intrude upon their privacy" (lines 
1-4). When looking for a new house one must enter, inspect and evaluate the homes 
of strangers. The client orients to the awkwardness or unpleasantness of such a 
situation through describing house-hunting as 'imposing on people' and 'intruding 
upon their privacy'. Moreover, she repeats and stresses that this is something she 
'hates' having to do. She goes on to state that "it's a bit symptomatic of that that I 
always feel as if I'm in the (. ) under position" (lines 5-6). Being 'in the under position' 
suggests being disadvantaged or inferior. However, this description is qualified 
'feeling as if indicating that this is the client's own subjective impression. This makes 
the implication available that, whatever her feelings, in many ways she may actually 
have the upper hand. Feeling in the under position, though, is described as a 
'symptom' (line 5) and therefore an unfortunate consequence of her strong dislike of 
imposing and intruding on people. 
The client's impression of being at a disadvantage is offered in the context of 
looking for a new house. Offered as an example of her strong dislike imposing on 
people this can be understood as an analogy explaining her feelings of diminished 
status in relationship with the therapist; the immediate prior context of this sequence. 
That is, discussing one's personal problems with someone else, even in a professional 
capacity, may be experienced as imposing on their time, energy and expertise. 
Moreover, in attending a clinic one may feel at a disadvantage with respect to 
intruding on the therapist's territory. 
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Therapist's problem (reZ ormplation The therapist commences his reply with a 
formulation of what the client has said in the form of a gist. A gist is a subclass of 
formulation used to summarise an understanding of what has gone before. As such, 
features of the preceding talk may be preserved, deleted or transformed (Heritage & 
Watson, 1979). He states; "You're in the under position (. ) and you feel you mustn't 
you mustn't try and try and impose yourself' (lines 7-9). So, although preserving the 
client's reference to being 'in the under position' the therapist deletes her qualification 
of this description; her "feel(ing) as if'. He therefore presents her inferiority as a state 
of affair in contrast to the client's description of it as her subjective impression 
oriented to the possibility that in other ways she is not at a disadvantage. The therapist 
also characterises the client as feeling she 'mustn't' try and impose. He therefore 
implies that her reticence is an imperative or obligation rather than, as the client 
suggests, a'hatred' and thus a strong dislike. There is therefore a transformation in the 
meaning of the client's account. She suggested that her impression of inferiority was a 
consequence of her strong dislike burdening other people. The therapist, however, 
(re)formulates this in terms of the client's feeling that her low status obliges her to 
restrict the demands she makes on others. 
This (re)formulation is then used by the therapist as a basis from which to 
develop a more detailed account of the client's feelings. So, having described her as 
feeling she 'mustn't impose' it is suggested "but at the same time" (line 11) she feels 
"bitter and resentful about being exploited pushed around and neglected" (lines 11- 
14). This description of the harsh treatment received from others is not something the 
client had complained of in her account. Being 'exploited pushed around and 
neglected' can, however, be understood as an implication the therapist has drawn from 
her description of feeling in the 'under position'. In this context the client is 
characterised as feeling one thing; that she 'mustn't impose', 'but at the same time' 
another; bitterness and resentment. Juxtaposing these reactions in this way therefore 
implies that experiencing such things at the same time is problematic. 
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The therapist expands this description of the client's problem. He states; 
"there's a real conflict there you hniij yourself to a role (. ) to a relationship with 
somebody of inferior in a way (. ) and then you feel bad about the fact" (lines 16-20). 
So, feeling she 'mustn't impose' is transformed to the client 'limiting herself to a role 
of inferior'; feeling 'bitter and resentful' summarised as 'feeling bad'. These revised 
descriptions have implications for the development of the therapist's account of the 
client's problem. That is, in suggesting that the client 'limit herself to an inferior role 
in relationship with someone else indicates this to be self-imposed. Moreover, 
suggesting that she 'then feels bad about the fact' construes her imputed distress over 
this to be her own fault. On the other hand, other people's behaviour; 'exploiting, 
pushing around and neglecting' her, is not developed. So, even if this is construed 
only as the client's perception of how she is treated, possible external causes for her 
distress are not explored. 
Therapist's topic shift to the therapeutic relationship The therapist then changes topic 
to that of power in the therapeutic relationship. He therefore returns to the topic 
originally raised by the client prior to offering her description of house-hunting. In 
doing so, though, a disjunction is made with the immediate prior matter; the client's 
self-imposed inferiority and resulting inner emotional tensions. That is, he suddenly 
refers to his own actions and motivations in the therapeutic relationship. However, he 
prefaces this topic shift "and so" (line 22) thereby indicating a connection. So, over 
and above the normal expectation that participants' contributions are relevant to the 
matter at hand (Antaki, 1994) the client is primed to seek features in common 
between the two topics. 
The therapist states; "here I am trying to give yoi the power to chose what we 
talk about to use the time for y -w" 
(lines 22-24). Thus he offers an account of his own 
intentions suggesting that he is 'trying' to give the client 'the power to chose'. 
However, in describing this as only 'trying' the therapist orients to the effort involved 
while indicating that his attempts have been unsuccessful. So, it is suggested that even 
when empowerment is offered the client does not accept it. 
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The therapist goes on to produce an account of this failure. First, he states; 
"there's a part of you not wanting to do that" (line 25). It is therefore suggested that 
his efforts failed due to the client 'not wanting' and thus rejecting the power offered 
her. As such, her feeling of diminished status in relationship with the therapist is itself 
implied to be self-imposed. Second, he suggests a reason as to why the client might 
behave in this way; that she is "maybe frightened of the responsibility frightened of 
something about what that could led to" (lines 26-28). The cause of the client's 
disempowerment is therefore suggested to be her own personal shortcomings insofar 
as 'fear of responsibility and what that could lead to' implies inappropriate adult 
behaviour. Finally, having characterised the client as responsible for her own 
disempowerment he suggests that this might indicated something about her. He states; 
"so maybe there's part of you that's wanting to be taken care of by a powerful other 
person" (lines 30-31). It is therefore implied that 'being afraid of responsibility', 
suggested to be manifest in the therapy situation, indicates a general, underlying need 
within the client to be looked after. 
Thus, through reference to the situation in therapy, the therapist produces 
evidence for the legitimacy of his problem (re)formulation that the client is, herself, 
responsible for her low status. This then also legitimates his avoidance of exploring 
alternative, external causes. He therefore produces a step-wise shift in topic through 
producing a feature in common between his (re)formulation of the client's presenting 
problem and the therapeutic relationship; the self-imposed nature of the client's 
inferior status in relationship with others. 
Therapist's topic shift to the client's current domestic situation The therapist continues 
his account, using his suggestion of the client's 'need to be taken care of as a means to 
connect the therapeutic relationship with the client's current domestic problems. This 
is achieved through using this particular characterisation of the underlying issue to 
provide a solution to the client's home difficulties. So, the therapist states that "maybe 
it would be okay at home if you felt that you were being really taken care of and 
looked to and se " (lines 33-35). Describing the possible requirements for 
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things to be 'okay at home' in this way resonates with the therapist's earlier reference 
to the client "wanting to be taken care of by a powerful other person" (lines 30-31). 
That is, needing to be 'really taken care of, 'looked after and supported' implies 
childlike dependency as opposed to the self-sufficiency commonly regarded an 
indication of psychological health and maturity in contemporary Western culture 
(Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988; Sampson, 1977). So, although it is not directly 
stated, the therapist's description of the client implies that it is her strong dependency 
needs, rather than not being 'looked after' per se, that is a cause of her domestic 
problems. Finally, the therapist goes on to suggest that maybe if she were really taken 
care of her partner "could have all the power he we (. ) and that would be okay" 
(lines 35-36). In raising the issue, he indicates that the client's partner 'having a lot of 
power' might have been considered problematic. However, suggesting that power 
issues might not be a problem if she were 'really taken care of, indicates that the 
client's unfulfilled dependency needs, as manifest and identified in the therapeutic 
relationship, may be considered the real issue. 
Client's response The section of audio-tape selected as relevant to the discussion of 
the client's domestic problems ends at line 37. However, a few extra lines of dialogue 
have been presented to assess the client's reaction to the therapist's (re)formulation. 
The client offers a minimal response; "Mm" (line 37), although the therapist has 
offered a possible explanation of her domestic problems which provides many 
features which could have been developed. That is, a relevant next turn would be for 
the client to inspect the therapist's account and provide some assessment of it's utility. 
Thus, producing a minimal response can be understood as a 'topic-bounding' utterance 
oriented to the closure of the topic that has been in progress (Shegloff & Sacks, 
1973). It therefore appears to be, if not a rejection, at least a not an immediate 
acceptance of the therapist's offered explanation. 
In order to continue the conversation, a minimal response must be responded 
to by the introduction of a new topic, an invite to furnish a topic, or by an attempt to 
re-establish the prior topic (Button & Casey, 1984). In this sequence, the therapist 
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waits five seconds, presumably for the expected fuller response from the client, and 
then himself introduces a new topic; an evaluation of his own role. Thus he suggests 
that although he is offering to help the client "there are limits to what I can do" (line 
40). He therefore orients to the client's implicit non-acceptance of his account of her 
domestic problems through mitigating the extent of what she can reasonably expect 
from him. 
Analysis of this first extract therefore demonstrates how the therapist presents 
the therapeutic relationship as relevant to the client's current domestic problems. That 
is, he first offers a (re)formulation of the client's presenting account and then 
accomplishes a stepwise shift in topic to the therapeutic relationship through the 
production of features in common between the two; her self-imposed inferiority. 
Offering an explanation for this, he suggests the underlying problem is her strong 
dependency needs which is then used to offer an understanding of the client's 
domestic problems through a second step-wise shift in topic. This is an 
understanding, however, that is not taken up by the client. 
The therapist uses similar strategies in producing an account of the client's 
domestic problems in the following extract drawn from the third session of this 
client's therapy. In this sequence, the therapist offers a problem (re)formulation in 
which the therapeutic relationship and the client's childhood are made relevant to her 
present domestic issues. Analysis explicates both the process of problem 
(re)formulation and related therapist initiated topic shifts but also, in this particular 
sequence, how the therapist continues to pursue his (re)formulation after the client's 
disconfirmation of it. We enter the conversation during the client's description of her 
childhood. She has explained that she was the only child of parents who ran a 
business, the nature of which required they work particularly long hours: 
Extract (2) Session (3) 
1 C: ... so it's always been work (. ) I suppose (. ) 2 and very I mean when we d have time they 
3 were so tired anyway (. ) we just didn't sort of 
4 have the stereotype sort of family life that 
5 you know () I think a' um (. ) that's why 
6 it means a lot to me now. 
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7 T: Sure (. ) that's something () that you've never 
8 really had (. ) 
9 C: (mm (. ) mm) 
10 T: I there was something you see that 
11 there's something about what happened when we 
12 first met as well as I mean yeah there was a 
13 very strong theme that I picked up a lot of 
14 time about you feeling neglected () and 
15 uncared for. 
16 C: Mm I'd never really thought of it in that way 
17 um (. ) because they did what they iI 
18 suppose () 
19 T: (exactly) 
20 C: um 
21 T: (mm) 
22 C: in the circumstances. 
23 T: They did what they could in the circumstances 
24 and y have been very g at providing a 
25 rational construction that enables you in a vy. a 
26 to hide from your own feelings (. ) of course 
27 you know they had no alternative they were 
28 busy with the business so I had to do the 
29 shopping () they l to be busy at Christmas 
30 and other family times () but what that leaves 
31 you with is is an emotional gip about not not 
32 just 
, nofeeling cared 
for um (. ) and (. ) 
33 those feelings don't go away it doesn't matter 
34 how rational you try to be () if you feel 
35 neglected you feel neglected () and so then 
36 you start looking for explanations and you 
37 come up with feelings of () you're no good (. ) 
38 and that nobody will be interested in to hear 
39 you tell your life story or nobody wants to 
40 know on as r (. ) you're someone to be used 
41 () whether it be for the shopping when you 
42 were a gbW or running a house now () it's 
43 the same pattern. 
44 C: Mm. 
45 T: And coming here maybe you're someone to be used 
46 you know this is this is just research... 
Client's description of her childhood In concluding the account of her childhood the 
client offers a summary; "so it's always been w k" (line 1). She expands on this 
suggesting that "when we t¢ have time they were so tired anyway" (lines 2-3). The 
phrase 'when we did have time' suggests that having time was an unusual occurrence 
for her family. It also functions, though, as a qualifier preserving the main theme - 
that it was mostly work - while portraying the more credible situation that it was not 
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work all the time. However, that her parents were 'so tired anyway' in turn acts as a 
qualifier implying that they did not have the energy to make good use of such an 
opportunity when it arose. The client, therefore, presents her childhood as one in 
which there was little opportunity to spend quality time together as a family. She goes 
on to characterise this in terms of not having a "stereotype sort of family life" (line 4) 
thereby suggesting it was unusual or, at least, different from the norm. This is then 
linked to her current circumstances as she states; "that's why it means a lot to me 
now" (lines 5-6). The client, therefore, indicates not having had a normal family life 
in her childhood is an explanation for why such things are important to her in her 
current adult life. 
Therapist's problem (re)formulation The therapist then produces a formulation 
offering an understanding of what the client has just said by way of a summary 
assessment. So, presumably referring to the client's reference to 'family life', the 
therapist states; "Sure () that's something (. ) that you've never really had" (lines 7-8). 
In this, the client's description of a non-normative family life in her childhood 
becomes something she has 'never really had'. Moreover, the therapist does not repeat 
and thus deletes her account that this an explanation as to why family life is important 
to her now. Thus, although prefacing this (re)formulation 'sure' suggests an 
agreement, the therapist's statement transforms salient issues of the client's account. 
Specifically, suggesting that family life is something she has never had makes a new 
theme pertinent; things absent or missing in the client's life, which the therapist then 
subsequently develops. 
Therapist's tonic shift to the therapeutic relationship Introducing the theme of absence 
through a summary assessment of the client's account of her childhood, the therapist 
produces a topic shift to his experience of her in the therapeutic relationship. In fact, 
summary assessments have been identified as a strategy often deployed prior to a shift 
in topic (Jefferson, 1984). This topic shift is initiated by the therapist's suggestion that 
his experience of the client feeling neglected "was something that happened when we 
first met as well" (lines 11-12). The suggestion that such feelings are manifest in 
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therapy 'as well' indicates that a link is being identified between the new and previous 
topics. The topic shift from the client's childhood to that of the therapeutic 
relationship is therefore accomplished by the therapist in a stepwise fashion through 
indicating that there is a feature in common. However, instead of pointing to aspects 
of the client's background and features of her family situations, the therapist focuses 
on her feelings which it, is implied, may be a consequence. 
So, the therapist indicates that he experiences the client as feeling "neglected 
(. ) and uncared for" (lines 14-15). Although it is not something the client has directly 
complained of, this particular characterisation of her feelings is justified by the 
therapist in a number of ways. Thus, he describes 'neglect' as "a very strong theme 
that I picked up a lot of time" (lines 12-14). First, describing 'neglect' as 'a very strong 
theme' implies that it is something very obvious to him. Second, that he perceived it 'a 
lot of time' suggests it was a pervasive feature of their interaction. Third, in 
suggesting that her 'neglect' was something he 'picked up', the therapist implies that 
this emotion has an objective status; that it is 'out there' and directly available to 
perception. Thus, the therapist's claim is particularly difficult to contend as it appeals 
both to private evidence; his own perception of things, and his category entitlement as 
an expert in psychological matters (Potter et al., 1993). Presenting his experience of 
the client in this way, therefore, functions both to establish his characterisation of her 
as feeling 'neglected', as at least, tenable and as a valid issue for discussion in therapy. 
Moreover, describing these feelings as manifest "when we first Met" (lines 11-12) 
implies that the client brought them with her to therapy. It is thus suggested that 
'neglect' is an underlying and long-standing personal problem belonging to the client. 
Client's disconfirmation The client responds to the therapist's problem (re)formulation 
around her feelings of 'neglect' as a new idea; "I'd never really thought of it in that 
way" (line 16). She therefore does not reject this understanding outright. However, 
her reply can be understood as a hedged disconfirmation in that having 'never really 
thought' of being neglected she indicates that, in contrast to the therapist's description 
this has not been an obvious or long-standing issue for her. Moreover, she does not 
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continue the topic of her feelings but, instead, offers an explanation for why she had 
'never really thought' of being 'neglected'. She suggests this was; "because they did 
what they could I suppose (. ) (T: exactly) um (T: mm) in the circumstances" (lines 
17-22). She therefore takes up the implication in the therapist's comments that 'feeling 
neglected and uncared for' refers to the previous topic; her childhood experience. 
However, in stating that her parents 'did what they could in the circumstances' she 
mitigates their behaviour. That is, she suggests that they did their best and if their 
circumstances did not allow them to do more this was not their fault. The client, 
therefore, again orients to the specific context of her childhood (see lines 1-4), the 
aspect of her account avoided by the therapist, suggesting that her childhood was 
limited by this situation rather than by parental neglect. She thereby implies that she 
had not thought of her childhood in terms of neglect because she had no reason to. 
Therapist's continuing problem (re)formulation However, the therapist continues his 
problem (re)formulation, specifically linking his characterisation of the client's 
feelings with her childhood circumstances. But he first indicates agreement with the 
client's mitigation of her parents behaviour both through commenting "exactly" (line 
19) after she describes her parents as 'doing what they could' and by repeating her 
phrase "TI gy did what they could in the circumstances" (line 23). He therefore 
suggests that this account of her specific circumstances is not under dispute and 
furthermore implies that, although disconfirmed by the client, his problem 
(re)formulation around her feelings of neglect is compatible with such an account. 
The therapist then goes on to establish the compatibility of his account of her 
feelings and the client's account of the limitations of circumstances. He describes her 
account as a "rational construction" (line 25). So, it is implied that, although not 
'wrong', it is a motivated and defensive interpretation. Second, he offers an account of 
the motivation behind this stating; it "enables you in a mmy to hide from your own 
feelings" (lines 25-26). He therefore reintroduces the topic of the client's feelings, 
which she had not continued, suggesting that she is 'hiding' from them. It is therefore 
implied that she might not be fully aware of her emotions with respect to her 
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childhood. Characterising her account as a 'rational construction' and suggesting this 
allows her to 'hide' from her feelings, especially in the context of psychotherapy, 
implicates the presence of unconscious defences. So, stating that she has "been very 
good at" (line 24) this implies that these unconscious defences have been successful. 
It is therefore suggested that her conscious experience may be distorted. 
Characterising her disconfirmation thus, functions to raise doubt regarding the client's 
account of her own feelings. Moreover, it also allows the therapist to claim to be able 
to articulate the client's feelings, in this instance, more accurately than she herself can. 
Her disconfirmation of feeling neglected is therefore construed as compatible with the 
therapist's problem (re)formulation around such feelings by characterising her account 
as defensively, although unconsciously, motivated. 
The therapist then goes on to develop his account of the client's problem 
through focusing on a feature of her childhood. He states; "of course you know they 
had no alternative they were busy with the business so Ih to do the shopping (. ) 
they had to be busy at Christmas" (line 26-29). Prefacing this description 'of course' 
indicates that the client's mitigation of her parents behaviour, that 'they had no 
alternative', is not under dispute. Moreover, by utilising the first person the therapist 
implies that the account he is offering reflects the client's own perspective. However, 
he goes on to develop his problem (re)formulation through presenting an account of 
the problematic, emotional consequences of her childhood circumstances. 
you with is is an So, first the therapist suggests; "but what that love 
emotional gp about not not just not feeling cared for" (lines 30-32). The phrase 
'emotional gap' suggests a discrepancy between one's emotional needs and the support 
received. The therapist therefore implicates the existence of an emotional problem 
with respect to her 'not feeling cared for'. Second, he stresses the existence of this 
problem; "those feelings don't go away it doesn't matter how rational you try and be if 
you feel neglected you feel neglect" (lines 33-35). Thus he offers two statements 
making a similar point emphasised through repetition; 'those feelings don't go away' 
and 'if you feel neglected you feel neglected'. That the client feels neglected is 
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therefore presented as a general statement of fact. Moreover, in suggesting that 'it 
doesn't matter how rational you try and be', the therapist again discounts the client's 
mitigation of her parents as a defensive, post hoc explanation of the past which will 
not change the nature of her problematic feelings. Third, he offers another 
problematic, emotional consequence of the client's childhood. He states; feeling 
neglected, "you start looking for explanations and you come up with feelings of (. ) 
you're no good" (lines 36-37). So, he suggests that a further consequence of feeling 
neglected is that the client arrive at a self-deprecatory account of herself for which 
she will seek an explanation. Feeling neglected in her childhood is therefore presented 
both a problematic issue in itself and the source of a subsequent problem; low self- 
esteem. Feeling neglected is therefore further construed as a valid and important issue 
for discussion in therapy. 
Thus, the therapist pursues his problem (re)formulation regarding the client's 
feelings of neglect after her hedged disconfirmation of this by means of three 
strategies. First, he characterises her disconfirmation as influenced and thus distorted 
by unconscious defences. Second, her explanation for her disconfirmation; the 
mitigation of her parents behaviour, is construed as perfectly compatible with the 
therapist's account of her feeling neglected. And, finally, childhood neglect is 
presented as a problem in need of redress, as causing other problems and thus to be an 
important issue for therapy. 
Therapist's topic shift to the client's current domestic situation Having construed the 
client's childhood as having problematic, emotional consequences, including low self- 
esteem, the therapist then makes a direct connection between this and the client's 
current domestic situation. That is, he suggests that having concluded that she is 'no 
good' she is "someone to be used (. ) whether it be for the shopping when you were a 
child or running a house now (. ) it's the same pattern" (lines 40-43). The therapist 
therefore accomplishes another stepwise shift in topic, this time from the client's 
childhood to her current domestic situation, through the connecting issue of the client 
being 'someone to be used'. Furthermore, in describing being 'used' as a 'pattern' he 
158 
Chapter 6 
indicates that this is not haphazard or accidental but a systematic connection between 
childhood and present day. As such, it is implied both that the client does feel 'used' 
in her current domestic situation and also that this has its roots in her childhood 
experience. By implication, the nature of the client's current domestic difficulties is 
construed in terms of her own predisposition to feel or be taken advantage of; an 
emotional handicap, and thus the source of her current problems are located within 
her. 
Client's response The section of dialogue selected as pertaining to the client's 
domestic problems ends at line 44. However, as in extract one, a few extra lines of 
dialogue have been added in order to assess the continuing development of the 
conversation. As in the first extract, the client responds minimally to the therapist's 
suggestions; "Mm" (line 44). This is so even though he has offered an explanation for 
her current domestic difficulties which provided many features for further discussion. 
She can again, therefore, be understood as not immediately accepting his account 
although not violating the co-operative nature of the discussion or challenging the 
therapist's professional role through overt disagreement. Orienting to the research 
context of the therapy, the therapist himself continues; "And coming here maybe 
you're someone to be used you know this is this is just research" (lines 45-46). So, in 
contrast to extract one in which the therapist introduced a new topic, in this sequence 
he pursues the previous topic; 'feeling used', although the client did not contribute to 
the development of this theme. 
Analysis of this second extract, therefore demonstrates how the therapist 
presents both the therapeutic relationship and the client's childhood as relevant to her 
current domestic problems. As in extract one, the therapist was shown to first offer a 
(re)formulation of the client's account; in this extract the importance of family life. 
Second, he then accomplished a stepwise topic shift to the therapeutic relationship 
through producing features in common between her childhood and his experience of 
her in therapy; the client's feeling of being neglected. Finally, although the client 
offers a disconfirmation of this, the therapist continues his (re)formulation 
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implicating the client's low self-esteem. He then produces a further stepwise topic 
shift to the client's current domestic problems through the connecting feature of her 
feeling used. The client had originally oriented to the relevancy of her childhood as 
an explanation for why quality time together as a family is important for her now (see 
lines 2-6). The connection the therapist makes by way of her own emotional problems 
thus can be seen to issue from his particular (re)formulation of her childhood 
experience. The therapist's account of her domestic problems is, however, not taken 
up by the client. 
DISCUSSION 
This analysis shows several features of this unsuccessful therapy. It is demonstrated 
how the therapist produces accounts of the client's domestic problems through making 
other states of affair, particularly the therapeutic relationship (extracts 1& 2) and the 
client's childhood (extract 2), relevant to her current home situation. This was shown 
to be accomplished in three stages in both extracts. First, the therapist transformed 
features of the client's account; house-hunting (extract 1) and the importance of 
family life (extract 2) by way of a problem (re)formulation. Second, he made a 
stepwise shift in topic from his particular characterisation of the client's problem to a 
description of features of the therapeutic relationship. An important aspect of move 
was deleting the contextual aspects of the client's account and making the identified 
problems part of the general pattern of the client's experiences. And, third, this was 
followed by another stepwise topic shift to an account of the problems in the client's 
current domestic situation. 
This study points to the implications such strategies have for the 
understanding of the client's problems. That is, it is shown to be the therapist's 
(re)formulation of the client's presenting account that allows the production of 
features in common between these otherwise disparate areas of the client's life. 
Furthermore, an implication of such a move is that, as common denominator, the 
client is construed as the source of her current domestic problems. Thus, the client's 
difficulties, "at home" (extract 1, line 33) or ""running a house now" (extract 2, line 
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42) are construed as stemming from her underlying personal vulnerabilities; a need to 
be looked after (extract 1) and a predisposition to feel neglected and used (extract 2). 
This finding is in concurrence with the earlier study on problem (re)formulation 
(Chapter 5) which showed a similar effect of the therapist making relevant and 
focusing on the client's feelings or reactions. 
A major feature of this research therefore is to demonstrate that therapeutic 
interventions can transform the nature of clients' presenting problems and, with the 
interventions studied, in the direction of locating problems within the client. 
However, in order to identify the source of problems as internal they must be shown 
to occur consistently across different situations. The present study shows how 
consistency, and hence internality, requires a lot of work on the part of the therapist 
(see Edwards, 1995). It is he who decontextualises the client's account by selecting 
certain aspects (e. g., emotional reactions) and deleting reference to others (e. g., 
particular situations and others' behaviour). It is also he who constructs the client's 
consistency through drawing analogies between therapy and home or different aspects 
of the client's life. Having constructed consistency, the therapist is then able to claim 
a common, underlying internal cause. A general implication of this is that it may be 
therapeutic principles, themselves, that encourage therapists to produce such accounts 
of their clients' consistency. In contrast, the meaning of actions, words, experiences, 
etc. can be understood as indexical; in part determined by context. Similarly, 
demonstrations in the variability in accounts point to the way that they are constructed 
to do a certain job and to be coherent and meaningful in particular contexts (e. g., 
Wetherell & Potter, 1992). 
In following the procedure identified above, the therapist can be understood to 
be complying with therapy protocol with regard to the use of hypotheses (Hobson, 
1985). The protocol distinguishes three distinct types of hypotheses; understanding, 
linking, and explanatory. The protocol also advises on sequencing, suggesting that the 
therapist utilise these forms of hypotheses in this particular order. Thus, in an 
understanding hypothesis, the therapist coveys an empathic understanding of the 
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client's account but also "brings something of his own perspective to bear in the 
mutual understanding of the client's experience" (Shapiro & Firth, 1985, p. 2). This 
was identified in the analysis in terms of problem (re)formulation by which the 
therapist offered a characterisation of the client's account which had the effect of 
transforming features of that account. In a linking hypothesis, the therapist makes 
connections between the client's feelings, behaviours and experiences in the 
therapeutic situation with those in other contexts and at other times. Linking 
hypotheses were, therefore, identified in terms of stepwise topic shifts, first to the 
therapeutic relationship, as advised in therapy protocol, and then to the client's current 
domestic situation through the production of features in common. Finally, an 
explanatory hypothesis is made when the therapist expresses "the possible underlying 
reasons for behaviour and experience" (Shapiro & Firth, 1985, p. 3) which is open to 
modification by the client. In producing a causal account of the client's domestic 
problems, the therapist's second topic shift to the client's domestic situation can 
therefore be understood as moving into such an explanatory hypothesis. 
This study therefore shows in detail how elements of the therapy protocol 
were accomplished, identifying strategies and devices which are part of everyday 
communicative competence. Moreover, in showing how the therapist complied with 
protocol the sequences analysed in this particular study cannot be discounted as 'bad 
therapy'. Rather, in demonstrating how following therapeutic protocol can fail to 
produce a therapeutic result this analysis is of general significance. 
There is also a link here with Davis' (1984,1986) identification of three stages 
of problem (re)formulation; definition, gathering evidence and obtaining the client's 
consent to work on the problem. Although Davis came to an understanding of these 
stages through an analysis of one full session of therapy, indicating that the process 
develops over a period of time, the first two stages can be identified in each of the 
short extracts presented in this paper. This study, therefore, suggests that 
(re)formulation can also be studied as a micro-process occurring over short periods 
and possibly at many points in the therapy dialogue. 
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Davis describes the first two stages of problem (re)formulation 'definition' and 
then 'documentation' of the problem. So, in the extracts presented here, the therapist 
can be seen to characterise the nature of certain features of the client's problems and 
then to gather evidence that these features are, in fact, problematic. However, this 
study also demonstrates that stepwise shifts in topic were a conversational device 
utilised by the therapist to produce evidence supporting a particular problem account. 
For example, in both sequences, an appeal to the immediate context of the therapeutic 
relationship allowed the therapist to ground his proposals in an account of his own 
experience of the client (a strategy also noted by Davis, 1986). Such claims carry 
particularly strong entitlement unless, of course, one's rationality is under dispute. 
This can therefore be understood as an effective legitimation device open to the 
therapist who otherwise has no direct knowledge of the client's life and 
circumstances; knowledge to which the client has direct appeal. However, although 
the therapist increases the credibility of his perspective in this way, the evidence thus 
raised was shown to be premised on his particular (re)formulation of the client's 
account and his particular characterisation of her feelings in the therapy situation. The 
pursuit of the understanding offered by the therapist therefore requires the client co- 
operate with this account of her problems and affect. 
The final stage of problem (re)formulation as identified by Davis; organisation 
of the client's consent, was not found in either of the extracts presented here. In fact, 
the client was shown to respond to the therapist with topic bounding turns closing 
down the discussion potential of his suggestions. Davis suggests that the final stage of 
problem (re)formulation concerns "the client's resistance to having her problem 
defined in a particular way and how the therapist goes about overcoming it" (1986, 
p. 65). When co-operation is not immediate the therapist would appear to have two 
options; either to drop his line of understanding (as in extract 1) or to pursue it despite 
the client's reticence (as in extract 2). This second option would require the therapist 
at least persuade the client to explore the merits of a new perspective. 
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This second option connects with Frank and Frank's (1961) seminal work 
pointing out the close associations between rhetoric and psychotherapy. That is, the 
practitioner is regarded as seeking to influence the listener through personal character, 
engaging the emotions and through "providing a truth, real or apparent, by argument" 
(p. 66; see also, Spence, 1982). The connection to the process of problem 
(re)formulation is particularly striking given that Frank and Frank report the 
rhetoricians definition of 'argument' as "methods for transforming meanings" (1961, 
p. 68; see also Frank, 1986). 
If meaning is understood as a discursive achievement the basic precondition 
for the creation of therapeutic meaning would appear to be, at least, the continuance 
of a dialogue between client and therapist. In fact, counselling techniques have been 
characterised merely as "a set of social devices for making conversation happen" 
(Patton, 1984, p. 449). Moreover, from a linguistic perspective, Anderson and 
Goolishian (1988) suggest that the goal of therapy is to "participate in a conversation 
that continually loosens and opens up, rather than constricts and closes down" 
(p. 381). As noted by Davis (1986) and demonstrated in the extracts presented here 
from the discussion of an unresolved issue, some therapist (re)formulations may have 
a 'closing down' effect on the client's participation and therefore potentially disrupt 
the therapeutic potential of the encounter. 
The former study (Chapter 5) on this client's particular problem domain 
suggested a mismatch between the client's presenting issues; her partner's behaviour, 
and the implications of the therapy protocol; internalisation of problems. It was 
speculated that, in light of the client's continuing disconfirmation of problem 
(re)formulation, the therapist's strict adherence to the protocol contributed to the poor 
therapeutic outcome. This present study points to a similar conclusion. 
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Construction of anger in one successful psychodynamic- 
interpersonal psychotherapy: Problem (re)formulation and 
the negotiation of moral context7-1 
Chapters 5 and 6 presented detailed studies of therapist-attempted problem 
(re)formulation. These two chapters concentrated on explicating this process as it 
occurred within therapy conversation pertaining to one unresolved, client-specific 
problematic theme in a more generally unsuccessful case of psychodynamic- 
interpersonal psychotherapy. This final empirical chapter continues to investigate the 
process of problem (re)formulation but within the context of a successfully resolved, 
client-specified theme in a generally successful case of psychodynamic-interpersonal 
psychotherapy. Factors contributing to the success and failure of problem 
(re)formulation will therefore be explored through studying these contrasting 
outcome cases. In fact, these two psychodynamic-interpersonal therapies offer a 
particularly good comparison for the following reasons. First, the two therapies were 
conducted by the same male therapist. Second, both female clients were similar in 
age, background and presenting diagnosis. And third, both problematic domains 
studied had a domestic theme. A comparison of these two cases, along with the 
understandings of process gleaned from the initial study (Chapter 4), will therefore be 
conducted in the discussion chapter of this thesis. This chapter though presents the 
final empirical study of this thesis addressing the question 'how does change occur in 
psychodynamic-interpersonal psychotherapy? '. 
As in the initial study of extracts from therapy (Chapter 4), the current chapter 
presents research on a successful case of psychodynamic-interpersonal psychotherapy. 
One aim of this thesis, however, is to develop an approach to linking discursive 
7.1 Sections of this chapter were presented at the international meeting of the Society for 
Psychotherapy Research, Vancouver, Canada: Madill, A., Barkham, M., & Shapiro, D. A. (1995, 
June). Construction of anger in a successful psychodynamic-interpersonal psychotherapy: Negotiation 
of moral context and justification. In W. B. Stiles (Moderator), Accomplishing key tasks in 
contrasting pssychotvherapies: Qualitative studies from the Second Sheffield Psychotherapy Projeex. 
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analysis of process with evaluations of domain and case outcome. This concluding 
chapter therefore presents a modification of the approach adopted which addresses 
some of the limitations identified in the former three studies. 
The approach has been modified in the following ways. First, the material 
presented in the first study in Chapter 4 attempted to account for the process of 
change throughout one problematic theme across 4 sessions of an 8-session therapy. 
The analysis of this material offered a coherent and informative understanding of the 
change process involved. However, selecting extracts from only 4 sessions was 
considered to place artificial restrictions on material examined. Thus, as in the studies 
presented on the unsuccessful case in Chapters 5 and 6, material for the present study 
was selected from all 8 sessions of therapy. 
Second, following from the work conducted on the unsuccessful case, the 
current study was approached with a view to developing an understanding of a 
specific research topic; problem (re)formulation. As a pilot study, the approach in 
Chapter 4 was much more open-ended. 
Third, in contrast to the studies presented in Chapters 5 and 6, which 
examined specific features of the process of problem (re)formulation (client 
disconfirmations and therapist initiated topic shifts), the current study traces the 
process as it occurs throughout the therapy in relation to one particular content theme. 
This strategy aims to forge a closer link between discursive analysis of process and 
client evaluation of outcome at the domain level. Thus, in order to provide as detailed 
analysis as afforded in Chapters 5 and 6, the focus of analysis was narrowed to a sub- 
theme. This allowed a close examination of specific sequences while tracing the 
development and changes in this sub-theme throughout therapy. The material 
available for analysis was therefore pre-selected on the criteria of thematic content. 
This contrasts with the more global analysis offered in Chapter 4 and the narrower, 
specific analyses presented in Chapters 5 and 6. 
This concluding study focuses on the topic of emotion; alluded to but not a 
central feature of the previous chapters. Emotional process are often considered 
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central in understanding client change in psychotherapy (Greenberg & Safran, 1989). 
Clients characteristically present with emotional difficulties and exploration of, or at 
least orientation to, the client's emotional experience is an essential feature of many 
therapeutic rationales, e. g., the conversational model (Hobson, 1985), client-centered 
therapy (Rogers, 1951), focused expressive psychotherapy (Dalrup, Engle, Holiman, 
Beutler, 1994). Focusing on the topic of emotion, the present study seeks an 
understanding of how therapeutic transformation in a client's account of her feelings 
toward a significant other was accomplished during therapy. Specifically, this study 
examines how a client came to describe herself as feeling anger toward her mother 
having previously rejected this understanding in an earlier session of therapy. 
In academic psychology there are three major approaches to the study of 
emotion. The first is premised on the existence of 'primary emotions'. Primary 
emotions are considered innate and physiologically based and typically include such 
emotions as happiness, surprise, sadness, anger, disgust and fear (Ekman, 1985; Izard, 
1977; Plutchik, 1962; Tomkins, 1970). The second is the cognitive account which 
suggests that the identification of specific emotions is accomplished through an intra- 
psychic interpretation of situation and context (Schachter & Singer, 1962). The third 
approach to the study of the emotions is the social constructionist account which is 
the perspective adopted in this current study. 
Social constructionism views human understanding as an artifact of cultural 
and historical discourses rather than a product of direct experience of ourselves and 
the world (Gergen, 1985b). However, this position does not deny that feelings are 
'real' or that there may be a physiological component to many emotion states. The 
argument rather is that "the reality of emotions is social, cultural, political, and 
historical, just as is its current location in the psyche or the natural body" (Abu- 
Lughod & Lutz, 1990, p. 18-19). Hence, from this perspective a major problem with 
traditional approaches to the study of emotion is the construct validity of the 
vocabulary of the emotions itself. Accordingly, conceptualising particular emotions as 
'primary' or innate is considered based on the erroneous assumption that because we 
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have a complex vocabulary of emotions some of these have a unique object status. 
Social constructionism, on the other hand, offers an approach concerned with how the 
use of the vocabulary of the emotions is "governed by expectations implicit in the 
moral order of the society and period in which they are to be found" (Warner, 1986, 
p. 135). Social constructionism also contrast the cognitive approach to the emotions. 
That is, focus is directed toward the historical origins and cultural contexts in which 
our repertoire of emotional terms was developed. Moreover, there is a concern with 
the way in which accounts of emotional state function within their interactional 
context rather than consider emotion primarily a private, intra-psychic event. 
There are three main strategies open to a social constructionist investigation; 
cross-cultural, historical, and a focus on social discourse (Abu-Lughod & Lutz, 
1990). Research utilising cross-cultural and historical analysis provide a background 
to the topic explored in this chapter; the emotion of anger. Anger or rage features as a 
primary emotion in all the traditional psychological models cited above. It would 
therefore appear to be a strong candidate for consideration as an innate and 
fundamental human experience. Cross-cultural studies, though, illustrate how the 
expression of what might be described as anger may be understood as a matter of 
cultural or sub-cultural style. For example, Warner (1986) reports volatile displays in 
the Tikopians, intensified respect in the Koreans, chilly silence in the British and 
accusations of having been bewitched in the Tiv, Nyakyusa and Azande. However, a 
social constructionist perspective suggests that what characterises such behaviour as 
expressions of anger is not reference to an underlying emotional state but the effect 
such expressions have of positioning the individual in the local moral order. That is, 
in anger "there is always a sense of being a victim with respect to rights or interests 
that are felt to be violated" (Warner, 1986, p. 141). The angry person can therefore be 
understood to be communicating an offended status. So, accounting for oneself as 
experiencing a particular emotion can be viewed in terms of the implications this has 
for the evaluation of oneself (and others) within the context for which that claim is 
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made. In other words, accounting for oneself as experiencing a particular emotion can 
be viewed as a social action. 
Cultures vary not only in emotional display but also in the way in which the 
emotions are understood. For example, understanding anger in terms of bewitchment 
can be seen to place the cause of the emotion outside oneself in a very direct sense. 
Although contemporary Western culture makes use of a similar resource, e. g., 'A 
makes B angry' this would not usually be regard to impute direct causality. Rather, 
B's judgement of A would normally be considered the cause of the emotion as B 
could no longer consider her/himself angry if s/he discovered A's conduct to be 
excusable (Warner, 1986). 
Several features of the contemporary Western account of the emotions have 
been identified. Some of these are of particular relevance to the present study (for full 
discussion see Lutz, 1988). "Predicated [... ] on the belief that emotion is in essence a 
psychobiological structure and an aspect of the individual" (Lutz, 1988, p. 4) emotions 
are considered to be something that we 'have' or, rather paradoxically, that happen 'to' 
us (Harre, 1986). A connected idea is that "only the subject can truly know his or her 
own emotions" (Lutz, 1988, p. 72). It is, though, also considered possible to determine 
how someone is feeling through empathising with or observing their display, even 
when the individual may not wish us to know. However, reports of emotional state 
are not usually considered open to dispute for although one may question the 
appropriateness of a person's feelings, considered the property of the individual one 
would be considered to have little or no grounds to challenge that the emotion was in 
fact being experienced (Warner, 1986). The one major exception to this 
understanding may be psychotherapy and related contexts where one participant is 
positioned as 'troubled' and in which accounts of disturbed psychological process may 
be invoked. This, therefore, makes psychotherapy a particularly interesting area to 
study in relation to negotiation of emotional state from a social constructionist 
perspective. 
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Historical studies, though, suggest that this contemporary account of the 
emotions as both feeling and display is a relatively recent development within English 
speaking cultures. For example, from the study of historical documents such as plays 
and diaries Stearns and Stearns (1988) demonstrate a transforming understanding of 
the emotions over the last 300 years. They suggest that in the 17th century emotion 
was viewed as a form of agitation to which crowds were suspect and conceptualised 
in terms of public display. As Harre and Gillett (1994) state; "(w)hat was meant by 
saying that someone was angry was not that they were experiencing a certain bodily 
feeling but that they were expressing their outrage and engaging in reprimand by 
putting on a certain display" (p. 152). It is only over the last two hundred years that 
emotions have been taken to refer to private and bodily feelings. Moreover, replacing 
the concept of the sentiments during the 19th century, emotions also became 
understood as a female preserve. Interestingly, though, anger is the one exception to 
this rule. It "is the one emotion that is exempted in everyday discourse from the 
expectation that women feel and express more emotion than men. It is in fact every 
emotion but anger that is disapproved in men and, conversely, expected in women" 
(italics in original, Lutz, 1990, p. 81, citing Hochschild, 1983). 
The present study takes the third research strategy open to a social 
constructionist research; a focus on social discourse (see above, Abu-Lughod & Lutz, 
1990). So, in the analysis presented here the issue under investigation is not the 
veracity of the client's feelings toward her mother. Rather, the concern is to explore 
the way in which the client came to describe herself as feeling angry toward her 
mother having specifically rejected this understanding in an earlier session of therapy. 
The primary aim of this study therefore is to explicate the process of successful 
problem (re)formulation in relation to this particular sub-theme as it was negotiated 
within the therapy conversation. A further aim is to link this discursive understanding 
of process with an evaluation of domain outcome through examining the client and 
therapist accounts, offered within the therapy dialogue, as to why this change was 
considered beneficial (an outcome supported by client questionnaire self-report data). 
170 
Chapter 7 
As in the previous empirical studies a discourse analytic approach (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987) has been utilised. 
METHOD 
Case selection The case was a successful therapy of a female client who completed 8 
one-hour, weekly session of psychodynamic-interpersonal therapy. This therapy was 
drawn from a pool of 117 cases comprising the Second Sheffield Psychotherapy 
Project (SPP2: Shapiro et al., 1990). The case was selected on the basis of the client's 
scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI: Beck et al., 1961) which was the 
criterion outcome measure for the study. 
The BDI was administered on 6 occasions resulting in the following scores: at 
initial screening (21), intake assessment (20), immediately prior to the first session 
(24), 2 weeks after completing therapy (0), 3-months follow-up (0), and 1-year 
follow-up (0). At the intake assessment the client was interviewed by a trained 
assessor and obtained a diagnosis of a Major Depressive Episode. The client's scores 
indicated a moderate-severe depressive episode prior to commencing therapy, this 
falling to a minimum score indicating no depressive symptomatology after therapy 
completion. Change therefore met the most stringent criteria of clinical significance 
offered by Jacobson and Truax (1991). 
Written consent to use audio-tapes of this therapy for research purposes was 
obtained from the client after therapy completion. 
The client The client was female, in her forties, in full-time, white-collar employment 
and shared her home with her elderly parents and her two teenage children. At the 
time of therapy she was in the process of divorce from her husband, the children's 
father. 
The therapist The therapist was male, of similar age to the client and with 18 years 
experience with psychodynamic-interpersonal therapy. Peer group supervision was 
the norm. This therapist also conducted the unsuccessful therapy studied in Chapters 
5 and 6. 
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Theme selection At the second part of the intake assessment the client was presented 
with a list of individualised problems derived from the assessment interview. She was 
asked to select a total of 10 items, 2 from each of 5 categories: symptoms, mood, self- 
esteem, relationships, and specific performance. In line with the domestic theme 
focused on in this thesis, the problem chosen for detailed analysis was 'feeling that I 
have let my family down'. All 10 personal statements were rated by the client each 
week immediately prior to the therapy session. The task required the client to rate 
how much each problem statement had bothered her during the week on a 7-point 
scale with anchor points of ' 1' ('not at all') to '7' ('extremely'). The ratings for the 
selected statement across the 8 sessions was as follows: 655-4222. [Data from 
session 4 was missing]. A score of '2' ('very little') indicated that this theme could for 
all intents and purposes be considered resolved at therapy completion on the criterion 
of client personal questionnaire ratings of problem severity (Mulhall, 1976; Phillips, 
1986). 
Selection of dialogue for analysis In order to obtain transcripts of the therapy 
conversation pertaining to the selected issue, two psychology graduates listened to 
audio-tapes of the case for relevant passages. Both graduates were in their twenties; 
one was male and the other female (the author). One was working as an assistant 
psychologist in a psychiatric hospital and the other was a doctoral student in clinical 
research. Both listened to all sessions of the therapy and independently selected 
passages on the basis of selection instructions prepared by the author (Appendix 3). 
As the aim of this procedure was merely to obtain relevant material for study, all 
selected passages were transcribed. This provided 29 passages varying in length from 
a few lines of dialogue to 18 pages of transcript. 
To narrow the focus of analysis further a sub-theme was then selected from 
these transcripts by the author for detailed study. This sub-theme concerned 
discussion of the client's anger and was selected for the following reasons. First, there 
appeared to be some interesting changes in the way the client utilised the term 'anger' 
as a description of herself in relation to her mother. The sub-theme was therefore 
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assumed to allow an analysis of how such change was accomplished. Second, the 
client and therapist offered an account of why considering the client angry toward her 
mother had been helpful. This allowed an analysis of the participants' construction of 
these changes as beneficial. Third, on a pragmatic level, the sub-theme was relatively 
easy to distinguish from surrounding text (marked by keywords such as 'angry' or 
'cross') and narrowed the study material to 11 extracts of at most two pages of 
transcript. Finally, the process by which a client came to express herself as angry with 
her mother and to consider this change beneficial to her was thought to be of clinical 
importance and interest. 
Analytic procedures The first stage of analysis involved listening to audio-tapes of the 
complete 8-hour therapy in order to contextualise the extracts selected for detailed 
study. In the second stage, all extracts selected for detailed study were subjected to a 
preliminary analysis. This involved close and repeated reading of the text, attending 
the meaning conveyed but also the way in which this meaning was constructed or 'put 
together'. Detailed notes examining how the extracts appeared to 'make sense' were 
written from this close reading of the text. In focusing on change processes, particular 
attention was directed to points during which the client's account appeared to change 
significantly. During this preliminary analysis, then, key sections of text were 
identified for presentation. The final stage entailed the production of a detailed 
analysis of these key sequences, linking analytic claims to specific extracts. This 
analysis is presented in full below. 
ANALYSIS 
In the extracts selected for study, the sub-theme 'anger' is first raised during the 
second session of therapy. The following sequence appears during discussion in 
which the client describes a difficulty expressing this emotion. Specifically, she had 
suggested a tendency to get upset or to avoid situations that might make her feel 
angry. We enter the conversation as the client offers an example of this problem in 
relation to an incident involving her husband: 
173 
Chapter 7 
Extract (1) Session (2) 
1 C: ... we'd promised we'd take the children to 2 this (. ) fun fair and fair and he went and got 
3 himself absolutely blotto at lunchtime was 
4 incapable of going anywhere (. ) um II just 
5 sort of again walked out collected the kids and 
6 took them myself had to go on the bus (3) um I 
7 suppose though you know I should have made a 
8 big fuss about it but I couldn't 
9 T: (mm) 
10 C: partly for the children's sake you know II 
11 thought alright (. ) promised them an outing so 
12 you know the outing was the thing that 
13 mattered (4) and there's odd you know silly 
14 little incidents like that (3) when I think 
15 about them (4). 
16 T: So when you get upset one of the things that 
17 can be happening is that you're feeling angry 
18 but you can't show it 
19 C: (mm) (5). 
Client's description of an incident An interesting feature of the first extract is the way 
in which moral context saturates the client's account. The extract begins; "we'd 
promised we'd take the children to this (. ) fun fair" (lines 1-2). So, as a promise 
carries an obligation, it is suggested that this outing was something to which the 
children had an entitlement. Therefore, describing her husband as "incapable of going 
anywhere" (line 4), and so unable to take the children to the fair, indicates he had 
renayed on a moral responsibility. In fact, her husband's culpability is made pertinent 
in three ways. First, the illegitimacy of his behaviour is built using a contrast 
structure: 'we'd promised... he went' (see Smith, 1990). Second, the client suggests her 
husband was unable to fulfil his promise because he had "got himself absolutely 
blotto at lunchtime" (lines 7-8). This makes the implication available that as 
presumably he need not have got drunk, and moreover in the middle of the day, he 
had put his own pleasure before his obligation to the children. Her husband is 
therefore suggested to have been particularly irresponsible and selfish. Third, the 
extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) 'absolutely blotto' and the definitive 
'incapable' make the client's account quite unambiguous. 
In describing her reaction to this situation the client states she "just sort of 
age, walked out" (lines 4-5), although going on to make the suggestion that she 
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"should have made a big fuss about it" (lines 7-8). So, a further contrast is drawn 
between how she did react; 'walking out', and how she ought to have reacted; 'making 
a big fuss'. It is therefore implied that an expression of complaint would have been a 
more appropriate reaction to her husband's irresponsible behaviour than making an 
abrupt exit. Thus, not making a 'big fuss' is presented as an accountable matter and 
the client goes on to provide an explanation of her behaviour. That is, she describes 
taking the children to the fair herself having "promised them an outing so you know 
the outing was the thing that mattered" (line 13). So, in making reference to the 
promise made, her action of 'walking out' is placed within the greater context of the 
client fulfilling her own obligations to the children. 
The client's suggestion that 'the outing was the thing that mattered', though, 
draws an implicit contrast with something of less import; but what? The client had 
indicated that although she should have made a big fuss she "couldn't partly for the 
children's sake" (line 10). As 'making a fuss' suggests causing a disturbance of some 
kind, in not doing so 'for the children's sake' it is implied that such behaviour may 
have had an upsetting effect on them. Thus it is the children's needs that are implied 
to have been of greater importance to the client in this situation than an expression of 
complaint to her husband. In being only 'partly' for the children's sake the implication 
becomes available that other contingencies also had an effect on her behaviour. 
However, moral and pragmatic considerations are identified as contributing to the 
restraint of her anger. 
Therart's problem formulation The therapist responds to the client's account with a 
upshot. An upshot is a subclass of formulation used to indicate an implication or 
ramification of what has been said (Heritage & Watson, 1979, see page 120). The 
therapist suggests that when the client gets upset "one of the things that c be 
happening is that you're feeling angry but you can't show it" (lines 16-18). So, he 
focuses on one aspect of the client's account; that she could not make a 'big fuss'. This 
was also the one feature to which the therapist had oriented verbally during her turn; 
"I should have made a big fuss but I couldn't (T: mm)" (lines 7-9). However, two 
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observations can be made with regard to this. First, in focusing on the client's lack of 
complaint or demonstration of anger he deletes the moral and pragmatic context in 
which the client had placed her reaction. Moreover second, the therapist offers a 
summary of 'when you get upset' thereby implying that his comments pertain to all 
occasions in which the client feels this way. This, though, is presented in a mitigated 
way in that it is suggested that feeling angry is only 'one of the things that can be 
happening' when she is upset. Thus, with the client's assent; "mm" (line 19), a 
tentative problem formulation is obtained around the client's personal difficulty 
expressing anger. 
The topic of anger is continued for a while after this first extract but was not 
selected as pertaining to the wider theme 'feeling that I have let my family down'. The 
sub-theme anger was however next raised in relation to this wider theme later in this 
second session during discussion of the client's relationship with her mother. 
Discussion of the client's anger in this regard is presented in full but for ease of 
analysis split into three sections. Thus, the sequence begins: 
Extract (2a) Session (2) 
1 T: So maybe there's quite ab for you (. ) to be 2 angry and upset about in relation to your mum 
3 (. ) (C sighs) over the years (4). 
4 C: Not angry I don't think really bit sad about it 
5 (. ) 
6 T: (mm hm) 
7 C: it seems a shame that we never Jvg been 
8 T: (mm) 
9 C: bl to be really close 
10 T: (mm hm) 
I1 C: (. ) but II wouldn't say angry about it (. ) 12 just seems a shame 
13 T: (yeah). 
14 T: Of course it's hard to know isn't it from what 
15 we've sAi¢ about how if you're angry it comes 16 out as upset perhaps hard to know whether you 
17 hm been angry with your mum or not (. ) do you 18 see what I mean? 
19 C: (MM) 
20 T: that it wouldn't come out directly and perhaps 
21 you wouldn't even know (8). 
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Therapist's problem formulation The discussion begins with an upshot provided by 
the therapist; "So maybe there's quite a bit for you (. ) to be angry and upset about in 
relation to your mum (. ) (C sighs) over the years" (lines 1-3). Thus, he raises the 
possibility that the client may be characterised as feeling both 'angry' and 'upset' with 
her mother. Furthermore, stating 'there's quite a bit' for her to angry and upset about, 
and 'over the years', suggests that such feelings would have multiple and prolonged 
justification. The therapist therefore offers a problem formulation with respect to the 
client's feelings towards her mother insofar as feeling upset and angry suggests a 
disturbed relationship with a significant other. 
Client's disconfirmation Formulations require an evaluation of appropriateness from 
recipients (Heritage & Watson, 1979). In this instance the client offers a 
disconfirmation of the problem formulation stating that she is "Not angry I don't think 
really bit sad about it" (line 4) (see Chapter 5). So, the client does not repeat the 
therapist's idea of being 'upset' but uses the milder description of being 'bit sad about 
it'. Thus, although confirming the suggestion that she is in some way distressed with 
regard to her mother, she de-emphasises this issue by expressing it in dilute form. 
Moreover, she specifically rejects the therapist's suggestion that she is angry. 
The client expands her account stating; "it seems a shame that we never have 
been (T: mm) able to be really close (T: mm hm) but II wouldn't say angry about it" 
(lines 7-11). This statement has several interesting features. First, in the context of the 
therapist's comment that she may feel both angry and upset with her mother, the client 
makes reference to only one specific aspect of this relationship; not being 'close'. 
Highlighting one aspect implies that this might be considered the main and possibly 
only justification for such feelings. This therefore contrasts with the therapist's 
suggestion that justifications are multiple. Second, the phrase 'we never have been 
able to be really close' is neutral with regard to responsibility and blame. Thus, as part 
of the logic of anger is that it may be considered an appropriate response to having 
been wronged, such neutrality implies there is no reason for the client to be angry 
with her mother. Furthermore, third, the client's suggestion that it 'seems a shame' is 
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specific in this regard; that the distance between herself and her mother is a matter of 
regret rather than of anger. 
mal grgpist's problem (relformulation The therapist commences his reply; "Of course 
it's hard to know isn't it from what we've §Aid about how if you're angry it comes out 
as upset" (lines 14-16). In making reference to something 'we've said' the therapist 
indicates the relevance of a former discussion. 'about how if you're angry it comes out 
as upset'. He therefore suggests it has been established that the client's anger is 
inevitably demonstrated through an expression of distress. Moreover, in prefacing this 
statement 'of course' he implies that this is something self-evident and thus an item of 
shared knowledge. 
The idea that the client gets upset when she is angry was raised in the 
sequence presented in extract one drawn from slightly earlier in same session. So, in 
making reference to something said, the therapist can be understood as drawing on at 
least the discussion presented in this former extract. In this sequence, however, it was 
stated that when the client is upset "one of the things that M be happening" (extract 
1, lines 21-22) is that she is feeling angry. Thus, the suggestion was that in expressing 
distress the client may be angry, not that her anger is inevitably expressed as distress. 
In this later sequence, therefore, the therapist offers a transformed and thus 
(re)formulated understanding of the matter (Davis, 1984,1986). 
This (re)formulated understanding of the client's emotional expression relies 
on the deletion of contextualising features. That is, first, the understanding of the 
client's problem expressing anger on which the therapist's account is based itself was 
enabled through deleting the moral and pragmatic context in which the client had 
placed her reaction (extract 1). Second, contextualising features are deleted again 
through transferring an understanding offered with regard to an incident between the 
client and her husband to the client's relationship with her mother. Presented as 
inevitable and as a pattern across different contexts, the client's expression of anger as 
distress is therefore further presented as an inherent feature of the client herself. 
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The therapist continues stating; "perhaps hard to know whether you have been 
angry with your mum or not" (lines 16-17). So, having suggested the client's anger 
'comes out as upset', he points to a specific example and raises the possibility that any 
anger toward her mother may be difficult to identify. The client's account of not 
feeling and having no reason to feel angry toward her mother is therefore implicitly 
challenged. Expanding on this the therapist suggests it might be hard to know if the 
client has been angry with her mother or not as it "wouldn't come out directly and 
perhaps you wouldn't even know" (lines 20-21). In suggesting the client's anger 
'wouldn't come out directly' an implicit contrast is made with the possibility of there 
being more direct expression of this emotion. The client's expression of anger is 
therefore suggested to be distorted or obstructed in some way. Moreover, the 
statement that perhaps she 'wouldn't even know' if she has been angry with her mother 
or not, raises the possibility that the client might not be aware of her own feelings in 
this respect. In this way, the client's account of not being angry with her mother 
becomes compatible with her, in fact, being angry but with the emotion being 
obstructed, outside her awareness and thus problematic. 
The therapist's challenge to the client's account of her feelings toward her 
mother is therefore managed in three ways. First, his account is premised on a 
(re)formulated understanding of what had been accomplished earlier in therapy; that 
the client's anger is inevitably expressed as 'upset'. This is therefore presented as a 
consistent pattern. Second, having implicated the presence of a consistent pattern the 
therapist is able to transfer an understanding of the client's emotional expression in 
one context (an incident with her husband) to another (her relationship with her 
mother). The source of the client's behaviour is therefore implied to be internal to the 
client herself. Third, the therapist's account is premised on invoking an understanding 
of the emotions in which the client's own feelings may not be completely evident to 
her. Any potential appeal by the client to personal knowing in such matters is 
therefore undermined. The conversation continues: 
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Extract (2b) Session (2) 
22 C: II have been (. ) angry about (. ) things and um 
23 (4) can remember we had somebody who lived near 
24 (. ) and oneday I went down to chat to her and 
25 um something must have upset me at home I 
26 suppose and I (. ) sat and chatted to her (. ) 
27 and she must have told me mum (. ) which 
28 T: (mm hm) 
29 C: really annoyed me you know I though she was 
30 sort of breaking a confidence 
31 T: (mm hm) 
32 C: and mum was cross about certain things I'd said 
33 about her (. ) I remember that I must have been 
34 about (. ) fourteen fifteen probably at the time 
35 (9) but um I don't remember any other incidents 
36 really. 
37 T: But you say you were angry with not with your 
38 mum but with the other woman (. ) that's right? 
39 C: Well I was (. ) I was upset that (woman's name) 
40 had sort of broken what I 
41 T: (mm) 
42 C: regarded as a confidence that it got back to me 
43 mum certain things I'd said. 
44 T: Sure (. ) and again you use the word upset for 
45 angry. 
46 C: (C laughs joined by T) Yeah cause angry doesn't 
47 come into my repertoire. 
48 T: That's right it doesn't come into your 
49 repertoire that's it. 
50 C: It it really doesn't 
51 T: (mm) 
52 C: (. ) no. 
Client's continuing disconfirmation Immediately prior to this sequence the therapist 
had implicitly challenged the client's account that she did not feel angry toward her 
mother. He suggested that (1) her expression of anger may be distorted or obstructed 
in some way and (2) she may not be aware of this emotion when she has it. In 
response the client states; "I have been (. ) angry about (. ) things" (line 22) and goes 
on to describe a relevant incident. So, in contrast to the therapist's suggestion that she 
may not be aware of her own anger, the client's statement that she 'has been angry' 
implies that rather this is an emotion she can knowingly experience. She can therefore 
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be understood to be offering a continuing disconfirmation of the therapist's problem 
(re)formulation around her obstructed or unidentified experience of anger. 
Therapist's continuing problem reformulation In response the therapist focuses on 
one aspect of the incident the client describes. He states; "But you say you were angry 
with not with your mum but with the other woman" (lines 37-38). Thus, the therapist 
orients to the client's account of having been angry specifically with regard to the 
issue of her feelings toward her mother. This was a theme raised by the therapist in 
his former turn; "perhaps hard to know whether you have been angry with your mum 
or not" (extract 2a, lines 16-17). However, the issue of the client's anger towards her 
mother was offered by the therapist as a specific instance of the implication that the 
client's generally expression of this emotion is problematic; that "if you're angry it 
comes out as upset" (extract 2a, lines 15-16). So, in focusing on the client's account as 
one in which she was angry 'not with your mum but with the other woman', the 
implication becomes available that the example does not challenge the idea that the 
client's anger may be distorted or unidentified with respect to her mother. In orienting 
to this specific feature of the client's account, though, her implicit disconfirmation of 
the general implication that she may be unaware of her own anger is glossed over. 
In response the client merely repeats her account of the circumstances 
justifying her anger; the "breaking (of) a confidence" (line 30). She therefore can be 
understood as reorienting to the importance of her challenge to the general 
implication that her expression of anger is problematic, of which anger toward her 
mother was one example. In doing so, though, the client does not repeat her 
description of being "angry" (line 22) or "really annoyed" (line 29) but uses the 
phrase 'I was upset'. And it is this aspect of her reply that the therapist develops; "Sure 
(. ) and again you use the word upset for angry" (lines 44-45). Prefacing his reply 
'sure', the therapist indicates an acknowledgement that the client was 'upset' about the 
broken confidence. However, he goes on to suggest that 'again you use the word upset 
for angry'. 
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This statement has three interesting implications. First, that the word 'upset' 
was used for that of 'angry' implies that of the two 'angry' would have been the correct 
description. The client's account of her feelings is therefore further challenged by the 
therapist. Second, the therapist states that the client 'again' uses the word upset for 
angry. He therefore indicates that she has a tendency to do so or, at least, has done so 
before. He therefore identifies the client's description of her feelings in relation to 
anger not only as erroneous in this particular instance but as generally mistaken. So 
third, although the therapist orients to a linguistic distinction, an effect is to offer a 
documentation of the client's problem with anger. 
What justification has the therapist for making such suggestions? Earlier in the 
discussion the therapist had suggested that when the client is angry "it comes out as 
uz-d" (extract 2, lines 15-16). This was therefore presented as established 
understanding; an implication that was not challenged by the client. The therapist can 
therefore be seen to draw on this understanding to suggest that in describing herself as 
'upset' the client may, in fact, have been experiencing anger and furthermore that this 
may be typical of her. Moreover, as the client had just offered an example of when 
she has "b, (. ) angry about (. ) things" (line 22), it seems reasonable to impute this 
emotion to her. 
Having again had her account of her feelings challenged by the therapist, the 
client offers an explanation for her comment that she "was upset that (woman's name) 
had sort of broken what I (T: mm) regarded as a confidence" (lines 39-42). She states; 
"Yeah cause angry doesn't come into my repertoire" (lines 46-47). However, what 
does the term 'repertoire' mean in this context? 
Two interpretations appear possible. First, following from the therapist's 
orientation to the words the client used; that she "used the word upset for angry" 
(lines 44-45), the client could be understood to mean that the word 'angry' merely 
does not come into her descriptivellinguistic 'repertoire'. This interpretation would be 
compatible with the client's disconfirmation of the therapist's problem (re)formulation 
around her problematic expression of this emotion. That is, that 'anger' is a word the 
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client does not commonly use is compatible with her still feeling and adequately 
expressing this emotion. 
On the other hand, that anger does not come into the client's 'repertoire' could 
be understood in terms of her experientialbehavioural 'repertoire'. This second 
interpretation is made pertinent by the wider context of the discussion in which the 
therapist has suggested the client may not be aware of her own anger (extract 2a, lines 
16-21). There are two implications of this latter interpretation. First, in line with the 
client's previous disconfirmations, in suggesting that anger does not come into the 
client's experiential repertoire she could be understood as indicating that if she does 
not feel angry then she is not angry. However, second, that anger does not come into 
her experiential repertoire would also be compatible with the therapist's suggestions 
that the client's anger may be outside her awareness. 
Rather than attempt to recover intended meaning from the client's statement, a 
discursive approach focuses on how meaning is taken up and developed in subsequent 
conversation. In reply the therapist states; "That's right it doesn't come into your 
repertoire that's it" (lines 48-49). Thus he echoes the client's comment that anger 
'doesn't come into her repertoire', prefacing his reply 'that's right' so indicating 
agreement with her. However, as the meaning of the client's statement is not explored 
it is not clear with what the therapist is agreeing. Moreover, the client's reply; "It 
really doesn't" (line 50), suggesting that anger 'really doesn't' come into her repertoire, 
indicates a continuing ambiguity. That is, in stressing the veracity of what she has just 
said after the therapist has indicated agreement with her suggests that the client is not 
taking his agreement at face value but understands her position to require further 
validation. So, how does the conversation continue?: 
Extract (2c) Session (2) 
53 T: So that sounds like there as if you're sort of 
54 sort of feeling sort of frustrated (. ) 
55 frustrated with me for going on about it or 
56 something? it really doesn't (C laughs) it sort 
57 of (tails off). 
58 C: Well it's just not p. r of me to W angry (. ) 
59 T: (mm mm) 
60 C: it's just not in my make up 
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61 T: (mm) 
62 C: I don't 
63 T: (mm). 
64 T: You don't. 
65 C: No (C laughs followed by T). 
66 T: I suppose at some is in some way I suppose I 
67 don't believe it I suppose that's what's 
68 happening () it feels like what you're saying 
69 that there's a whole bit of you that isn't 
70 there (. ) and I just don't believe it (2) or 
71 something you (. ) I mean only that that sounds 
72 very I don't know I mean that sounds funny it's 
73 not when I said I don't believe it I mean I 
74 feel that there must be part of you that you're 
75 not expressing and you must you know that must 
76 be costing you something () that by by writing 
77 it out of the script like that you're you're 
78 doing yourself some harm I suppose that's what 
79 I feel. 
80 C: Perhaps I've (. ) I don't know if I've written 
81 it out of the script for so long it just 
82 doesn't exist now... 
Theist's shift in conversational topic The conversation continues with the therapist 
suggesting "that sounds like there as if you're sort of sort of feeling sort of frustrated 
with me" (extract 2c, lines 53-55). Thus he comments on the way in which the client 
'sounds' indicating that this suggests she might be feeling 'frustrated with him'. In 
doing so, the implication becomes available that the way in which the client has 
expressed herself is a relevant new topic for discussion (see also Davis, 1986). 
Client's So ' nuing disconfirmation Having had the way in which she has spoken 
oriented to, an appropriate response would be for the client to comment on the 
therapist's suggestion. She does this by offering an explanation for why she might 
'sound frustrated'; "it's just not of me to &a angry (. ) (T: mm mm) it's just not in 
my make up (T: mm) I dol" (lines 58-62). So, in stating that anger is 'just not part 
of her or in her 'make up', the client makes a strong case that not getting angry is an 
established and natural part of her particular constitution; that she is just not that kind 
of person (see Wetherell & Potter, 1989). So, the implication is that her frustration 
with the therapist is due to being continually challenged on something which is 
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evident to her. Moreover, in specifying that it is "not par of me to ggt angry" (line 
58) the client's former statement that "angry doesn't come into my repertoire" (extract 
2b, lines 46-47) finally becomes established as her behavioural/experiential repertoire 
as opposed to merely descriptive/linguistic. 
The therapist echoes the client's statement "You don't" (line 64) and although 
this is again validated by her (line 65) goes on to explicitly question her position 
stating that "in some way I suppose I don't believe it" (lines 66-67). In understanding 
the therapist's comment it is important to note that in contemporary Western culture 
anger is often considered a fundamental human experience (e. g., Ekman, 1985; Izard, 
1977; Plutchik, 1962; Tomkins, 1970). In this context, a claim that one does not get 
angry appears unreasonable and likely to be received with scepticism. So, although 
the client's statement could have been understood as making the seemingly more 
reasonable claim that she is merely not easily roused to anger, the therapist's reaction 
of disbelief suggests rather than her claim is being oriented as extreme. Moreover, the 
client's laughter while validating her position; "No (C laughs followed by T)" (line 
65), may indicate an acknowledgement of the unusual nature of what she is saying. 
And understanding the client's claim as at least unusual makes sense of her earlier 
unwillingness to take the therapist's agreement with her at face value (extract 2b, lines 
50-52). Thus, it is in drawing on a commonsense understanding of the nature of the 
emotions, and thus the inherent tenability of certain claims regarding them, that the 
therapist can offer an explicit challenge to the client's account that she does not get 
angry. 
However, why might the client have come to make such a seemingly extreme 
claim regarding her own emotions? Throughout this second session discussion 
(extracts 2a-2c) the client had had her account of her feelings questioned by the 
therapist. This may be an unusual situation in that in contemporary Western culture as 
a common understanding is that "only the subject can truly know his or her own 
emotions" (Lutz, 1988, p. 72). The client therefore is in a position of having to defend 
an account which would not normally be challenged. Accordingly, extreme case 
185 
Chapter 7 
formulations have been identified as a strategy which may be invoked in situations 
requiring one to assert the strongest possible case to defend against or to counter 
challenges to the legitimacy of one's account (Pomerantz, 1986). Moreover, the 
client's claim to the effect that she does not get angry was made specifically in 
response to the therapist suggestion that she might be feeling frustrated with him 
(lines 55). In the context of being characterised as possibly frustrated with someone 
professionally qualified and attempting to help you, one might be expected to have a 
good reason. So, the client's suggestion that she 'doesn't get angry' can also be 
understood as oriented toward implying that the grounds for her frustration with the 
therapist are very secure; that the status of her lack of anger is unambiguous. 
However, the implication of the client's statement is that her position is readily open 
to challenge for being untenable. 
Therapist's continuing problem (re)formulation So, the therapist responds; "in some 
way I suppose I don't believe it I suppose that's what's happening" (lines 66-68). In 
stating 'I don't believe it' the therapist indicates the client's claim that she does not get 
angry is untenable to him. Moreover, stating 'that's what's happening' suggests that 
'not believing it' has been the basis of their interaction and thus the therapist's 
challenges to the client's account of her feelings. 
The therapist, however, goes on to offer a reason for his disbelief. He suggests 
"it feels like what you're saying that there's a whole bit of you that isn't there (. ) and I 
just don't believe it" (lines 68-70). So first, the client's suggestion that she doesn't get 
angry is characterised as implying that part of her is missing. However second, that 
part of her could be missing is itself construed as untenable in that it is something he 
'just doesn't believe'. The therapist's disbelief, though, is offered in a mitigated way. 
That is, his disbelief is suggested to be only in "some way I suppose" (line 66) and 
with reference to being something he 'feels' (lines 68,73-74 and 79). It is therefore 
oriented to only as his own opinion or how it seems to him. But why should the 
therapist's disbelief have been offered in this way? It can be suggested that indicating 
disbelief with what someone has said is potentially disruptive as could be understood 
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as implying that one is not just mistaken but is perhaps not telling the truth. Offering 
such a suggestion in a mitigated way, therefore, allows the point to be made while 
orienting interactional ease. That is (1) in suggesting the disbelief is a personal 
opinion the implication becomes available that one might oneself be mistaken and (2) 
that the disbelief is only in 'some way' implies perhaps that an acceptable explanation 
for the client's seemingly untenable position might be forthcoming. A tentative 
intervention of this nature is also in line with the protocol of the conversational model 
of psychodynamic-interpersonal psychotherapy (Firth & Shapiro, 1985; Hobson, 
1985). 
In a similar vein, the therapist continues by offering a further, expanded 
explanation for his disbelief; "when I said I don't believe it I mean I feel that there 
must be part of you that you're not expressing" (lines 73-75). The therapist therefore 
modifies his characterisation of the client from orienting to the implication that 
'there's a whole bit of you that isn't there' to suggesting that there is part of her she is 
'not expressing'. These two accounts are subtly different. The suggestion that a bit of 
her 'isn't there' implies that the client's anger does not exist and was construed by the 
therapist as an untenable position. Alternatively, suggesting that there is a part of her 
she is 'not expressing' implies that the client's anger exists but is just not 
demonstrated. Thus construing the client's account as an untenable and thus 
unbelievable position, the therapist reinterprets it in line with his suggestion earlier in 
the session that the client might " feel angry but [... ] can't show it" (extract 1, lines 
17-18). 
The therapist then uses this understanding to offer a specific account of a 
problem. He suggests that in not expressing her anger; "that must be costing you 
something (. ) that by by writing it out of the script like that you're you're doing 
yourself some harm" (lines 75-78). The notion that not expressing anger is 'costing 
her something' and 'doing herself some harm' suggests that this is in some way 
unhealthy or self-destructive. In this way, then, the client's emotional expression, or 
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rather lack of expression, is further suggested to be problematic and, by implication, 
an important topic for therapy. 
Client's continuing dpi confirmation Although the client's position that she does not get 
angry has been characterised as untenable and the therapist has offered a case that her 
emotional expression is problematic, the client continues to disconfirm the therapist's 
problem (re)formulation. That is, she states that perhaps "I've written it out of the 
script for so long it just doesn't exist now" (lines 80-82). So, the client echoes the 
therapist's reference to "writing it out of the script" (lines 76-77), however, rather than 
use this to develop an account of a harmful and thus problematic effect, she 
implicates length of time to account for the absence of her anger. Such an idea, 
therefore, draws on an alternative rationale in which consistent behaviour is a 
demonstration of inherent characteristics. Thus by the end of the second session 
discussion regarding the nature of the client's feelings toward her mother, the client's 
conclusion that her anger 'just doesn't exist now' appears a continuing disconfirmation 
of the therapist's problem (re)formulation that her anger is merely 'not expressed'. 
A further mention of anger with regard to the client's parents appears in the 
following session; the third session of therapy. The next extract was selected for 
presentation and analysis as it demonstrates the way in which the therapist continues 
to develop a problem formulation around the client's anger with regard to her parents. 
We enter the discussion as the therapist offers a description of the client's feelings in 
this respect: 
Extract (3) Session (3) 
1 T: That that you've W what you've got is (. ) 
2 feelings in yourself that you don't jig (. ) 
3 cold calculating sort of thing which are k&Z 
4 there by the feeling that you by the belief 
5 that you can't (. ) ever change anything while 
6 they're avg. 
7 C: Yes probably you're right there mm. 
8 T: So you allowing them to control you you're 
9 feeling a kind of anger towards them which you 
10 you feel is like it's murderous it's like not 
11 wanting them to be around anymore 
12 C: (mm) 
13 T: and I suppose I'm wondering what that means in 
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14 terms of your (. ) your future for when they 
15 have gone (5). 
Therapist's problem formulation The therapist suggests to the client that "what you've 
got is (. ) feelings in yourself that you don't like" (lines 1-2). Thus he offers a 
formulation by way of a summary understanding of how the client feels (Garfinkle & 
Sacks, 1970). Moreover, he indicates a problem insofar as 'having feelings you don't 
like' can be understood as disturbing or, at least, uncomfortable. Stating that this is 
something "you've gm" (line 1) also has the effect of presenting this problem as 
unambiguous. The therapist continues by describing these problematic feelings in 
more detail. He states that it is a "cold calculating sort of thing" (line 3). The 
description 'cold and calculating' suggests something inherently negative. Such a 
characterisation of the client's feelings therefore validates the problem formulation 
that she has feelings she does not like. 
The therapist then goes on to offer an account of how such problematic 
feelings are maintained. He suggests it is "kW there by the feeling that you by the 
belief that you can't (. ) ever change anything while they're alive" (lines 3-6). Three 
observation will be made in relation to this statement. First, within the context of a 
client presenting with depression raising the idea of 'changing things' implies 
changing things for the better. Second, that the client's problematic feelings are 
maintained through not being able to change things suggests that her improvement is 
being in some way obstructed. However third, suggesting that the client has 'the 
feeling', 'the belief that she cannot change anything 'while they're alive' presents this 
as the client's own opinion. So, the implication becomes available that, although not 
wrong, there may be other ways of understanding the situation. The client's 
problematic feelings are therefore suggested to be maintained by her own subjective 
understanding that her improvement is being impeded, if only by her parents' 
presence. 
The client confirms the problem formulation; "Yes probably you're right there 
mm" (line 7), and the therapist continues. He states; "So you allowing them to control 
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you" (line 8). Thus, an upshot of the client's belief that she cannot change anything 
while her parents are alive is suggested to be that she is 'allowing them to control her'. 
That the client 'allows' her parents control, though, suggests that she lets this happen 
and so by implication could make it stop. The client herself is therefore further 
implicated in maintaining the conditions causing her distress. 
It is in this context, though, that the therapist describes the client as "feeling a 
kind of anger towards them which you you feel is like it's murderous" (lines 9-10). 
What justification might the therapist have for making this statement? It can be 
suggested that, although it is implied that the client is not without blame, the belief 
that her parents are impeding her recovery from depression is enough for the therapist 
to speculate that she may feel angry about this; a possible implication of having been 
wronged by them. This particular line of discussion though is not explored further 
and the therapist introduces a new but related topic; the client's "future" (line 14). 
However, there are two important implications of this sequence. First, the therapist 
construes the client as feeling extremely angry with her parents without the client 
offering a direct disconfirmation of this. Second, and perhaps accounting for her lack 
of challenge, it is suggested that in terms of her own beliefs at least the client has 
reason to feel this way. 
The next mention of anger in relation to the client's parents appears in the fifth 
session. And it is in this sequence that the client comes to describe herself as feeling 
anger toward her mother. The sequence begins as the client describes her more 
general reaction to her mother: 
Extract (4) Session (5) 
1 C: 
... (6) I just cannot be very sympathetic with 2 her. 
3 T: You don't feel sympathetic. 
4 C: No. 
5 T: You don't feel sorry for her you just feel 
6 angry. 
7 C: I feel my. for her um because OK she's not 
8 well 
9 T: (mm) 
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10 C: she's far from well but she doesn't try and 
11 make the best of (. ) of what she has (. ) um my 
12 father leads a very very difficult life with 
13 her she's so demanding of him and he is so 
14 patient and silly with her at times (. ) um and 
15 I can see you know what's happening there and I 
16 I lose all sympathy and patience with her 
17 really I know I should n' because I know she's 
18 not well (. ) but II find it very difficult to 
19 be very tolerant with her (. ) which seems 
20 really quite cruel really when you're talking 
21 about your own mother. 
22 T: Yeah there there's a lot of overlay here of all 
23 the duty stuff of what you should feel 
24 C: (mm) 
25 T: think we need to try and get a bit beneath that 
26 to what you do feel (C laughs) and you don 
27 feel sympathetic. 
28 C: No I don't. 
29 T: Maybe if we can look and see what you dd feel. 
30 C: (10) 
31 Anger I think towards her (. ). 
32 T: (mm) 
33 C: and being as () the type of person that she is 
34 1 think. 
Therapist's problem formulation This extract commences with the client indicating 
that she "cannot be very sympathetic" (line 1) with her mother. The therapist 
reiterates the idea; "You don't feel sympathetic" (line 3). Thus he presents a 
formulation by way of a gist offering an understanding of the sense achieved so far 
(Heritage & Watson, 1979). However, in doing so he exchanges the word 'be' for 
'feel'. So, there is a subtle change in meaning from not'being sympathetic; suggesting 
a way of behaving, to not 'feeling sympathetic'; indicating an internal state. This 
though is confirmed by the client (line 4) and the therapist goes on to offer an 
expanded account of the client's feelings toward her mother. He states; "You don't 
feel sorry for her you just feel angry" (lines 5-6). He therefore presents another gist 
with a further subtle transformation in description from not feeling 'sympathetic' to 
not feeling 'sorry'. Moreover, the therapist adds that the client does feel 'angry'. Thus, 
the client's account that she "cannot be very sympathetic" (line 1) with her mother is 
transformed in two stages by the therapist to the suggestion that she does not "feel 
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sorry for her you just feel angry" (lines 5-6). Moreover, a problem is implied in that it 
is suggested the client harbours angry and thus disharmonious feelings toward a 
significant other (see also extract 2). 
Client's disconfirmation Although the client had accepted the first formulation that 
she does not feel sympathetic toward her mother, she responds to the therapist's 
second formulation that she 'doesn't feel sorry' for her with a disconfirmation. That is 
she states; "I feel sorry for her um because OK she's not well" (lines 7-8). However, 
the client goes on to qualify her reason for feeling sorry for her mother; "she's far 
from well but she doesn't try and make the best of (. ) of what she gas" (lines 10-11). 
In describing her mother as not 'making the best of what she has' it is suggested that 
she does not try to help herself or focus on the positive. Thus it is implied that her 
mother is blameworthy insofar as she is overly helpless and negative in the face of her 
illness. Furthermore, the client states that "my father leads a very very difficult life 
with her she's so demanding of him" (lines 11-13). So, in making the client's father's 
life 'difficult' through being 'demanding' it is suggested that her mother's behaviour 
has a destructive effect on at least one other person. She is therefore further implied 
to be blameworthy in being selfish. And it is having implicated her mother as 
culpable in these two respects that the client expands on her original statement (lines 
1-2) suggesting she "lose(s) all sympathy and patience with her" (line 16). Thus, 
'feeling sorry' is specifically linked to her mother being ill whereas the client's lack of 
sympathy is explained by her mother's negativity and selfishness. 
Having suggested that she 'loses all sympathy and patience' with her mother 
the client goes on to reflect on this. She states; "I know I shouldn't because I know 
she's not well" (lines 17-18). Suggesting she 'shouldn't' lose sympathy and patience 
with her mother 'because she's not well' implies that she ought to have sympathy and 
patience purely because her mother is ill. However, the client then orients specifically 
to the category of person she is talking about; "I find it very difficult to be very 
tolerant with her (. ) which seems really quite cruel really when you're talking about 
your own mother" (lines 18-21). So, not being 'tolerant' is described as 'cruel' in 
192 
Chapter 7 
relation to one's own mother. The category 'mother' is therefore indicated to be 
special in this regard, the implication being that there is an obligation to be indulgent 
toward such a person. The client therefore raises the possibility that she herself may 
be at fault through regarding her mother in an inappropriately severe way particularly 
given that she is ill. 
One final observation will be made with regard to this segment (lines 7-21). 
The client's turn was a reply to the therapist's suggestion that "You don't feel sorry for 
her you just feel angry" (lines 5-6). The client specifically disconfirms the idea that 
she does not feel sorry for her mother. However, she does not directly address the 
suggestion that she feels angry. What the client does indicate is that she "1(s) all 
sympathy and patience" (line 16) and "find(s) it very difficult to be very tolerant with 
her" (lines 18-19). Although the client has indicated how she does not feel, such 
description allows inferences to be made about how she does feel. That is, in losing 
sympathy and patience, the client can be understood to feel at odds and vexed with 
her mother. Moreover, that she finds it difficult to be tolerant suggests that she feels a 
certain antipathy toward her. 
So, given that the feeling 'anger', which might reasonably include a feeling of 
antipathy and vexation, has been made pertinent by the therapist why might the client 
not have used this particular description? The following suggestion can be made. 
Between persons, part of the logic of the term 'anger' is that it is accusatory (Warner, 
1986). That is, anger implies that one has been wronged or offended and may carry 
the connotation that one has a right to retaliate. Being angry with someone is 
therefore potentially disruptive of the relationship. On the other hand, describing 
oneself as losing sympathy and patience orients to these affiliative feelings having 
been present, finding it difficult to be tolerant implying the possibility that tolerance is 
at least attempted. Moreover, there is no implication that one has been particularly 
wronged or that one might seek redress. In fact, the client specifically orients to the 
possibility that she may be being "quite cruel" (line 20) and so herself blameworthy in 
some way. Thus, the client's description of her reaction to her mother, although 
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invoking criticism of her, can be understood as generally oriented toward at least 
potential affiliation. This contrasts with the possibility of implying a disruption of 
their relationship as might have been suggested had she described herself as angry. 
Continuing discussion of the client's feelings So, how does the therapist reply? He 
states; "there's a lot of overlay here of all the ¢i y stuff of what you should feel" 
(lines 22-23). An 'overlay' suggests a surface covering of some kind. Furthermore, 
that this covering is described as 'duty stuff it is implied to be an artifact of 
convention and obligation. Thus, the therapist makes the implication available (1) that 
the client has not yet expressed her true feelings toward her mother and (2) that her 
true feelings may be less than deferential. With regard to 'duty stuff, the therapist 
goes on to suggest that "we need to try and get a bit beneath that to what you -dQ 
feel" 
(lines 25-26). So, in making a suggestion about what 'we need to try and' do, the 
therapist implies an important task for therapy; 'getting a bit beneath to what you do 
feel'. It is therefore indicated to the client that she is required to articulate her true 
feelings which lie under the surface even though they may not be dutiful. 
Having indicated that an important task is to get to what the client does feel 
the therapist completes his turn stating; "and you dowt feel sympathetic" (lines 26- 
27). It is therefore implied that how the client does not feel toward her mother has 
been established but how she positively does feel has not. Moreover, with the client 
only confirming that she does not feel sympathetic (line 28) the therapist repeats this 
request; "Maybe if we can look and see what you ¢Q feel" (line 29). However, 
stressing the need to establish what the client feels has implications for the evaluation 
of her former description of her reaction to her mother. That is, the client's account of 
losing patience and sympathy (line 19) and of finding it difficult to be tolerant (lines 
18-19) is implied to be of minor importance. Moreover, her description of how she 
does feel; feeling sorry for her mother (line 7), is apparently discounted. By 
implication therefore an acceptable account of the client's true feelings are further 
suggested to be of a non-deferential nature. 
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The client responds after a ten second pause; "Anger I think towards her (. ) 
(T: mm) and being as (. ) the type (. ) the type of person that she is" (lines 30-33). So, 
finally, the client describes herself as angry toward her mother. However, she had 
specifically disconfirmed this idea in the second session and maintained the 
disconfirmation against challenge by the therapist (extracts 2a, 2b & 2c). Moreover, 
the second session and this fifth session discussion are similar in that although the 
therapist offers a description of the client as angry with her mother in both (extract 
2a, lines 1-3 & extract 4, lines 5-6) the client initially describes herself as "bit sad 
about it" (extract 2a, line 4) and "sorry for her" (extract 4, line 7). So, how did the 
client come to describe herself as feeling angry toward her mother in this fifth 
session? 
Let us recap on the wider context in which this fifth session discussion takes 
place. First, before the client describes herself as feeling angry toward her mother the 
therapist has made this suggestion to her at least three times during therapy (extract 
2a, lines 1-3, extract 3, lines 8-9 & extract 4, lines 5-6). It is therefore implied to be at 
least a tenable proposition. Second, during the second session the therapist had 
challenged the client's account of her own feelings suggesting that anger toward her 
mother may exist outside her awareness (extract 2a, lines 16-21). The client's own 
account of her feelings therefore have been implied to be fallible. Moreover, third, 
during the third session the therapist had presented a case that, in terms of her own 
beliefs, the client would be justified in feeling angry toward her parents (extract 3). 
So, it is suggested that such a feeling could be understood as warranted. 
Given this context, how specifically might the fifth session discussion (extract 
4) have enable the client's account of feeling angry toward her mother? It may be 
suggested that this was an effect of discursive negotiation between client and 
therapist. That is first, the therapist directly imputes the emotion of anger to the client 
in relation to her mother (lines 5-6). Second, the client's own more affiliative account 
of her feelings are characterised as 'surface' and 'bounded by conventional obligation' 
and therefore not wrong but not her true feelings. Third, her true feelings, and by 
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implication the account acceptable to the therapist, are implied to be non-deferential. 
Fourth, it is indicated to be an important therapeutic task that such true feelings be 
articulated. Moreover, fifth, the client herself had described her mother as behaving in 
an unduly negative and selfish way. So, from the client's own account feeling angry 
toward her mother might be considered reasonable. Thus, although conceivably she 
could have replied in many different ways, an account of feeling angry toward her 
mother appears the most reasonable answer for the client to provide. And, arguably, it 
would have required much skilled interaction work for the client to have supplied an 
alternative. 
The final extract is taken from the eighth and last session of therapy. The 
sequence is drawn from a discussion regarding how the client has changed throughout 
the course of therapy. Specifically, this extract is of interest as the client and therapist 
offer accounts as to why the understanding that the client feels angry toward her 
mother has been helpful: 
Extract (5) Session (8) 
1 T: ... you've kind of (. ) seen it for what 
it is 
2 when you know that it h OK to talk about what 
3 you want and what you feel and it is OK to talk 
4 about sexuality or (. ) angry feelings almost in 
5 a way murderous feelings towards your mum (2) 
6 it's OK to feel those things (6). 
7 C: Mm I think those feelings were g sort of 
8 (. ) an inner resentment 
9 T: (mm) 
10 C: I suppose 
11 T: (mm) 
12 C: um but I understand them more now 
13 T: (mm) 
14 C: and (2) more im it it doesn't bother me (. ) 
15 very much now that those feelings are there 
16 I've sort of accepted them 
17 T: (that's right) 
18 C: and I think they're sort of reasonably 
19 justified 
20 T: (mm) 
21 C: um so I feel sort of more at ease. 
22 T: That's right yeah (29). 
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The therapist's account of therapeutic success The sequence begins with the therapist's 
statement that the client has "kind of (. ) seen it for what it is" (line 1). It is therefore 
suggested that the client has come to a perception of the truth and, by implication, had 
previously been mistaken or misguided. The therapist expands on this. 'Seeing it for 
what it is' is about "know(ing) that it ja OK to talk about what you want and what you 
feel" (lines 2-3). Stating that the client now 'knows' that 'it ids OK' to do something 
further construes her as having perceived the true nature of things. That is, the 
legitimacy of talking about her 'wants' and 'feelings' is offered as an item of 
knowledge and thus a matter of fact. Moreover, as wants and feelings are usually 
considered internal states in contemporary Western culture, the therapist implies the 
therapeutic effect of articulating what is going on inside. 
The therapist offers two specific examples; "it is OK to talk about sexuality or 
(. ) angry feelings" (lines 3-4). Sexuality and anger may often be considered highly 
charged topics. That is, in many circumstances sexuality may be regarded a taboo 
subject and anger is potentially disruptive of interpersonal relationships through being 
accusatory. So, furthermore the therapist implies that it is therapeutic to discuss such 
difficult issues. He expands on the topic of anger suggesting that the client's angry 
feelings are "almost in a way murderous feelings towards your mum" (lines 4-5) 
concluding that "it's OK to feel those things" (lines 4-6). Thus having suggested what 
the client now knows it is legitimate to 'talk' about (lines 2& 3-4), the therapist also 
suggests what it is legitimate to feel. He therefore offers an account of therapeutic 
success in terms of the client coming to a perception of the truth in two respects. The 
first regards the legitimacy of articulating what is going on inside, particularly in 
relation to difficult issues. The second is the legitimacy of having angry and, by 
implication, accusatory feelings toward her mother. 
Two observations will be made with regard to the therapist's account. First, he 
indicates to the client what it is legitimate to talk about and to feel. However, this is 
presented as (1) a matter of fact and (2) something the client herself knows. The 
perspective therefore gains validity through being offered as more than just the 
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therapist's opinion and, furthermore, grounded in the client's own experience. Second, 
invoking the therapeutic benefits of articulating wants and feelings and giving 
expression to difficult issues can be understood as drawing on notions of 
individualism in relation to personal freedom of expression. Interestingly, this 
contrasts with the client's original characterisation of her behaviour in which she 
described foregoing personal expression in part for the benefit of others; "I should 
have made a big fuss about it but I couldn't (T: mm) partly for the children's sake" 
(extract 1, lines 7-10). In this respect, therefore, the therapist can be understood as 
linking the success of the therapeutic process to the client's adoption of a more 
individualistic stance. 
The client's account of therapeutic success So how does the client herself characterise 
the process of successful therapy? In response to the therapist's suggestion that it is 
OK to feel 'angry almost murderous feelings towards her mum' she states; "I think 
those feelings were there" (line 7). How might this be understood given that the client 
had formerly disconfirmed the therapist's suggestions to this effect earlier in therapy 
(extracts 2a, 2b & 2c)? Suggesting that feelings she had formerly disconfirmed 'were 
there' implies that, as presumably she had not been lying, such emotions existed 
outside her awareness. The client's account therefore echoes an idea raised by the 
therapist early in the second session that her anger "wouldn't come out directly and 
perhaps you wouldn't even know" (extract 2a, lines 20-21). The client therefore draws 
on the idea that feelings can be 'unconscious entities'. That is, it is through drawing on 
such an understanding that changing one's account of how one feels is explained by 
the implication that the emotion has just been uncovered or revealed. In this way 
therefore the client also echoes the therapist's account of therapeutic success in terms 
of coming to an understanding of the truth. 
The client then goes on to offer an understanding of the success of therapy 
with regard to her feelings of 'inner resentment'. There are three aspects to this 
account. First, the client states "I understand them more now" (line 12). Thus she 
echoes the therapist's suggestion of 'knowing' something (line 2) in terms of having a 
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greater understanding. However, she links this to understanding her feelings rather 
than to knowing what it is legitimate to talk about and feel. Second, she states; "it 
doesn't bot he me so much now [... ] I've sort of accepted them" (lines 14-16). 
Suggesting her 'inner resentment' 'doesn't bother her so much now' indicates that she 
was previously disturbed by such feelings. So, stating that she now accepts them 
suggests that therapeutic success is being linked with the ability to respect the 
meaning of otherwise disturbing emotions. This can be understood therefore to echo 
the therapist suggestion that 'it's OK to feel those things'. And third, the client states 
that such feelings are "sort of reasonably justified" (lines 18-19). So, she indicates her 
'inner resentment' to be warranted and thus by implication to have in some way 
suffered an injury. So, it is suggested that her distress has a cause outside of herself 
and an external attribution of blame offered as a factor contributing to her 
improvement of feeling "sort of more at ease" (line 21). 
Thus, the client and therapist offer accounts of therapeutic success that are in 
some ways similar. That is, both imply that the client has come to an understanding of 
truth and accepted the legitimacy of certain difficult or disturbing feelings. However, 
the client's account stresses gaining understanding of these feelings and perceiving 
them to be warranted. The therapist, on the other hand, focuses on the therapeutic 
effect of talking about difficult issues. Both, though, imply the therapeutic effect of 
an external attribution of blame. That is, (1) the therapist's suggestion that it is 
legitimate for the client to feel angry with her mother carries the implication that she 
may consider herself wronged by her. Moreover (2) an external attribution of blame 
is the implication of the client's statement that her resentment is 'reasonably justified'. 
DISCUSSION 
The above analysis offers a detailed examination of selected extracts pertaining to the 
discussion of anger within the successfully resolved, client-specified problematic 
theme 'feeling that I have let my family down'. The primary goal of this analysis was 
to explicate the process of successful problem (re)formulation through understanding 
how this client came to describe herself as feeling anger toward her mother having 
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specifically rejected this understanding in an earlier session of therapy. In achieving 
this aim descriptions were approached as social actions; that is, analysis oriented to 
how descriptions functioned within their immediate interactional context. This 
contrasts viewing accounts as neutral representations of states of affair. 
Accordingly, this analysis demonstrates how client change may be usefully 
approached as a discursive achievement. Specifically, it was suggested that the 
therapist persuaded the client of the reasonableness of considering herself angry with 
her mother. The benefit of a detailed discourse analysis of extracts is that many of the 
rhetorical strategies utilised by the therapist, and thus some of the discursive 
processes whereby client change was promoted, can be identified. In general such 
strategies can be understood as contributing to the three stages of problem 
(re)formulation as identified by Davis (1984,1986); (1) definition of the problem, (2) 
documentation or gathering evidence for the existence of the problem, and (3) 
organisation of the client's consent to work on this problem. 
Analysis commenced with an extract selected from a discussion in which the 
client had alluded to a difficulty expressing anger. The example of this problem 
offered by the client, though, placed the restraint of her anger within specific moral 
and pragmatic circumstances; her obligation to take the children on an outing. 
However, such contextualising features were glossed over in the therapist 
summarising problem formulation that "when you get upset one of the things that M 
be happening is that you're feeling angry but you can't show it" (extract 1, lines 16- 
18). An effect of such a generalised and decontextualised account of the client's 
action was that the implication became available that not expressing anger is indeed a 
feature of the client herself. So, with the client's assent, the beginnings of a tentative 
problem definition around the client's personal difficulty in expressing anger was 
initiated between the participants. 
Decontextualisation of the client's account was also noted as the therapist 
attempted to transfer an understanding of the client's emotional expression in one 
situation to another different situation slightly later in the session. First, the therapist 
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drew on the tentative problem definition around the client's difficulty expressing 
anger as established and shared knowledge (extract 2a). This implied that a consistent 
pattern in the client's behaviour had been identified. Second, this was then used to 
transfer an understanding of the client's difficulty expressing anger during an incident 
with her husband (extract 1) to characterise her relationship with her mother (extract 
2a). 
Decontextualisation has already been identified as a strategy which may be 
invoked to construct consistency in clients' behaviour (see Chapters 5& 6). As 
suggested in the former study (see page 161), the production of client consistency, 
implying an internal cause of behaviour, is a descriptive accomplishment within the 
therapy dialogue which many require a lot of work on the part of the therapist. This is 
demonstrated clearly in the present analysis as this client initially disconfirmed the 
therapist's suggestions (extracts 2a, 2b & 2c) and had to be persuaded that her 
difficulty with anger identified vis-ä-vis her husband was indeed transferable to her 
relationship with her mother. 
The therapist invoked a further strategy to enable transfer of the problem 
definition around the client's difficulty expressing anger to her relationship with her 
mother contra the client's disconfirmation. He produced an account of the emotions in 
which the client's own feelings may not have been completely evident to her; "it 
wouldn't come out directly and perhaps you wouldn't even know" (extract 2a, lines 
20-21). As suggested in the introduction to this chapter, from the contemporary 
Western viewpoint the subject is generally understood to be the adjudicator of her or 
his own emotional state (Lutz, 1988). Thus, unless considered deliberately deceitful, 
report of one's own feelings are normally immune from challenge. A pertinent 
exception to this understanding, however, may be situations in which an individual is 
considered 'troubled' and in which accounts of disturbed psychological processes may 
be invoked. Accordingly, the therapist produced an account of the obstructed or 
distorted nature of the client's anger to sustain a challenge to the client's own account 
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of her feelings (see also Chapter 6, extract 2). Such an understanding appears to draw 
on a psychodynamic understanding of unconscious processes. 
In attempting to transfer the problem definition around the client's difficulty 
expressing anger to her relationship with her mother, the therapist also moves into the 
second stage of problem (re)formulation; documentation of the problem. During this 
stage the therapist had to provide evidence for his characterisation of the client as 
feeling angry toward her mother contra the client's disconfirmation. Four particular 
strategies were identified. 
First were the suggestions from the therapist that the client had reason to be 
angry with her mother. During the second session the therapist had suggested to the 
client that "maybe there's quite a bit for you (. ) to be angry and upset about in relation 
to your mum" (extract 2a, lines 1-2). The possibility of anger was however 
disconfirmed by the client. During the third session, then, the therapist supplied a 
specific reason for anger in that, from the client's own perspective, her parents could 
be understood as passively obstructing her recovery from depression (extract 3). This 
particular understanding was not actively accepted or rejected by the client. However, 
linked to supplying reasons for the client's anger toward her mother, the therapist 
continued to impute this emotion to her (extract 2a, lines 1-2; extract 3, lines-8-9; 
extract 4, lines 5-6). This in itself makes the proposition appear at least tenable. 
The second strategy utilised in a documentation of the client's problem 
expressing anger within the context of her relationship with her mother was the 
therapist's orientation to the client's use of words. Thus during the second session he 
stated that "again you use the word upset for angry" (extract 2b, lines 44-45). The 
analysis, though, noted how such a strategy was premised on the assumption that 
anger was the correct description of the client's feelings. However, this manoeuvre 
had the effect of implying that the client was generally mistaken regarding her angry 
feelings and so constituted further evidence of the global nature of the problem. A 
similar strategy was noted in analysis of the unsuccessful case in which a description 
of the client reaction within the therapeutic situation was utilised as documentation 
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for the existence of a problem she had specifically disconfirmed (Chapter 5, extract 
3). 
A third strategy in documenting the problem was the therapist's production of 
an account in which 'not being angry' actually does constitute a problem; "there must 
be part of you that you're not expressing and you must you know that must be costing 
you something (. ) that by by writing it out of the script like that you're you're doing 
yourself some harm" (extract 2c, lines 74-78). This statement appears to draw on an 
understanding in which anger is considered a fundamental human experience (as most 
clearly articulated in the account of the primary emotions, see pages 167-168). The 
account the therapist offers may also share features with a hydraulic understanding of 
anger (Lakoff & Kovecses, 1987). Such an understanding is similar to the Freudian 
energy model of the psyche (Power & Brewin, 1991). This model suggests that 
'psychic energy', like anger, follows the laws of thermodynamics. As such, the 
implication is that if 'psychic energy' is not expressed directly it will not disappear but 
may manifest in a distorted and possibly harmful way. 
The final stage of problem (re)formulation is identified by Davis (1986) as 
obtaining the client's consent to work on the problem. In relation to the extracts 
presented here, this final stage might more appropriately be termed 'obtaining the 
client's acceptance of the issue as defined by the therapist'. Specifically, this entailed 
obtaining the client's acceptance of being characterised as feeling angry toward her 
mother; in the account offered by the therapist, an understanding obscured by the 
client's difficulties with this emotion. In line with the three stages of problem 
(re)formulation the therapist succeeded in obtaining the client's consent having first 
identified and thus defined a problem around the client's expression of anger and 
provided some evidence that this could be considered an issue in her relationship with 
her mother. 
The specific stages whereby the therapist obtained the client's acceptance of 
an account of feeling angry toward her mother were detailed during the analysis of 
extract 4 (see pages 195-196). However, in general the therapist characterised the 
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client's own account of her feelings toward her mother as bounded by obligation and 
so, not wrong, but not her true feelings. He then indicated it to be an important 
therapeutic task that the client reveal her true emotions which were implied to be of a 
non-deferential nature. As such, the therapist's account links to the identification of 
'confession' as a central feature of contemporary medical discourse and in models of 
subjectivity in general. Parker (1989a) suggests that the notion of confession is so 
organised in modern discourse that the development of a healthy identity is intimately 
connected to the acknowledgement of "troubling hidden secrets about the self' (p. 61). 
Moreover, according to Foucault, the modern technology of the self is based on the 
idea that "one can, with the help of experts, tell the truth about oneself' (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1982, p. 175). Thus, some psychotherapy processes may be premised on 
implicit understandings regarding the therapeutic value of revealing hidden or 
disturbing aspects of the self. In fact, the therapist appears to invoke this 
understanding in providing an account of therapeutic success; "you know that it is OK 
to talk about what you want and what you feel and it is OK to talk about sexuality of 
(. ) angry feelings almost in a way murderous feelings towards your mum" (extract 5, 
lines 2-5). 
Identifying the rhetorical strategies utilised by the therapist to promote client 
change is not to imply that the client was the passive recipient of therapist 
intervention. In fact, the analysis demonstrates clearly how the client actively 
participated in the negotiation of meaning within the therapy conversation, rejecting 
the therapist's suggestions throughout the second session discussion (extracts 2a, 2b & 
2c). Moreover, this analysis suggests that the therapist had to build up a very 
persuasive account before the client accepted the alternative description of her 
feelings offered by him. 
An important feature of this study is the way in which the descriptions offered 
by the client and therapist were approached as social actions; as accounts used to do 
things. For example, in defence of her own position, the client herself had offered a 
documentation of the absence of a general problem around anger through producing 
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an example of her ability to knowingly experience this emotion (extract 2b). This, 
though, was countered by the therapist through the implication that the example was 
not immediately relevant to the client's relationship with her mother. Thus, although 
the therapist invoked the idea of a general problem around the client's expression of 
anger to sustain a transferral of this problem to the client's relationship with her 
mother (extract 2a), a move undermining the existence of this general problem was 
construed an inadequate challenge to this account. This demonstrates the way in 
which the legitimacy of evidence sustaining particular accounts may be variably 
construed according to immediate functional implication. Thus participants' use of 
accounts and descriptions and how the meaning of these are taken up during 
conversation can usefully be considered moves in the promotion of the legitimacy of 
particular versions of reality over others. Tracing such negotiations in detail then 
contributes to understanding how certain versions, in this instance the therapist's, 
become established as 'correct'. 
Another feature of the interaction demonstrated in this study is the way in 
which linguistic resources available in contemporary culture were drawn upon by 
participants in establishing arguments and counter-arguments for particular versions 
of the client's world and experience. For example, the client's appeal to personal 
knowing with respect to her own emotional experience was countered by the 
therapist's through implicating the presence of unconscious processes (extract 2a) and 
the idea of anger as a fundamental human experience (extract 2c). Moreover, the 
therapist's invocation of a hydraulic, or energy model of anger in which non- 
expression may be unhealthy was countered by the client's appeal to length of time to 
account for its absence; an account which does not implicate a harmful effect of non- 
expression (extract 2c). 
If such descriptions are viewed as competing accounts of reality, rather than as 
positions which can be judged on the criterion of accuracy, a question is raised. Why 
should the therapist seek to promote a description of the client's relationship with her 
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mother implicating the emotion of anger contra the client's disconfirmation of this 
account and provision of an alternative 'sadness' account (extract 2a)? 
One feature of our everyday commonsense understanding about people is that 
individuals are reasonably consistent in their behaviour. For example, this is the basis 
of trait theories of personality. Drawing on such an understanding, it appears natural 
to assume that having obtained a problem definition around the client's difficulty 
expressing anger this issue might be found in the client's relationship with her mother. 
Discursive analysis, though, in attending the detail of accounts, shows how 
descriptions vary according to interactional context (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). 
Consistency is therefore demonstrated to be constructed through accounts making 
sense of actions in terms of personal variables. A good example of this was provided 
in the first extract in which the client's behaviour toward her husband was accounted 
for in terms of her own personal tendency rather than, as was possible, a reaction to 
the situation itself. A discursive approach therefore allows a critical inspection of the 
values underlying the promotion of one description of reality over other possible 
descriptions. This contrasts with viewing particular descriptions as 'natural' or 
'obvious'. 
The client had originally described her feelings about her relationship with her 
mother in terms of being "(n)ot angry I don't think really bit sad about it" (extract 2a, 
line 4). White (1990) suggests that "(b)oth 'anger' and 'sadness' pertain to the sorts of 
problematic events in which the transgressions of others impinge on the self' (p. 52). 
Both may therefore be plausible descriptions of the client's feelings regarding her 
possibly difficult relationship with her mother. However, accounts of anger or sadness 
in the characterisation of a relationship carry quite different connotations. Anger, with 
its accusatory connotations, implies a focus on the violation of rights and the 
legitimacy of redress. As Harre and Gillett (1994) specify; "because a display of 
anger, irritation, or annoyance expresses a judgement of the moral quality of some 
other person's action, such a display is also an act of protest, directed toward the 
offending person. " (pp. 146-7). In contrast, sadness is neutral with regard to blame so 
206 
Chapter 7 
implies an emphasis on mutuality and repair. Accordingly, negotiating an 
understanding of sadness into one of anger has the effect of transforming the moral 
context of the client's relationship with her mother. 
So, if anger as protest offers a potentially disrupting account of the client's 
relationship with her mother in a way that her original description around sadness did 
not, why might this understanding have been promoted by the therapist? Two kinds of 
reasons can be suggested. 
The first reason is rooted in clinical understandings of depression. The 
dialogue examined in this study was selected from the therapy of a client presenting 
with a major depressive episode. Contemporary understandings of this condition 
include the idea that a feature of depression may be 'anger turned inwards'. From such 
a perspective, enabling an appropriate expression of anger might be regarded a 
therapeutic way of addressing the client's depressive symptoms. This understanding 
appears similar in some respects to the therapist's suggestions that it may be 'costing' 
the client something not to express or experience anger (extract 2c). An underlying 
assumption might be that the 'hot', 'active' emotion of anger offers an antidote to the 
'empty', 'passive' condition of depression; a condition that 'sadness' may merely 
appear to echo. 
The second kind of reason that might be offered for the therapist's promotion 
of an angry account of the client's relationship with her mother draws on more 
general understandings of cultural values and related gender issues. 
As suggested in the introduction, anger is the one emotion considered 
expressed more readily by men than by women in contemporary Western culture 
(Lutz, 1988) (here it is not suggested that particular qualities belong to individual 
men and women but that people are positioned within or subjected by gender 
discourses). As such, female clients might, in particular, be encouraged to identify 
anger as a therapeutic strategy. However, as suggested above, understanding the 
client's relationship with her mother in terms of 'anger' or 'sadness' suggest different 
standards of evaluation which effect the meaning awarded this relationship. White's 
207 
Chapter 7 
(1990) anthropological research on the 'disentangling sessions' of a Solomon Island 
society offers an insight into this issue. The function of these disentangling sessions is 
to resolve conflicts within the community. The protocol of these sessions, though, call 
for the presentation of complaints in the format of 'sadness' rather than 'anger' 
accounts. In explanation White suggests that "(i)n doing so, conflict events are 
narrated so as to highlight valued interpersonal relations and community solidarity" 
(1990, p. 52). In the therapy examined here the narrative was transformed in the 
opposite direction. What values does this change invoke? 
Research suggests that, from the contemporary American-English viewpoint, 
injured rights represent a central cause of anger (Averil, 1979). More specifically, in 
the United States anger has been shown to relate to transgressions of the values of fair 
play, competitiveness, and individualism (Tarvis, 1982). Both participants studied 
here were British. However, in providing evidence that the client had reason to be 
angry the therapist can be understood to evoked the value of individualism in terms of 
frustration of the client's personal freedom (see Lutz, 1988). Specifically, the therapist 
implied the legitimacy of the client's anger through pointing to her parents' 
obstruction of her change and their control of her (extract 3). The value of 
individualism is also invoked by the therapist in his linking of therapeutic success to 
the client's increased freedom of expression (extract 5). 
The client, on the other hand, appeared to draw more on the transgression of 
the value of fair play in her own accounts implicating the appropriateness of anger; 
her husband's broken promise (extract 1), her neighbour's broken confidence (extract 
2b), her mother's selfishness (extract 4). Moreover, all these implicate the 
transgression of social obligation in producing an appropriate context for anger. The 
difference between the therapist and client's accounts is highlighted in Lutz's (1988) 
research on a Micronesian community. In the Ifaluk community, Lutz found that the 
themes surrounding the legitimate expression of anger, or righteous indignation 
(song), revolve around the transgression of social cohesion. Moreover, she found that 
"anger which is a response to personal restraint and anger which is a response to a 
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moral violation by another [song], is lexically coded by the Ifaluk" (Lutz, 1988, 
p. 178). This distinction is not found in the English language but appears particularly 
relevant to the present study. That is, although finally accepting an account of feeling 
angry toward her mother the client suggests this is due to the effect her mother's 
selfishness and negativity has on other people (extract 5). The social cohesiveness 
implied in the client's original 'sadness' account of this relationship therefore appears 
reproduced in her production of anger in terms similar to the Ifaluk concept of 'song' 
and contrasts the therapist's grounding of anger in more individualistic values. 
As already has been suggested, the therapist's account of therapeutic success 
within the therapy dialogue (extract 5) related this to the client's adoption of a more 
individualistic stance in terms of personal freedom of expression. However, although 
both participants link therapeutic success to revelation of the truth and accepting the 
legitimacy of certain difficult or disturbing feelings the client and therapist stresses 
different aspects of this processes. The therapist focused on the therapeutic effect of 
talking about difficult issues (linked to the notion of 'confession above). The client 
emphasised gaining understanding of these feelings and perceiving them to be 
warranted. In fact, for the client, understanding her 'inner resentment' as warranted is 
the resolution of the problem: "I think they're sort of reasonably justified (T: mm) um 
so I feel sort of more at ease" (extract 5, lines 18-21). 
How might the client's account of therapeutic success, her 'feeling more at 
ease' be understood? It is suggested here that in negotiating an angry account of the 
relationship, it is implied that the client may consider herself to have been wronged 
by her mother. So in linking therapeutic success to the 'reasonable justification' of this 
account the client can be understood to be stressing the therapeutic value of making 
an external attribution of blame in this particular context; an account supported by the 
therapist's suggestions that it is legitimate for the client to feel angry toward her 
mother and that she has reason to feel this way. 
In summary, then, several rhetorical strategies utilised by the therapist have 
been identified in the promotion of successful problem (re)formulation. First in 
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relation to problem identification were (1) decontexualisation of the client's account, 
and (2) characterisation of aspects of the clients emotional experience as disturbed. 
Second, in relation to documentation of the problem the therapist's strategies can be 
generalised as (1) providing evidence for the problem based on an assumption that the 
problem exists contra the client's disconfirmation, and (2) providing an account in 
which the issue does actually constitute a problem. Third, in relation to obtaining the 
client's acceptance of the problem as defined by the therapist, building on the former 
two stages (1) the client's account was characterised as bounded by obligation so that 
her real feelings were implied to be less deferential and, (2) articulation of the truth 
was presented as an important therapeutic task. Moreover, it is suggested that 
therapeutic success was linked to the production of an account in which an external 
attribution of blame is warranted. 
Many of these strategies have already been identified in the former two studies 
on one of this therapist's unsuccessful cases of psychodynamic-interpersonal 
psychotherapy (Chapters 5& 6). Issues pertaining to the successful therapeutic 
utilisation of such strategies are examined in the discussion chapter of this thesis 
where the findings from the two successful cases and one unsuccessful case of 
psychodynamic interpersonal psychotherapy studied in this thesis will be collated. 
This final empirical chapter was designed to address the limitations identified 
in the former three studies. Specifically, in order to forge a strong link between 
process and outcome this study was designed to allow a detailed analysis tracing the 
processes of change across one sub-theme of a resolved client-specified problematic 
issue. However, in doing so this last study has its own limitations. First, the 
problematic issue selected for study and for which client self-report outcome data was 
available was defined by the client as 'feeling that I have let my family down'. In 
focusing on the sub-theme of anger, the link to outcome data becomes tenuous. This, 
issue, though was addressed through studying the participants' accounts of 
therapeutic success offered within the therapy dialogue regarding the sub-theme 
studied. 
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Second, though, in focusing on anger as a sub-theme it is possible that 
conversation pertaining to this sub-theme occurred in sections not selected as 
pertaining to the wider theme 'feeling that I have let my family down'. This 
shortcoming is accepted. However, this analysis does not pretend to provide an 
exhaustive account the construction of anger in this case of therapy. Rather, the aim 
was to document some of the processes contributing to client change and so provide 
an understanding of the promotion of successful problem (re)formulation in 
psychotherapy in a way which retained the clinical significance of the material. 
Accordingly, in developing a discourse analytic approach to change process 
research addressing the question 'how does change occur in psychodynamic- 
interpersonal psychotherapy? ' two competing requirements have been in play. First, 
is the requirement for the analysis to be wide enough in scope in order to forge a link 
between process and outcome and so provide understandings of utility to 
practitioners. Second, from the discursive point of view, the analysis has also to be 
specific enough to allow detailed analysis of process from selected extracts of 
dialogue. Getting this balance right will be a continuing project. 
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Discussion 
This thesis was designed with a view to developing a discourse analytic approach to 
change process research addressing the question 'how does change occur in 
psychodynamic interpersonal psychotherapy? '. In achieving this aim three cases of 8- 
session psychodynamic-interpersonal psychotherapy were selected for detailed study 
from the Second Sheffield Psychotherapy Project (Shapiro et al., 1990). These cases 
provided the data for four empirical studies of psychotherapy dialogue; one from each 
of two good outcome cases (Chapters 4& 7) and two studies from a poor outcome 
case (Chapters 5& 6). 
Chapter 2 offered an extended rationale for approaching the psychotherapy 
process from a discursive perspective. This chapter presented a detailed deconstructive 
analysis of a traditional stage model approach as represented by the assimilation of 
problematic experiences scale (APES). In summary, it was argued that the APES drew 
on a variety of cultural assumptions to provide an account of change in psychotherapy, 
e. g., that persons are self-contained and autonomous (Sampson, 1977,1989). 
Furthermore, the APES was argued to privilege a version of change in which this is 
construed as an intrapsychic, rational, and agentic process. 
In contrast, discursive psychology was offered as a means of researching the 
unique contours of specific sequences from psychotherapy dialogue. As such, the way 
in which descriptions such as of intrapsychic process, rational procedures, agentic 
action, etc. are utilised and negotiated within client-therapist interaction become topics 
for research (see Madill & Doherty, 1994 for example in relation to personal agency, 
Appendix 4). Moreover, in explicating how socio-cultural linguistic resources are 
drawn upon to describe, enable, and understand the therapeutic process, psychotherapy 
is set within its historical and cultural context. In this way a critical distance is forged 
between the researcher and therapeutic rationales and strategies employed by the 
clinicians studied. In discursive analyses the therapist is as much the topic of research 
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as the client, and professional clinical understandings approached in just the same way 
as clients' perspectives on their problems and process (see Florsheim, 1990) 
Forms of discourse analysis have already been utilised with regard to 
psychotherapy talk (e. g., Burman, 1992; Edwards, 1995). However, the aim of the 
current thesis was to utilise a discourse analytic approach within the remit of the 
change process paradigm as it has been developed within psychotherapy research (see 
Chapter 1). To recap briefly, the change process paradigm challenges the researcher to 
work with: 
(1) a conceptualisation of outcome as a fluid and continuous process between client 
and therapist; 
(2) a conceptualisation of processes as functionally interdependent, responsively 
variant, context-dependent in meaning and therapeutic action, and having no pre- 
determined effect; 
(3) an explication of process within the context of evaluation of outcome; 
(4) an appreciation of individual differences in clients (and therapists); 
(5) and a requirement for research to be informative to practice. 
It was argued that such requirements, based on a developing understanding of 
psychotherapy research as it has been conducted since the 1920s, are ideally suited to 
the introduction of a discourse analytic approach to the field. The challenge for 
discursive psychology, however, is to incorporate evaluation of therapy outcomes into 
discursive research and to produce findings that will be informative to practitioners. 
The development of such an approach has been an integral aim of the current thesis. 
This concluding chapter now continues with a summary of the findings 
presented in this thesis. This section includes some speculation regarding the general 
insights into psychotherapy process such research affords. The discussion then takes a 
critical look at the use of discursive psychology in psychotherapy research in relation 
to its conceptualisation of personal agency, representation of 'the other', and political 
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issues such as feminism. The thesis finally concludes with a discussion of the 
limitations of the studies presented in this thesis and ways in which this research can be 
developed in the future. 
Rights and obligations. responsibility and blame: A discursive perspective on change 
processes in psychotherapy 
Full discussions of findings were provided within each empirical chapter so will only be 
summarised again here briefly. The primary aim of this section is to draw together the 
thesis as a cohesive body of work, and speculate on the general insights into 
psychotherapy process offered by this discourse analytic research. 
The pilot study presented in Chapter 4 demonstrated the viability of using 
discursive analysis to study change processes across one problem domain of selected 
sessions of a therapy. In this study the process of change was linked to the client's 
presentation of her problem via the abstraction of subject positions identified as 
saturating the client's account. Analysis suggested that by accepting the client's 
positioning as dutiful daughter, the therapist contributed to the formulation of an 
understanding in which the client's action of placing her dementing mother in care did 
not severely challenge the client's dutifulness. This was aided by the client's positioning 
of her mother as the bad mother and self as the damaged child. That is, placing her 
mother in care became understood as a contingency of the client's recovery from 
depression; a goal implicitly legitimated by the therapist during the therapy 
conversation. This study therefore demonstrates that the way in which clients present 
problems may contain loaded implications regarding their possible solution. The 
pathway to change in this particular case appeared to be the therapist's acceptance of 
the client's account of her situation and legitimation of action which might otherwise 
have been considered a potential challenge to her morality, or at least, dutifulness. 
Research on the unsuccessful case focused on the way in which the therapist 
attempted to reformulate and thus transform the client's account of her problems. In 
Chapter 5 the client was shown to present her problems in terms of her partner's 
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ineffectual reassurance, paucity of domestic contribution, career priority, and 
unreasonable criticism of her. Analysis demonstrated how the therapist attempted to 
reformulated this account implicating the client own jealousy, low self-esteem, self- 
defeating behaviour, and guilt about her ability as a mother. Chapter 6 then focused on 
how the therapist made other states of affair, particularly the therapeutic relationship 
and the client's childhood, relevant to the client's current domestic problems. An 
implication of this was that the therapist constructed a plausible account in which the 
client's difficulties 'at home' or 'running a house now' could be understood as stemming 
from her need to be looked after and predisposition to feel neglected and used. 
These two studies showed in detail how elements of the therapy protocol were 
accomplished, identifying strategies and devices which are part of everyday 
communicative competence. For example, analysis demonstrated how the therapist 
produced evidence for consistency in the client's behaviour through (1) attending some 
features of her accounts and glossing others, and (2) producing features in common 
between disparate areas of the client's life through stepwise shifts in conversational 
topic. Moreover, these studies extended understanding of the three stages of problem 
(re)formulation identified by Davis (1984,1986) through identifying some of the 
conversational strategies utilised by the therapist to produce problem (re)formulations 
and linking these to the use of hypotheses in psychodynamic-interpersonal 
psychotherapy (Shapiro & Firth, 1985). In the extracts studied, the client responded to 
the therapist's interventions with disconfirmations (Chapter 5) or topic bounding turns 
(Chapter 6). Hence, by the end of therapy it appeared that little consensus had been 
reached regarding the source and nature of the client's problems. In conclusion it was 
suggested that the therapist's strict compliance with therapy protocol contributed to 
the poor outcome of this particular problematic theme. 
The final empirical chapter focused on the process of successful problem 
(re)formulation. This study continued to explicate the rhetorical strategies utilised by 
client and therapist in presenting different accounts of the client's world and 
experience. As noted in the unsuccessful case (Chapters 5& 6) the therapist was 
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demonstrated to offer a reformulated description of the client's problem through 
decontextualising her account and implicating the presence of disturbed psychological 
processes. He then provided evidence for the problem based on an assumption that the 
issue existed and that it was, in fact, problematic. Finally, it was argued that the client's 
acceptance of the therapist's account, i. e., that she felt angry toward her mother, was 
achieved through persuading the client as to the reasonableness of this characterisation 
of her feelings contra the client's original account. 
These studies suggest that a strength of a detailed discursive analysis of 
extracts is that many of the rhetorical and conversational strategies utilised by the 
therapist, and thus some of the discursive processes whereby client change was 
promoted, can be identified. However, in viewing such processes relativistically as 
discursive strategies, interventions are also opened to critical scrutiny. Accordingly 
issues such as the way in which client's accounts of their problems may be implicitly 
discredited by therapeutic strategies can be raised and discussed (e. g., see Chapters 5; 
Watson, 1978). There is also a demonstration of the way in which clients can 
themselves subvert, or enable, the process of change, for example, through the use of 
counter argument or implicating solutions in their problems presentation. Discourse 
analysis is thereby demonstrated to be capable of retaining the complexity of 
psychotherapy data. In line with the change process paradigm, outcome can be 
approached as a fluid and continuous process between client and therapist; processes 
can be studied as functionally interdependent, responsively variant, context-depend in 
meaning and therapeutic action, and having no pre-determined effect. 
All three cases were of psychodynamic-interpersonal psychotherapy. Moreover, 
in all cases the clients were female, of comparable age and occupation, with 
problematic issues of a domestic nature. However, analysis of these cases suggests that 
different pathways to change exist. The therapist in case (A) was shown to work with 
the client's account, leading to co-evolution of new meaning based in the client's own 
description of her situation and problems. The second therapist, studied in cases (B) 
and (C), however utilised a strategy of problem (re)formulation; unsuccessfully in (B), 
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and successfully and therapeutically in (C). A particularly interesting finding, though, is 
that the therapist was specifically shown to be adhering to therapeutic protocol in the 
use of hypotheses and attending to the client's feelings throughout the extracts studied 
in the unsuccessful case. (This aspect of the therapy was not investigated in either of 
the successful cases). A general question can therefore be asked. Why should different 
pathways to change have been successful while, in another case, adhering to 
therapeutic protocol have be unsuccessful? The analyses presented in this thesis 
suggest the beginnings of an answer to this question although the small number of 
cases studied requires this be speculative. The first part of this answer relates to the 
matching, or mismatching, of 'preferred versions'; the second to the negotiation of 
blame and responsibility. 
Discursive analysis attends to the ways in which the legitimacy of different 
versions of the world are negotiated within talk. In doing so, features of accounts such 
as their facticity, naturalness, or obviousness are approached as rhetorical 
constructions. The interest therefore is not in adjudicating how well descriptions 
represent reality but explicating how accounts are constructed so as to be persuasive. 
In relation to psychotherapy interaction, the analyses presented here suggest that the 
protocol of psychodynamic-interpersonal psychotherapy had the effect of promoting a 
particular version of clients' problems. Specifically, preferred accounts appeared to be 
those in which problems were understood as belonging to the client. Accordingly, in 
case (A) the therapist worked with the client's account of her problem presented in 
terms of her guilt placing her mother in care. In case (C) the client contributed to the 
formulation of a problem around her difficulty expressing anger, although had to be 
persuaded by the therapist that this problem was an issue in her relationship with her 
mother. In the unsuccessful case (B), however, the client presented with an 
externalised problem, her partner's behaviour, and did not accept the therapist's 
attempt to reformulate and internalise this account implicating her personal 
vulnerabilities. 
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Discussion of case (B), particularly in Chapter 5, addressed the issues 
pertaining to the legitimation of externalised problem accounts in therapy. For 
example, in the attempt to recognise socio-cultural and thus nonpersonal problem 
accounts within feminist therapy, it was argued that locating a core dynamic within the 
client was a choice rather than therapeutic necessity. The findings presented in this 
thesis therefore suggest the therapeutic benefit of matching clients' preferred problem 
accounts with the preferred accounts of particular therapeutic rationales. An important 
caveat, however, must be mentioned. In pointing to the functionality of accounting 
practices, discursive psychology suggests that clients are likely to produce variable 
accounts of their problems according to local interactional context. Hence, in relation 
to individual clients, preferred versions cannot be considered completely stable or 
'fixed'. The idea of the matching of preferred versions might, therefore, more usefully 
be considered a notion promoting the flexible use of therapy protocols through 
articulating and challenging the universality of the assumptions on which rationales are 
based (see Pilgrim, 1992); i. e., that they are 'preferred versions'. 
Second, understanding the existence of different pathways to change and why 
adherence to therapeutic protocol may not have been successful can also be related to 
the negotiation of blame and responsibility. Discussion of these issues also addresses 
an outstanding question; given the above speculation on the therapeutic utility of 
matching preferred versions, how can the therapeutic success of promoting a problem 
account in contradiction to the client's disconfirmation of it be accounted for in case 
(C)? 
A theme reoccurring throughout this thesis is how participants' use of accounts 
and descriptions can usefully be considered oriented toward promotion of the 
legitimacy of particular versions of reality over alternatives. Specifically, all the 
problematic themes studied here involved issues concerning the rights and obligations 
surrounding clients' circumstances. In case (A), the client's problem, and solution to 
this problem, was suggested to be embedded in understandings of the rights and 
obligations pertaining to mother-daughter relationships, particularly in relation to the 
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duty of care. In case (B), the client presented her problems in terms of the rights and 
obligations pertaining to her relationship with her partner; the right to domestic 
contribution and sympathetic understanding. Finally, case (C) again implicated the 
rights and obligations of the mother-daughter relationship through accomplishing an 
account of the client's right to feel angry toward her mother. As such, these analyses 
demonstrate how the process of therapy can be intimately linked to the moral sphere 
(Wood, 1983). 
Although only three cases were studied, some speculation can be made 
regarding the underlying process effecting therapeutic success and failure. Issues of 
rights and obligations are intimately linked with notions of responsibility and blame. In 
both successful cases, an account was achieved implicating an external attribution of 
blame. In case (A) the client's mother was associated with the genesis of the client's 
depression, her placement in care with the client's recovery. In case (C) an account was 
accomplished in which the client was considered legitimately angry with her mother; an 
understanding carrying the connotation that the client had been wronged by her mother 
in some way. On the other hand, in the unsuccessful case, the therapist attempted to 
reformulate the client's own account of her partner's culpability. This reformulation 
entailed the introduction of an account in which the client's problems were considered 
internal to her, hence implicating the client's own responsibility for the circumstances 
causing her distress. However, in line with the general pattern, having attempted to 
identify an internal core dynamic during this unsuccessful case (Chapter 5) the therapist 
also attempted an external attribution of blame through placing the genesis of the 
client's problems in her childhood experience (Chapter 6). 
The pattern of change promoted by psychodynamic-interpersonal 
psychotherapy appears therefore to be, first, the identification of a problem internal to 
the client, and second, accomplishing an account of this problem implicating an 
external attribution of blame. Further research is required to assess the generalisability 
of this pattern and whether clients co-operating with such accounts are more likely to 
be helped by this form of therapy than those who do not. As touched on in the current 
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thesis, such research will continue to raise issues regarding whether clients should be 
expected to comply with such procedures. 
There is a body of literature investigating the link between causal attributions 
and depressive symptomatology. The cognitive reformulation of learned helplessness 
theory (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978) suggests that depressed, anxious or 
generally distressed persons (Nezu, Nezu, & Nezu, 1986) have an expectation of 
uncontrollability and tend to attribute negative experiences to stable and global 
features of themselves (Peterson & Seligman, 1984; Sweeney, Anderson, & Bailey, 
1986). 
Evidence for an association between causal attributional style and vulnerability 
to and maintenance of depression has come from cross-sectional studies. Firth-Cozens 
& Brewin (1988) offer what they suggest to be the first study investigating "changes in 
attributions for actual life-events and problems in people having psychotherapy" (p. 47). 
In this study, 40 clients, each receiving 8 sessions of both psychodynamic-interpersonal 
and cognitive-behavioural therapy, were assessed for causal attributions and severity of 
depression before and after therapy. Results suggested that, although change from 
internality to externality was slight, attributions became significantly more unstable, 
specific and controllable throughout the course of treatment and linked with remission 
of depressive symptomatology. Brewin and Shapiro (1985), however, did find that 
students making internal and stable, or internal and global attributions for task failure 
were aided by provision of an external, stable, and specific attribution. Although 
finding some significant result, Firth-Cozens and Brewin (1988) concluded "it appears 
that large individual differences exist both in initial attributions and in the ways that 
these respond to difference therapies. Case studies of the processes involved in 
reattribution are necessary to throw light on this area" (p. 53). 
The research presented in this thesis is a start in this direction. In contrast to 
the Firth-Cozens and Brewin study, though, attributions were conceptualised in terms 
of situated accounts rather than stable cognitive processes measurable in terms of the 
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Attribution Questionnaire (AQ: Peterson, Semmel, von Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky, 
& Seligman, 1982). In discursive psychology "(a)ttributions are defined both 
operationally and theoretically as things people do, not as things people perceive or 
think" (Edwards & Potter, 1993, p. 24). In this way attributions are shown often to be 
accomplished obliquely through implication and to be linked to participants' rhetorical 
management of stake and interest. A good example of this was the way in which the 
client in case (A) was argued to position herself as the damaged child through 
providing an account of childhood memory loss. Such a positioning made the 
implication available that the client's mother may have contributed to the genesis of her 
depression without the client risking her dutifulness through being explicitly critical of 
her. 
In relation to psychotherapy processes, the discursive perspective suggests that 
investigation be made of the way in which participants construct and deploy 
descriptions. For instance, as the following comment by Firth-Cozens and Brewin 
(1988) suggests, questionnaire methodology may not capture some essential elements 
of attribution making; "(t)he usual single dimension for internality-externality was split 
in two [... ] in order to investigate more fully the observation of the first author that 
clients who complete the AQ often choose opposite extremes of the dimensions when 
rating different events, sometimes even arguing with themselves as to which extreme 
should be circled" (italics added, p. 49). Variation in, and orientation to, possible 
alternative descriptions is a matter of error and unreliability in cognitive approaches. It 
is accounted for and utilised as an analyst's tool in discursive psychology as variability 
is understood to be a feature of the action orientation of talk. That is, from the 
discursive perspective attributions are the product of descriptions not their starting 
point. 
The research presented in the current thesis suggests that external attributions 
of blame were co-constructed or legitimated in discussion with the therapist. The 
research also suggests that this was achieved only after the location of a core dynamic 
within the client. One possible understanding of this pattern is that identification of a 
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problem internal to the client enables this problem to be understood as controllable 
while evolving an external attribution of blame linked to this problem releases clients 
from the implication that they are responsible for this problem. Discursive 
investigation of the processes by which descriptions and accounts are negotiated in 
therapy conversations is therefore likely to provide a reconceptualisation and 
development of attribution theory in relation to therapy for depression (e. g., see 
Buttny, 1990, Blame-account sequences in therapy: The negotiation of relational 
meanings). 
This thesis addresses the general question 'how does change occur in 
psychodynamic interpersonal psychotherapy? '. Although offering the beginnings of a 
discursive answer to this question, in line with the conceptualisation of change as 
posited by the change process paradigm, it is not to suggest that this seemingly 
straightforward question has a straightforward solution. The hope of identifying 
specific processes contributing to positive outcome is fraught with difficulties. For 
instance, such a goal must circumvent the premise that therapist utilisation of such 
identified processes will inevitably lead to more consistently successful outcome; an 
assumption critiqued by the 'drug metaphor' literature (see pages 9-10; Stiles, 1988, 
Stiles & Shapiro, 1989,1994; Strupp, 1986). Hence, rather than attempt to identify 
specific effective processes a more reasonable aim perhaps is the generation of 
clinically meaningful hypotheses about the process of change from individual cases 
(Greenberg, 1986). The discursive approach is offered as a means of providing 
heuristic understandings regarding the ways in which therapeutic meaning may be 
negotiated within therapy conversations. At the same time the therapeutic process is 
opened up to critical inspection. 
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Discourse analysis rsonal agency and psychotherapy8-1 
One aim of this thesis was to develop an approach linking discursive analysis of 
psychotherapy processes with evaluation of outcome at domain and case level. This 
section of the discussion now takes a wider perspective and explores issues concerning 
personal agency which have arisen during the course of using discourse analysis 
(Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter et al., 1993; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) to study 
change processes in psychotherapy. 
'Personal agency' refers to the way in which people are understood as relatively 
active or passive beings. Thus, personal agency is linked with notions of motivation 
(incentive and initiation of action) and intention (direction of that action). Four main 
areas are covered. First, is a discussion of theories of subjectivity with respect to 
notions of personal agency. Second, is a an evaluation of whether or not discourse 
analysis could be considered deterministic. Third, is an exploration of discourse 
analysis' relationship to dualist accounts of the person. Finally, contrary to its 
theoretical position, there is suggested to be an implicit model of the person as a 
strategic language user to be found within discursive psychology. 
Acknowledging the movement for research to be relevant to the practitioner, 
these points are discussed in relation to the potential efficacy, acceptability and 
accessibility of discourse analytic research for the practicing psychotherapist. 
Psychotherapy is an important area to explore regarding the ramifications of such an 
approach as discourse analysis challenges commonsense assumptions about 
subjectivity. Accordingly, discourse analytic research may risk rejection through 
appearing to dehumanise participants through being agnostic to individual motivation 
as a causal explanation for behaviour. This may be particularly unacceptable to the 
psychotherapist working within a humanistic professional and ethical framework. 
8.1 A version of this section is in publication: Madill, A., & Doherty, K. (1994). 'So you did what you 
wanted then': Discourse analysis, personal agency, and psychotherapy. Journal of Community and 
Applied Social Psychology, 4,261-273. 
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The empirical chapters of this thesis examining extracts from psychotherapy 
(Chapters 4 to 7) focused on how the definition of and meaning awarded clients' 
problems were constructed within the therapy conversation. This contrasts an 
alternative psychological reading in which problems are revealed as features of clients. 
Moreover, the analyses were not concerned with the client or therapist as speakers or 
producers of the text. However, this may be exactly what an audience might expect to 
be addressed. In particular, a psychotherapy audience may be disappointed in that a 
discourse analyses, such as the ones presented here, do not comment on the client as a 
person. For example, one may wish to ask why some clients co-operate with the 
identification of a core internal dynamic whereas others do not. One might also wish to 
enquire what this indicates about particular clients. Such issues are intimately linked to 
theoretical understandings of subjectivity and the role of agency and motivation in 
these models. 
(i) Subjectivity and personal agency 
There are several models of the person circulating in contemporary Western culture. 
For example, Potter, Stringer and Wetherell (1984) identify trait, role and humanistic 
models. Common dominant assumptions are that people are rational, unitary wholes 
(Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn, & Walkerdine, 1984), self-contained, autonomous, 
unique individuals (Sampson, 1977,1989), and agents who are "a dynamic center of 
awareness, emotion, judgement and action" (Geertz, 1979, p. 229). A connecting 
underlying premise of all these models and assumptions is that the self is a natural 
entity about which there is a discoverable truth. 
Such ideas regarding the 'self-as-entity' are however being challenged as models 
of the person, and our experience of ourselves, are understood as both historically and 
culturally relative and to be constructed within language (e. g., Foucault, 1981; Gergen 
& Davis, 1985; Henriques et al., 1984; Hollway, 1989; Lutz & White, 1986; Shotter 
& Gergen, 1989a; Weedon, 1987). A post-structuralist conception of subjectivity has 
therefore emerged in which there is no longer considered to be a truth about the human 
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condition. One's sense of one's own subjectivity is understood as continually in flux, 
varying according to context, and constructed from available linguistic resources. 
Accordingly, people are considered to (re)produce subject positions (see pages 85-86; 
Althusser, 1971) within historically situated linguistic practices. Potter and Wetherell 
(1987) have developed a form of discourse analysis drawing upon these traditions. 
However, in contrast to a focus on subjectivity as experience, they prefer to emphasise 
the functionality of self construction within interaction. 
Some applications of post-structuralism have been criticised for negating the 
personal agency of individuals through tying subjectivity so tightly to context. For 
example, Henriques et al., (1984) argue that theorisation at the level of a situated, 
discursive self cannot explain the observation that there appears to be some 
consistency in the way individuals account for themselves. Similarly, an explanation is 
required for the utilisation of particular subject positions within interaction when 
alternatives were, conceivably, available. These issues, regarding 'selection' of subject 
positioning, are not only raised during analysis of interaction but have a theoretical 
basis. That is, Billig (1987; Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton, & Radley, 
1988) presents a case for 'rhetorical opposition' suggesting that our stock of cultural 
knowledge offers contrary themes which people can draw upon when they deliberate 
or argue. This indicates that, in many contexts, contrary subjectivities would be 
available. It would therefore seem necessary to be able to explain why a particular 
subject position was (re)produced given the array of alternatives available in an 
interactional context. 
one commonsense way of addressing this issue is to examine the motives or 
intentions of the speaker (e. g., Abrams & Hogg, 1990). Indeed, this is one of the 
preferred solutions of mainstream academic psychology and central to our ordinary, 
everyday accounts of people. However, this model of the person is critiqued by 
discursive psychology. Appeal to the motivation or intention of individuals is argued to 
reproduce historical and cultural assumptions about subjectivity, i. e., that people are 
rational, autonomous, self-contained, etc. In fact, such appeals are suggested to be 
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both unnecessary and highly problematic. This is so as attribution of motivation is 
argued to be inseparable from the rhetorical organisation and functional context of 
interaction (Heritage, 1990/1991; Potter et al., 1993). Discursive explanations are 
therefore offered for subject positioning and the consistency with which this might 
occur. Positioning is accounted for through the social function this might serve, for 
example being able to claim precedence for one's version of reality (Gergen, 1989a). 
The subject positions available to do this are argued to be constrained by linguistic 
resources and by power relations within society (e. g., Wetherell & Potter, 1992). 
These constraining factors are invoked to explain consistency in positioning when it 
occurs and avoid the need for accounts which place motivation and intent inside the 
heads of speakers. 
(ii) Discursive psychology and determinism 
Such functional accounts of subjectivity have been criticised for being deterministic 
and therefore unable to theorise the possibility of social or individual change or 
resistance to existing forms. This criticism is likely of particular concern to potential 
audiences of discursive psychological research involved in promoting change including 
those in the helping professions. Henriques et al., (1984; Hollway, 1989) have argued 
that addressing the issue of determinism would require theorisation of individual 
agency and motivation. However, Potter et al., (1990) imply that they are released 
from the implications of determinism through focusing on the micro-analysis of actual 
interaction. They suggest that linguistic resources can be shown to be flexibly managed 
within interaction and "invoked according to their suitability to an immediate context" 
(p. 212). The issue of determinism is also countered by Edwards and Potter (1992) in a 
broader discussion regarding the possibility that discursive psychological analysis could 
be considered 'linguistic behaviourism'. It is argued that, whereas 'function' is 
understood causally in behaviourism (itself a controversial issue; Seligman, 1977) in 
discursive psychology it is understood "rhetorically and normatively" (p. 100). That is, 
rather than viewing action in terms of laws, rhetorically constructed discursive acts are 
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considered to have no predetermined relation to consequences. Arguments and 
positions may be debated without assurance of outcome. 
This defence can be understood as drawing upon ideas developed in rhetorical 
psychology which is an important source for discursive psychology (Billig, 1987: Billig 
et al., 1988). However, Billig characterises the subject as argumentative debater and 
thus an active and creative user of language and has been understood as offering an 
alternative to social determinism through emphasising people as agentic beings 
(Reicher, 1988). Hence, Billig invokes features of the contemporary Western 
understanding of subjectivity. Although drawing upon the idea that language is used 
flexibly in interaction, it appears that Potter et al., (1990) do not follow through the 
implication that this suggests an actively creative subject. In fact, although utilising 
Billig's notion of 'witcraft' (Billig, 1987), we are warned not to consider the user of 
language 'artful' or'knowing' (Potter et al., 1990, p. 212). 
Henriques et al., (1984) and Hollway (1984,1989) offer a solution to what 
they consider to be the problem of determinism. They argue that it is crucial to theorise 
an agentic and motivated subject separable from the discourses in which subjectivity is 
constructed and that such a move is required in order to explain positioning. Uptake is 
argued to be connected to personal history and 'investment', or emotional commitment, 
in particular subjectivities. For example, Hollway examines this specifically within the 
context of gender power relations and motivational dynamics. In theorising 
subjectivity, a psychoanalytic model of the person is posited, utilising linguistically 
interpreted, Lacanian theory. Such a model was chosen for a variety of reasons 
including its challenge to commonplace assumptions about people, i. e., that they are 
unitary, rational beings (alternative models of subjectivity are also offered by 
McNamee & Gergen, 1992, Parker, 1992, Sherrard, 1991, and White & Epston, 
1990). Discursive psychology can be understood as addressing both the issue of 
investment (see 'stake and interest' below) and of personal history, as Henriques et al., 
advocate. However, it does so without specifically theorising a motivated subject. 
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Personal history, in the form of the consistency and continuity of identity, is 
accounted for in discursive psychology through the invocation of "the sedimentation of 
discursive practices over time" (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, pp. 78-9). To begin with, 
attempts to account for consistency are unusual in this work in that the overwhelming 
emphasis is on the variability in accounting practices. Moreover, it is not clear how the 
sedimentation process is to be understood. 'Sedimentation of discursive process over 
time' may be interpreted as suggesting the fragmented post-structural subject; i. e., 
subjectivity as a product of positions taken in discourse. However, this has been 
argued to be deterministic in that subjectivity becomes a function of discursive context. 
There is also no account of how such discursive positionings are 'held together' in 
order for there to be continuity of identity (Henriques et al., 1984). 
Thus discursive psychology counters the charge of determinism through 
appeals to the creative use of language. However, there is a paradox in that specific 
theorisation of an agentic and motivated language user is also critiqued by this 
approach. There may also be a vulnerability to charges of determinism when attempts 
are made to account discursively for personal consistency and continuity of identity. It 
may therefore be problematic to account discursively for personal and social change. 
(iii) Discursive psychology and dualism 
Discursive psychology is offered as a radical alternative to cognitive social psychology 
through promoting a functional account of linguistic action which does not appeal to 
any form of mental entity including motivation or intention (Potter et al., 1993; Potter 
& Wetherell, 1987). However, it may be argued that discursive psychology's potential 
relationship to motivational accounts of the person sometimes appears to be open to 
interpretation. 
Confusion may be provoked when claims to anti-cognitivism appear alongside 
statements regarding the importance and interest of cognitive science (e. g., Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987, p. 157). Moreover, suggesting that an aim of social constructionism is 
"to displace attention from the self-as-entity and focus it on the methods of 
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constructing the self' (p. 102) may also imply merely advocation of a change in 
emphasis from mental states and cognitive processes to the relatively unexplored 
regions of discursive function. This reading could be substantiated by Potter and 
Wetherell's (1987) statement that "analysis and explanation can be carried out at a 
social psychological level which is coherently separable from the cognitive" (italics 
added, p. 157). Parker (1992) argues that this actually reproduces the dualist 
conception of the separation of the individual and the social which discursive 
psychology aims to critique. 
In addition, discursive psychology appears to be compatible with motivational 
accounts of the person through seemingly unproblematic reference to the motivation of 
speakers. For example, in an analysis of accounts of violence Wetherell and Potter 
(1989) state that "we have not been concerned with the motives of the speakers. Some 
may have had a strong political point to make while some may have been simply 
concerned to make sense of a potentially order-threatening problematic claim: that the 
police have been violent" (italics in original, p. 218). Here it is suggested that, although 
it is not the focus of analysis, accounts might have been motivated in different ways 
which can be speculated upon. Similarly, it is suggested that "(t)he processes of 
categorisation, and thus the psychology of categorisation, reside, not just in the mind, 
but, we would suggest, within discourse as part of a collective domain of negotiation, 
debate, argumentative and ideological struggle. The same argument extends to other 
areas of subjectivity - motives, personality, intentions" (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, 
pp. 77-8). This implies that, although the focus in on the construction of such notions 
within language, certain processes, like that of motivation or intention, may also be 
cognitive events and thus internal to individuals. 
Quotes from the literature, like the ones examined above, may provoke 
confusion about the relationship of discursive psychology to motivation accounts of 
the person. Such confusion is facilitated by a reading of discursive psychology which 
implies that a complimentary theorisation of a motivated subject is possible while 
offering theoretical arguments against this. In fact, it is likely that an audience of 
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discourse analytic research may try to make sense of the material in just this 
commonsense way. Further, it may be argued that discursive psychology, itself, implies 
a particular type of motivated subject, contrary to its explicit critique of such a model. 
This is explored below. 
(iv) The strategic language user 
Discursive psychology focuses on subjectivity in terms of how different versions of the 
self are constructed within interaction. It is claimed that "analysis is agnostic with 
respect to issues of "planning" or "real motive"" (Potter et al., 1993, p. 387). However, 
it may be suggested that there is an implicit model of the subject to be found in the 
theory which may problematise this claim. It is argued that discursive psychology can 
be understood as implying a strategically motivated language user. This model of the 
subject is suggested in two ways; first by the idea of 'function' and, second, through the 
discussion of 'stake and interest' in the Discursive Action Model. 
Function is an important concept in discursive psychology. It is central to the 
theoretical position that language is considered in terms of social action, being used to 
do things such as blame, promise, affirm, etc. (Austin, 1962). However, invoking a 
functional understanding of language could be understood as implying a subject 
motivated to carry out certain intentions (e. g. see, Davis & Harre, 1990; Searle, 
1969a). Caveats to the point that "the suggestion is not that people are simply being 
strategically manipulative or deceptive" (Potter et al., 1993, p. 387) merely highlight 
that discourse analysis could be understood in this commonsense way. Moreover, an 
implication of such a strategic subject is that analysis can appear to comment 
unfavourably on the sincerity of speakers. 
An implicit model of the motivated subject is further suggested by the 'dilemma 
of stake or interest' which is an important feature of the Discursive Action Model. It is 
suggested that construing people as having a stake or interest in certain aims is a useful 
rhetorical device to undermine their accounts as biased. Thus the invocation of stake 
and interest is understood as a rhetorical strategy but not as a motivational 
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explanation for rhetorical moves. This distinction is managed through the suggestion 
that "one of the features of interaction between people and groups is that they are 
commonly taken as entities with desires, motives, institutional allegiances, and so on. " 
(italics added, Potter et al., 1993, p. 392). Thus rather than assuming that people are 
motivated, or have an investment in certain positionings (Hollway, 1989), it is 
suggested that interaction is carried out only as if this were the case. However, it may 
also be suggested that this does not account for the mobilisation discrediting strategies. 
It is difficult to understand why one interactant might discredit another, or for that 
matter appear neutral, unless they had a motive in so doing. Invoking the argument 
that this merely reproduces a discursively understood notion of subjects still seems to 
leave the initiation of such strategies unexplained. 
It is not claimed here that analysis of interaction should be predicated on 
speculation of the intention of interactants. It is acknowledged that this can be 
"desperately problematic and downright misleading" (Heritage, 1990/1991, p. 327). 
This is so, for example, due to the ambiguity of talk. Moreover, as Gergen (1989a) 
suggests "(t)o assume an inner region of self is one thing - to presume its 
thoroughfares, the shape of its structures, the colour of its interior surrounds and so on 
is quite another. " (p. 72). However, the paradox of such a position is that by offering 
no theorisation of the speaking subject a space is left for the audience to assume one. 
By default, as hopefully demonstrated, this is likely to be a model of the individually 
motivated strategic language user. This issue has implications for both the accessibility 
and acceptability of discursive psychological research. 
The analyses presented in this thesis could be understood as implying the 
strategic language use of the interactants, for example in the suggestion that many 
descriptions were oriented toward the attribution of blame and responsibility. 
However, as discursive analyses these were couched in terms of 'function' rather than 
client or therapist 'intention' and therefore invoked a notion of subjectivity which does 
not put motivation in the heads of speakers. A reflexive understanding these analytic 
texts might suggest that this is a rhetorical strategy on the part of the author. A 
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consequence of a discursive psychological approach though is that an appeal to 
researchers' motivation in producing findings would be relativised as an account which 
must then be understood functionally and rhetorically. This therefore undermines the 
necessity of accounting for research findings in terms of researchers' subjectivity. 
(v) Conclusions 
Discourse analysis focuses on the functional use of methods of self construction within 
interaction and not on the interactants as producers of the text. However, it was 
suggested in this section that such an approach may raise problems in four areas 
relating to personal agency. First, it was argued that discursive psychology draws on 
the model of the artful language user of rhetorical psychology to counter charges of 
determinism, yet refuses explicitly to theorise such a subject. Second, it was suggested 
that discursive psychology attempts to account discursively for individual consistency 
and continuity of identity but in doing so remains open to charges of determinism. 
Third, although claiming to critique commonsense notions of subjectivity, implicit 
dualist assumptions facilitate a reading that discursive psychology is compatible with a 
motivational model of the person. And finally, it was suggested that discursive 
psychology, itself, implies a particular model of the strategically motivated language 
user while claiming motivational agnosticism. These issues may confuse and concern 
audiences of discursive psychological research. 
Discursive psychology presents a theory which critiques our commonsense 
notions of subjectivity and personal agency. Questioning what we usually take for 
granted, this research challenges basic cultural assumptions and, as such, may appear 
inaccessible. However, in defence of discourse analysis, Parker (1992) suggests that 
this may be compounded by the difficulty encountered when communicating alternative 
models of subjectivity in a language which is structured by dualist conceptions. 
However, in relation to the psychotherapy practitioner in particular, discursive 
psychology may be problematical as analysis appears to ironicise accounts which, one 
wishes to assume, were offered in a context encouraging openness and trust. Within 
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such a context, the implication that people are primarily strategic, with its connotations 
of insincerity and manipulation, may be considered particularly unacceptable to those 
in the helping professions who are likely to work within a humanistic framework. 
Discourse analysis may also be perceived as disempowering of the individual 
through negating appeals to personal knowing through emphasising the construction of 
subjectivity in and through language. However, as post-structuralist ideas begin to 
enter the psychotherapeutic world (e. g., McNamee & Gergen, 1992) there are also 
more positive claims that such approaches may actually liberate the individual through 
locating 'problems' in culturally and historically constituted discourses (White & 
Epston, 1990). Such an understanding though must be tempered with an 
acknowledgement that, although defining something as problematic may be a linguistic 
achievement, the circumstances surrounding the problem so defined may often be 
material, e. g., violence, poverty, disability. 
Discourse analysis has been offered as an alternative to more traditionally 
psychological approaches in which problems are revealed as features of clients. It does 
so partly through bringing a socio-historical dimension. to the analysis of 
psychotherapy process. The paradox is though that if problem solution were to be 
understood without some acknowledgement of material culture and totally in terms of 
problem dissipation within language (Goolishian & Anderson, 1987) the wider 
sociological context of problems and the critical edge of the analysis may be lost. The 
responsibly for change, in terms of adjusting personal understanding, may be placed on 
the individual client in just the same way as if social and historical context had been 
ignored as in the traditional psychological account (Madill, in preparation). 
To conclude this section it is suggested that there are areas regarding the 
relationship of discursive psychology to motivational accounts of the person which 
require clarification. However, given the issues examined here, discourse analysis is 
considered as having much to offer psychotherapy research. For example, discourse 
analysis has a huge potential to explicate how the psychotherapeutic dialogue is an 
intimate part of both problem formulation and resolution and to provide an 
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understanding of how this is achieved. Thus, if open to the alternative account of 
subjectivity which is suggested by discursive psychology, an audience of this research 
may find that it offers viable insights into human interaction. 
Representing the other in discursive psychotherapy research 
The above section addressed some problematic issues in relation to personal agency 
made pertinent by the utilisation of discursive psychology in psychotherapy research. 
This following section examines issues surrounding 'representing the other' also raised 
within this context. All the material for the research presented in this thesis was drawn 
from the therapies of female clients presenting with a major depressive episode. In case 
(B) (Chapters 5& 6) the client introduced some of her problems in terms of her 
situation as mother and wife, the therapist suggesting that some of these issues seemed 
"straight feminist stuff'. So, exploring issues of representation, I shall make a reflexive 
move and consider whether the research presented here, too, could be considered 
feminist. 
But first, what is meant by 'representing the other'? Lee (1994) suggests two 
pertinent meanings of the verb 'to represent': to speak for and to speak about. 
However, the possible nature of the correspondence between the object represented 
and the meaning it is awarded is not straightforward and depends on one's 
epistemological stance. Realist positions, supposing a knowable reality independent of 
experience, maintain the possibility of representing the world in a, more or less, direct 
way. Issues surrounding representing the other, therefore, hinge on how accurately 
research presents those studied. On the other hand, relativist positions consider 
representations to be versions of the world; constitutive of reality, culturally bounded 
and contextually variable. Thus, there is considered to be no objective truth one can 
attempt to reflect, only plausible and useful accounts that may be offered. In assuming 
an a priori position on the nature of gender power relations and on women's experience 
as a viable object of research, feminist approaches can be understood to draw on realist 
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epistemology. Feminist research, therefore, may be problematic from within a relativist 
paradigm. 
Issues relating to representation of the other may be couched in terms of group 
membership. For example, it may be asked 'how are we to represent members of 
groups to which we do not ourselves belong? ' and, related to this 'do the problems 
become particularly acute when members of a 'majority' group attempt to represent 
members of a 'minority' group? '. From a relativist position, such issues are 
problematic. Group membership is not regarded an either/or matter but as a discursive 
achievement (Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 1990). Even if membership is considered 
physically bounded (e. g., 'women') discursive approaches demonstrate how the nature 
of the group as consisting of people of a particular kind is linguistically managed 
(Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Moreover, regarding human understanding as constructed 
in and through socio-cultural discourses, experience and identity are nolonger regarded 
the property of individuals. In representing the other, one is understood to draw on a 
reservoir of impersonal, linguistic resources; functional, local and revisable, just as the 
other does in producing a representation of her/himself. So, from a relativist, discursive 
position the notion that group membership has the potential to problematise 
representation is challenged in two ways. First, the possibility of providing a true or 
false representation of the group disappears as in its place are found only ever 
changing fragments of borrowed discourses. Second, personal experience and identity 
(possibly as a member of a group) are considered functionally constructed from 
impersonal, socio-cultural discourses and awarded no privileged status (see Potter, 
1988). 
Let me ground this theory in my own research. Material for my research was 
drawn from the therapies of three women presenting with depression. As such, there 
may be considered a potential to represent such women with regard to their treatment 
in psychotherapy. However, in doing so would I be representing a group of which I 
was a member? Like them, I am female, white, middle-class and in professional 
employment. However, unlike them I do not have children, am not in my forties, have 
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not been in individual therapy nor had a clinical diagnosis of depression. But what 
characteristics should I take into account when considering if I am, in fact, studying a 
group, far-a-less one to which I have membership? Moreover, even if I defined my 
study group in terms of 'women treated psychotherapeutically for depression' I could 
still argue this need not exclude me from membership. I could negotiate the boundaries 
of this definition and present a claim to membership in terms of having had experience 
as client in therapeutic groups and of being depressed in my own life. However, in 
discursive psychology the researcher's account of her or his own subjectivity would not 
be considered immune from analytic procedures. Such descriptions could be 
deconstructed as accounts functioning to imply the prima facie legitimacy of the 
research (Madill & Doherty, 1994). My research, though, would be understood as 
informed by cultural understandings of psychotherapy and depression as is the 
subjectivity and experience of the women I have studied. This is so, whether or not I 
might plausibly claim membership of the same 'group'. 
Positioning subjectivity and experience in discourse has drawbacks but also 
important benefits. A disturbing drawback is that regarding subjectivity as socially 
constructed undermines claims to personal knowing and so potentially disempowers 
those we study. However, viewing subjectivity in an individualistic way is also 
potentially disempowering. That is, it makes the implication available that differentially 
valued distinctions between people is of a natural kind. An important benefit of a social 
constructionist perspective, therefore, is that in viewing such distinctions as 
linguistically managed it becomes possible to challenge their naturalness and thus the 
legitimacy of the practices they sustain. 
Even if accepting that representations are forged from impersonal, cultural 
resources, is it not possible to consider there to be some, perhaps critical, differences 
between representation of oneself and representation of others? Individuals might be 
regarded to have differential access to ways of understanding themselves and the 
world. Furthermore, the circumstances of people's lives might be considered to provide 
differential expertise in the mobilisation of cultural meanings. Such issues are implicitly 
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addressed in discursive psychology. In analysing text one does not attempt to recover 
true meaning. Instead, the aim is to explicate how participants' concerns are managed 
by them during interaction (e. g., Edwards & Potter, 1992). In this way, my research 
has examined how participants have, themselves, represented the other. Thus, one 
study included an exploration of how a client characterised her mother during therapy 
and demonstrated how this description functioned in providing an account of the 
client's depression (Chapter 4). Another examined sequences in which a therapist's 
representation of a client, in terms of offering an account of her problems, was subject 
to disconfirmation by her (Chapter 5). 
Therefore, in its relativist stance, discursive psychology does not purport to 
represent the other in terms of 'speaking for` or attempting to present a veridical 
account of the subjectivity or experience of those studied. Rather, a discursive analysis 
seeks to explicate the rhetorical detail and functional implications of the variable 
descriptions offered by participants. However, in doing so, discourse analysis "is 
fundamentally an interpretative exercise which offers up readings of texts for scrutiny" 
(Potter, 1988, p. 51). And it is when one orients to the interpretative elements of 
discursive analysis that issues surrounding representing the other, in terms of 'speaking 
about' participants' interaction, emerge. 
If there is interpretative leeway in discourse analysis how might this effect the 
researcher's representation of interaction? It is my own observation, and that of some 
of my colleagues, that in psychotherapy research 'lay' researchers appear to be 
particularly sympathetic toward clients' accounts (Field, 1995; Harper 1995, personal 
communications). Harper suggests, though, that she has developed an appreciation of 
the therapist's standpoint, possibly through becoming more familiar with the therapy 
protocol, listening to therapists reflect on their interventions and through her own 
experience of being a client. Moreover, as a therapist involved in psychotherapy 
research, Stiles (personal communication, 1995) suggests that his client-centered 
orientation allows him to engage readily with the client's perspective in his work. 
Exploration of researcher reflexivity does appear to offer some interesting insights into 
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the process of representation in psychotherapy research. However, it is not compatible 
with a relativist, discursive position. As suggested above, to maintain epistemological 
coherence such descriptions must, themselves, be considered occasioned descriptions. 
Furthermore, accounts of researcher subjectivity may also assume the researcher 
occupies a stable position with regard to the work and can make the implication 
available that if researchers could be rid of their biases an objective account might be 
attained. 
But perhaps it is unhelpful to "write off experience as just another social 
construction" (Parker, 1994, p. 240). And, if discourse analysis is acknowledged to be 
interpretative, surely it is legitimate to enquire in what the researcher's representation 
of the other is grounded? Discursive psychology focuses on how participants' concerns 
are managed by them during interaction. This may be understood as, or indeed have 
the effect of, claiming analysis merely emerges from the text. Such implied empiricism, 
though, would compromise discursive psychology's social constructionist stance and 
suggest the possibility of objectivity incompatible with its relativist epistemology 
(Doherty, 1994). Potter (1988) has challenged this view. He suggests that in making 
the process of interpretation as explicit as possible during analysis discursive 
psychology allows an audience to contest the presented representation and assess its 
value. 
This, though, still side-steps the issue of in what discursive analysis is 
grounded? In this regard, relativist and critical realist positions have been contrasted. 
Advocating a critical realist position, Parker (e. g., 1992) argues that discursive 
analysis, sensitive to the power of discourse, must be grounded in the assumption that 
there is a real outside the text. However, this too is where a relativist discursive 
analysis may be understood to be rooted. That is, even in taking a relativist stance one 
must utilise cultural knowledge in producing an analysis of text (e. g., Wetherell & 
Potter, 1992). Critical realism requires the privileging of a version of reality before 
research begins. Relativism, on the other hand, accepts some things as provisionally 
real in conducting analysis but maintains the possibility of deconstructing their own 
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analytic assumptions and research findings (Edwards, Ashmore & Potter, 1995). So, in 
principle the two positions can be differentiated. However, is it possible to sustain the 
difference in practice? That is, unless one is explicitly deconstructing one's own 
assumptions during analysis a relativist stance, itself, can be understood as a claim 
functioning to obscure the perspective of the researcher. In a relativist framework, 
though, the researcher is regarded in the same way as the text studied. Fragmented, she 
or he is not assumed to occupy a stable positioned with regard to the work. 
So, how have I addressed issues surrounding representing the other in my 
discursive psychotherapy research? Taking a relativist stance, I do not purport to 
represent in terms of 'speaking for' those I study. This is so as there is considered to be 
no stable position from which the other speaks; no truth to be veridically represented. 
But in producing an analysis, I represent in terms of 'speaking about' the other. I 
produce an interpretative account of the interaction between client and therapist which 
is always open to challenge and subject to the validity criteria of coherence, plausibility 
and usefulness. 
A relativistic stance is often criticised for being apolitical and unable to offer a 
site for resistance. However, in this regard, my work has had some interesting 
implications. Therapists' comments in response to analysis of their cases were not 
awarded privileged status. In fact, it is my experience that discursive analysis often 
offers a perspective on the therapy differing from that of the therapist. This, perhaps, 
stems from the basic difference in viewing language as representational or constructive. 
However, rather than consider such differing representations problematic, discursive 
analysis has the potential to be utilised in a creative way. That is, in providing a novel 
perspective on therapy process its use as a supervisory tool is currently being explored. 
Moreover, although explicitly feminist research may be incompatible with a relativist 
position this does not mean that my research may not have feminist implications. For 
example, one study demonstrated how a therapist's interventions had the effect of 
transforming the client's presentation of problems located in her domestic 
circumstances to problems considered internal to her (Chapter 5). Thus it was 
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demonstrated how problems may be positioned within clients at the same time 
excluding socio-cultural accounts. This indicates how research from a relativist stance 
can also be the basis of "straight feminist stuff'. 
Validity and evaluation criteria pertaining to discourse analytic research were 
specified in Chapter 3 (pages 82-83). In this final section, the analyses presented in this 
thesis will now be discussed in relation to these criteria. To recap, Potter and Wetherell 
(1987) suggest that discourse analytic research may be evaluated in terms of (1) 
coherence of interpretation, (2) increased understanding of the subject matter, and (3) 
the raising of issues which would not have been found in other ways. Potter (in press) 
offers four more quality criteria applicable to differing kinds of discourse analytic 
studies: (4) deviant case analysis, (5) participants' understandings, (6) ability to inform 
subsequent research, and (7) audience evaluation. 
It appears that many of these criteria are linked to audience evaluation so that 
the author can only present justifications for claiming that validity has been fulfilled. 
That is, first, in relation to coherence of interpretation, it is suggested that each 
analysis at least presents a plausible account of the extracts studied. Over and above 
this it is also suggested that the accounts offered made sense of most features of the 
interaction. For example, in case (A) (Chapter 4) the client's more explicitly critical 
description of her mother in the final sessions of therapy was accounted for in terms of 
the client having established her dutifulness during session five. Second, the section 
linking these discursive analyses to the literature on depression and attribution (pages 
213-222) offers an extended account of the ways in which these studies, and studies 
like them, may increase understanding of this area. Third, it is also argued that in 
reconceptualising attributions as things people do, rather than things people have, the 
discursive approach can raise issues that the traditional psychological account does 
not. For example, discursive analysis can raise issues in relation to the ways in which 
therapists co-construct attributions in therapy. Fourth, a form of deviant case analysis 
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was introduced by way of contrasting cases (B) and (C); unsuccessful and successful 
problem (re)formulation. Incorporating these analyses with that of case (A) pointed to 
a pattern in the data in terms of a preferred version of clients' problems which appeared 
to be promoted by psychodynamic-interpersonal psychotherapy (pages 216-222). What 
seemed a deviant case can therefore be understood as an extension of an underlying 
pattern. 
The fifth evaluation criterion refers to participants' understandings. It may be 
that this criterion of validity was not maintained in all aspects of the research presented 
here. Often the length of extracts presented did not allow for an extended exploration 
of participants understandings. For example, the labelling of a client response as a 
'disconfirmation' was sometimes argued for during analysis rather than identified in 
terms of subsequent participants' interaction (e. g., Chapter 5). At other times, analysis 
was more grounded in participants understandings (e. g., Chapter 7). Finally, the four 
analyses presented here can be regarded a coherent body of work, each study 
informing the approach to the next, with the first study on case (B) (Chapter 5) 
informing and compatible with the second study on this case (Chapter 6). However, to 
what extent the analyses presented in this thesis can inform future research has yet to 
be established. 
It is the nature of research that it have flaws and limitations. The research 
presented in this thesis is, of course, no exception. In this discussion chapter the notion 
of agency in discursive psychology in relation to potential problems concerning the 
acceptability of this approach to the psychotherapy community has been critiqued. 
Issues concerning some of the political implications and limitations of discursive 
psychology have also be discussed. Moreover, the limitations of each analyses were 
discussed in relation to adapting the approach to each succeeding study. This final 
chapter continues with an evaluation of the limitations of the research presented in this 
thesis and, linked to this, possible future directions the research could take. 
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Discourse analysis is skill that requires much effort and practice to acquire. 
Attaining to a sophisticated application of discursive psychological principles therefore 
places great responsibility on the creativity and ability of the individual researcher. 
Alternative approaches also require high levels of skill but, for example, statistical 
methodology is taught to most psychology undergraduates and guidance is more 
widely available throughout the psychological community. A confounding issue is that 
many forms of discourse analysis do not concretise research methodology, preferring 
to maintain the research strategy as 'an approach'. In this way discourse analysis 
contrasts with many other qualitative approaches, for example grounded theory 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967), which offer more detailed guidance on research procedures. 
With the current emphasis on methodological pluralism, the psychotherapy research 
community may be open to discursive approaches, however, given the often obscure 
nature of procedures are perhaps unlikely to incorporate them as mainstream research 
tools. 
With regard to the specific studies presented here, an aim of this thesis was to 
utilise discourse analysis within the remit of the change process paradigm in 
psychotherapy research. The major challenge was to link discursive analysis of process 
with evaluation of outcome at the case and domain level. This has entailed two 
competing requirements: (1) that analysis be wide enough in scope to forge a link 
between process and outcome, and (2) be specific enough to allow a detailed analysis 
of process from selected extracts of dialogue. The studies presented in this thesis 
represent a developing approach to fulfilling these requirements, however, requires 
future research to refine the methodology. 
Chapter 4 offered an understanding of client change within one problem 
domain across four session of therapy. The broad scope of this study, however, had the 
drawback of making the audience too reliant on the researcher's selection of extracts. 
Chapters 5 and 6 therefore focused on explicating the process of problem 
(re)formulation as it occurred in specific sequences of dialogue. This, however, had the 
drawback of stretching the link between process and evaluation of outcome even at 
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domain level. Chapter 7 then returned to the broad and thematic analysis as taken in 
the initial case, but narrowed the focus to a sub-theme. This study maintained the link 
between process and outcome, and traced how changes in the client's understanding of 
a problem was promoted in therapy in a way that the clinical significance of the 
material was retained. However, the drawback to this particular study, again, was that 
the sequences presented in the study were pre-selected by the researcher from a much 
larger reservoir of data. 
In relation to these shortcomings, one direction for future research is to use 
discursive analysis more fully within the events paradigm as developed within change 
process research (page 11; Rice & Greenberg, 1984). The events paradigm offers a 
way of linking micro-analyses of process with similarly micro-level evaluations of 
outcome. For example, significant change events can be identified by client evaluation 
of the most helpful aspect or event in a particular session of therapy. Micro-analysis of 
this event is then conducted in order to explicate the processes of change involved. 
Analyses of other brief episodes carrying a common marker can then used to build up 
micro-theories of change. Stiles, Collier, Albert, & Sloane (1992) report an adaptation 
of the events paradigm through "examining selected problems as they are reworked 
over many sessions [... ] offer(ing) a small-scale conceptualisation of psychotherapy 
outcome, focused in a limited topic rather than the whole person" (p. 2). A similar 
approach was taken in this thesis. However, a future project will be to use client 
identification of helpful aspects of therapy to identify specific sequences for study to 
forge a link between micro-analysis of process and evaluation of outcome at an 'events' 
level. 
A further direction is to create a stronger link between micro-analysis of 
process and practitioner concerns. One way of achieving this is to work more closely 
with case therapists in the selection of material for analysis. In this thesis material was 
selected for analysis by the author through an acquaintance with the full context of 
each case and preliminary analysis of all the sequences pertaining to the problematic 
theme chosen for study. Having the case therapist select the research question and/or 
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specific extracts for analysis circumvents many of the problems of extract selection 
alluded to in the present research. Moreover, such a procedure would more directly 
address the issue of making research relevant to practice. 
A precursors to working more closely with case therapists would be to explore 
the value to practitioners of the research presented in this thesis. A project has 
therefore been initiated to produce an evaluation of the potential of discursive analysis 
for practitioners by way of a reflection on these studies by the case therapists. This 
project should identify both shortcomings and strengths of the discursive approach and 
identify ways forward in providing research with the potential to impact practice. An 
aspect of this project will be to evaluate the potential heuristic value of discourse 
analytic research as a parallel process to supervision with the aim of inclusion in 
clinical training programmes. Moreover, in its potential to articulate assumptions 
underlying the rationale of therapy protocols it could be that discourse analysis could 
offer a new perspective in the writing of therapy manuals. This links with the 
identification of the preferred problem accounts and solutions of various kind of 
therapeutic intervention. 
In conclusion, although the development of a discourse analytic approach to 
change processes requires further refinement, the present thesis has demonstrated the 
utility of discursive psychology to psychotherapy research. In doing so, the thesis had 
achieved the aims of (1) developing, and raising suggestions for the continual 
development of a discourse analytic approach to psychotherapy research, and (2) 
providing the beginnings of a discursive answer to the question 'how does change 
occur in psychodynamic-interpersonal psychotherapy? '. The continuing research 
programme promises to be an exciting one. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Theme selection instructions for case (A) 
"The task is to select excerpts of the dialogue between the client and the therapist 
where the conversation is based upon the client's developing ideas about "mother". 
For the purpose of this task we are treating "mother" not only as a description 
of a specific person in the client's life but as a schema. 
We want to look at the development of this client's schema by comparing her 
references to "mother" in an initial session of exploratory therapy to those of a later 
session. Your task is to select these references. 
The tape of the session that you are about to code will be provided. Listen 
through the tape and at each reference (either the client's or therapist's) to "mother" 
note down the tape counter number on the sheet provided. You may stop the tape as 
often as you like to re-check excerpts if you are not sure of your inclusion/rejection of 
them. " (A pr¬cis of Field, 1991). 
Appendix 2 
Theme selection instructions for case (B) 
"The purpose of listening to sessions 1,5,7, &8 (listener 1) and 2,3,4, &6 (listener 
2) of case (B) is to identify sections in which a particular content theme is being 
discussed. This theme is defined by the client thus: 'difficulty shouldering all the 
responsibility at home'. 
In identifying this theme listen for passages in which the client's home situation 
is spoken of in such a way that suggests the client feels a lot is expected of her. This 
includes feelings of being taken advantage of, not getting enough help, or just that she 
is expected to cope with a lot. Please also include ramifications of not having enough 
support at home, for example not having enough time to do other things. The client's 
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'home' here is defined as both the current situation with her partner and children and 
her childhood family experience with her parents. 
Please be inclusive when deciding whether a particular section belongs to this 
theme. I would also like you to include the full discussion of the issue once you decide 
this theme has been raised in the therapy. This may mean identifying passages of 100 
counter revolutions or more. Other passages will be much shorter. " 
Appendix 3 
Theme selection instructions for case (C) 
"The purpose of listening to session of case (C) is to identify sections in which a 
particular content theme is being discussed. This theme is defined by the client thus: 
'feeling that I have let my family down'. 
In identifying this theme listen for passages in which the client's family is 
spoken of in such a way that suggests the client feels a sense of duty toward them. This 
includes feelings of obligation, guilt, conscience, etc. It also includes discussions about 
expectations and standards that the family may demand of the client or their 
disapproval of her. The 'family' here is defined as the client's parents, spouse and 
children. 
Please be inclusive when deciding whether a particular section belongs to this 
theme. I would also like you to include the full discussion of the issue once you decide 
this theme has been raised in the therapy. This may mean identifying passages of 100 
counter revolutions or more. Other passages will be much shorter. " 
275 
Appendix 4 
Publications, conference papers, and talks arising 
(1) Publications 
MADILL, A., & Doherty, K. (1994). "So you did what you wanted then": Discourse 
analysis, personal agency, and psychotherapy. Journal of Community and 
Applied Social Psychology, 4,261-273. 
MADILL, A. (1995). Discourse analysis: Society for psychotherapy research 
workshop notes (Social and Applied Psychology Unit Memo 1514). Sheffield, 
UK: University of Sheffield, Medical Research Council/Economic and Social 
Research Council, Social and Applied Psychology Unit. 
MADILL, A. (in submission). "Some of this seems to me straight feminist stuff": 
Representing the other in discursive psychotherapy research. 
MADILL, A. (invited paper in preparation). Discursive psychology and counselling 
research: Problem (re)formulation, politics, and reality. For symposium 'Doing 
qualitative research in counselling: Issues and challenges'. British Journal of 
Guidance and Counselling, Autumn 1996. 
MADILL, A., & Barkham. M. (invited resubmission). Subject position and discursive 
processes of change in one successful case of psychodynamic-interpersonal 
psychotherapy. 
MADILL, A., Widdicombe, S., Barkham. M., & Shapiro, D. A. (in preparation a). 
Problem (re)formulation in psychodynamic-interpersonal psychotherapy: 
Discursive analysis of client disconfirmations. 
MADILL, A., Widdicombe, S., Barkham. M., & Shapiro, D. A. (in preparation b). 
Discursive analysis of therapist initiated topic shifts: Problem (re)formulation, 
sequencing, and the construction of relevancy. 
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MADILL, A., Barkham, M., & Shapiro, D. A. (in preparation). Construction of anger 
in one successful psychodynamic-interpersonal psychotherapy: Problem 
(re)formulation and the negotiation of moral context. 
MADILL, A., et at. (in preparation). Deconstructing assimilation: Are change process 
in psychotherapy cognitive, psychodynamic, or discursive? 
(2) Conference papers 
MADILL, A., Barkham, M., & Shapiro, D. A. (1994a, July). A discourse analytic 
approach to change process in psychotherapy. In D. A. Shapiro (Moderator), 
Qualitative =roaches in vsvchotheranv process research. Annual meeting of 
the International Society for Psychotherapy Research, York, UK. 
MADILL, A., Barkham, M., & Shapiro, D. A. (1994b, July). Discourse analysis and 
psychotherapy: presentation and construction. The Psychology Postgraduate 
Affairs Group, Postgraduate Conference, Sheffield. 
MADILL, A. (1994, Aug. ). Problem_ (re)formulation in psychotherapy. Sheffield 
University, Department of Psychology Postgraduate Conference. 
MADILL, A. (1995, March). Ani upset? Construction of emotion in 
psychotherap . Sheffield University, 
Department of Psychology Postgraduate 
Conference. 
MADILL, A. (1995, June). Discourse analysis: Understanding psychotherapy as text 
and social practice. In A. Bachelor (Moderator), C. Hill (Discussant), 
Oualitat. Ye methodology in psychotherapy research: Basic features of four 
WV oachh . Annual meeting of the 
International Society for Psychotherapy 
Research, Vancouver, Canada. 
MADILL, A., Barkham, M., & Shapiro, D. A. (1995, June). Construction of anger in 
a successful psychodynamic-interpersonal psychotherapy: Negotiation of moral 
context and justification. In W. B. Stiles (Moderator), B, ccomniishing keß 
in ongý, ypq ývchocý+erap, ý°' rn, alitarivn ýýdieý from the Cewnd Sheffield 
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Psychothgr pv Project. Annual meeting of the International Society for 
Psychotherapy Research, Vancouver, Canada. 
(3) Talks 
June, 1993 Discussion of selected extracts from case (B) at the Discourse and 
Rhetoric Group of Loughborough University. 
Oct., 1993 Discussion of extracts from case (A) at the Discourse Group of 
Sheffield University. 
Nov., 1993 Postgraduate seminar on case (A) at the Department of Psychology, 
Swansea University. 
Feb., 1994 Discussion of selected extracts from case (C) at the Qualitative 
Methods Group of Sheffield University. 
May, 1994 Presentation of an extract from case (B) as part of Clinic Team seminar 
at the MRGESRC Social and Applied Psychology Unit, Sheffield University. 
May, 1994 Seminar on case (B) and issues related to discourse analysis at the 
Discourse Group of the Manchester Metropolitan University. 
June, 1994 Discussion of 'Discourse analysis and personal agency' at the Discourse 
Group of Sheffield University. 
Nov., 1994 Seminar on 'A discourse analytic approach to change processes in 
psychotherapy' to Sheffield University Clinical Psychology course as part of 
Contemporary Issues teaching. 
Nov., 1994 Discussion of 'Discourse analysis and personal agency' at the Discourse 
and Rhetoric Group of Loughborough University. 
March, 1995 Workshop with Colleen Heenan on 'The use of discourse analysis as a 
clinical supervision tool' at the Society for Psychotherapy Research (UK) 
conference. 
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